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Editors’ Note

I

n the last twelve months, “clean technology” hit prime time
in the political arena. Nearly every campaign, every meeting of international leaders, and every town hall has lauded
clean and green technology as the solution to the job crisis, the
credit crisis, the climate crisis, and every other conceivable
modern ill. Through cleaner, greener technologies we can make
our air clearer, our planet cooler, and our lives more prosperous.
Like any vague promise, these discussions of clean technology
have not only fostered hope and brought out the skeptics and
cynics, but are also beginning to fuel real debate as to the future
of this emerging sector.
In this issue our staff set out to explore the current discourse
in the clean technology field, beyond political rhetoric and campaign policy speeches. What we learned is both distressing and
heartening. It seems that the world has barely taken a step down
the path to cleaner technological solutions, and we have a great
distance to travel before the panacea of clean technology can
generate the types of benefits we seek. However, as this issue
details, the debate is moving forward and countries around the
world—from the United States to India—are testing innovative
approaches on how to further global cleantech development and
trade.
Our contributors from all over the planet examine the distance that we have traveled through proposed and promulgated
policies, legislation, and regulations. And more importantly,
they examine the road ahead and the major obstacles that we
will need to break down, bypass, and overcome. An added feature of this issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy is
an introduction that strives to incorporate a perspective often
overlooked in cleantech debates: the human perspective. The
editors and staff of SDLP feel that throughout both high-level
policy discussions and local implementation, we must remember
the founding tenets of sustainable development by continuing
to make the linkages between its environmental, economic, and
social dimensions. In the context of cleantech and global warming, this most certainly includes a discussion of human rights.
From there, articles cover the international trade and intellectual
property regimes that keep clean technology from being freely
disseminated. They scrutinize the current and speculate on the
future positions of major international players, like China, India,
the United States, the World Bank, and the WTO. And they consider how we’re going to pay for it all.
We hope you enjoy this compilation of articles, which we
feel provides an excellent overview of a few of the most pressing issues in the clean technology debate. As this debate intensifies in the coming months, we hope this issue of SDLP will help
push the discourse beyond rhetoric and towards action.
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Perspective: Technology Transfer
and Human Rights: Joining Up the Dots
by Stephen Humphreys*
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and
its applications.”—International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Art. 15(1)(b)

T

he transfer of technology is one of the core mechanisms
at the heart of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) and a key vehicle for channeling
the “equity” demands in that treaty. The UNFCCC recognizes (i)
that in order to adapt to climate change and continue to develop
sustainably, poor countries will need technological assistance,
and (ii) that there is an obligation on richer countries—as their
contribution to the cause of climate change is greater and they
also have greater technological capacity—to provide that assistance. The treaty further makes developing country participation
in the climate regime dependent upon “effective” technology
transfer from industrial countries. Yet so far, for a variety of reasons, structured technology transfer has not taken place. Despite
its centrality, and despite enormous attention in UN negotiating
rooms over the years, the subject is infected by obscurity and
jargon, it has received little public airing and often seems marginalized or disconnected from other, better known areas of the
climate debate. There is no inherent reason that this should be
the case, in particular given the central importance of technology transfers to surmounting climate change equitably. It is in
that light that many of the articles in this issue of Sustainable
Development Law & Policy focus on the global transfer of clean
technologies and the mechanisms that strive to enable that trade.
However, there is yet another important dimension of both technology transfer and the climate debate: the human perspective.

The Human Rights Dimensions of
Technology Transfer
Since the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007, it has been
clear that technology transfer will remain critical to any global
deal on climate change, and so there is no room for continuing
political deadlock. The resulting impetus has engendered new
angles on climate-related technologies, among them increased
attention to the human dimensions—sometimes articulated as
the human rights implications—of this and other areas of climate change activity. More than most topics in the climate
change arena, actions and decisions on technology transfer will
have significant and specific human rights implications. These
are of two main kinds, one immediate, the second longer term.
First, technological solutions will be required to ensure
that the expected human rights consequences of climate change
impacts are avoided or minimized. In short, technological
Spring 2009

solutions are necessary for adaptation, especially where climate
change threatens basic subsistence—health, food, water, and
shelter, for example, all of which are recognized rights under
international law. Expected threats include droughts, water salination and sea-level rise; livelihoods will be at risk as crops, fisheries, livestock, and even land will deplete or vanish. In order to
head off the most dire consequences of these outcomes—forced
mass migration and conflict—solutions will need to be found and
mobilized quickly. In every case, such solutions will rely in part
on the availability of appropriate technologies to meet the new
conditions of life under a changed climate. These include water
treatment technologies for desalination and irrigation, for example, or agricultural solutions to adapt to changing or reduced crop
cycles. Protection from hotter temperatures through building
materials or techniques, from higher sea-levels through protective walls or other measures, and from increased vector diseases,
like malaria, through increased access to quality medicines and
healthcare systems to distribute cures and provide care.
However, investment in these technologies is beyond the
resources of many of the countries that will be worst hit. Finding
a means to make them available at low or no cost is therefore
critical to climate change adaptation if appalling human rights
consequences are to be avoided. Bringing a human rights analytic to bear on the expected impacts of climate change can help
direct attention to where the worst harms are foreseeable, which
in turn can orient responses towards the most useful and urgent
solutions. Since these solutions will involve—and are likely to
some extent to hinge upon—technological know-how, a human
rights angle can usefully be fed early on into both technology
development and technology delivery agendas. Where these
agendas are not yet being set in the climate change debate, attention to the human rights consequence will concentrate minds.
Where agendas are being drawn up, looking ahead to human
rights needs can provide useful orientation. In both cases, a
human rights lens may lead policymakers to recognize the need
for an intensive, coordinated, technically, and, in some cases,
legally creative response to climate change in keeping with the
requirements of the UNFCCC.
Second, long term development, upon which the protection
of human rights ultimately depends, will come under immense
stress due to climate change mitigation policies. For developed
and developing countries alike—but especially for the latter
* Stephen Humphreys holds a PhD in law from the University of Cambridge and
is Research Director at the International Council on Human Rights Policy, where
he is leading research into the human rights implications of climate change and
related technology policies.
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where, in many cases, basic human rights still remain unfulfilled—further development will increasingly rely upon access
to efficient, clean, and renewable technologies. Indeed, it will in
many cases require restructuring of entire economies. Securing
human rights over the long term in the face of climate change
requires the transfer of technologies for energy generation and
distribution and for adequate transport, among other things.
This is not a controversial demand, but once again little
attention has been directed to the human rights consequences
that will result from a failure to plan well in advance. For example, if technology transfer is slow or not forthcoming, individuals in many countries will inevitably be reliant on carbon-based
energy supplies for their immediate developmental needs. A
human rights sensitive approach to technology will be attentive
to the possibility that access to carbon-intensive technologies
may be more, rather than less, needed in some poorer countries, at least in the mid-term. The long-term fulfillment of basic
human rights—to food, water, property, health, and shelter, and
even culture and livelihoods—will depend, in many countries,
on a measured, structured, and informed conversion from carbon
to clean fuels. Awareness of these realities provides an appropriate basis for testing and fleshing out promises of future technological progress—which currently remain vague—against hard
needs that already exist and will only worsen over time.
In each of the above areas, a human rights optic can bring
essential nuance to policy. It can help ensure equitable access
to new technologies in recipient countries through sensitivity
to the possibility of inequalities of access and participation that
mutually reinforce privilege and vulnerability. And it can help
determine which of a possible range of technological solutions
to choose in a given context, by focusing on the core necessity to
maintain basic threshold levels of rights fulfillment for the greatest number over costly experimentation that may suit only a few.

Fragmentation of International Law?
Among the many obstacles cited for the delay in implementing effective technology transfer, intellectual property rights are
often assumed to be the primary problem. International protection
of intellectual property is thought to pose an initial hurdle to governments attempting to make transfer effective using public policy
tools. Treaty agreements, notably (but not only) the WTO-governed Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) ensure that the protections of private ownership
in a given technology are adequately reflected in the price of that
technology. Although TRIPS does not appear to be relevant to all
or even most of the technologies needed for climate change adaptation, this complaint deserves attention if only because it has had
a chilling effect on technology transfer negotiations.
TRIPS is not the only international legal instrument relevant to climate change or to technology transfer. Climate change
technology transfer takes place within the context of a broad
web of relevant treaty laws and customary practices, and is relevant to an unusually wide range of areas of science, law, and
policy. In addition to intellectual property law, other areas of
the international trade regime are clearly relevant, including the
3

safeguards of private property rights (the rights of investors or
technological proprietors) found in free trade agreements and
in Bilateral Investment Treaties. The latter frequently include
clauses specifically prohibiting host governments from actions
to further technology transfer. Where these treaties also include
“most favored nation” provisions, as most do, an international
regime effectively takes shape universalizing this prohibition.
To these must also be added international human rights law,
which is presumptively relevant whenever policy options have
human rights implications. Here, the principal instrument is
likely to be the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The 159 states that are party to the
ICESCR have undertaken to “progressively realize” the social
and economic rights (such as to food, water, health, education,
and housing) of those within their territories. Under conditions
of climate change, states’ obligations towards their own populations in these areas are arguably reinforced at the international
level, where arrangements between states effectively facilitate or
impede the capacity to fulfil these rights. In this regard, a rarely
cited provision of the ICESCR acquires renewed importance in
the context of climate change. ICESCR Article 15(1)(b) guarantees “the right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications.”
To conclude, technology transfer is a necessary and central
plank of any global climate change solution, but it often appears
stuck in jargon and entrenched positions engendered over years of
difficult negotiations. So ironically, whereas everyone acknowledges the critical importance of technology transfer, progress
has been slow or absent, and the subject has become unwieldy.
Approaching it from a human rights perspective may help overcome the impasse, by allowing all parties to refocus on basic
human imperatives and to set historical and ideological differences aside in the interests of dealing pragmatically with questions
of real urgency. Locating human rights entry points and priorities
can reorient the debate: what technologies are needed where and
how urgently? Useful future research agendas may include:
• Predicting human rights threats in specific localities;
• Assessing the best and most efficient technology solutions
already in existence to meet them;
• Framing technological research agendas for clean and efficient solutions for the most pressing urgencies;
• Assessing existing channels and barriers for international
cooperation;
• Seeking policy solutions for an international regulatory
framework;
• Assessing likely blockages and solutions at the national
level; and ultimately,
• What sort of research and policy framework is needed to
ensure that the right technologies reach the right communities in the most timely manner in order to prevent human
rights harms?
These are among the urgent human rights questions faced
by climate change negotiators as they seek any technology-based
solution for the future and will continue to be extremely relevant
to any discussion of clean technology transfer.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

An Introduction to This Issue:
Climate Change and Technology Transfer
by Dalindyebo Shabalala*

T

he Earth continues to experience record-breaking temperatures caused by increased concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The
impacts of this unprecedented warming include increased floods
and drought, rising sea levels, the spread of deadly diseases such
as malaria and dengue fever, and increasing numbers of violent
storms. These impacts threaten to be more severe and imminent
than previously believed. An urgent, global response is essential.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, however, have failed to live
up to their promise, especially in respect to technology transfer. This
failure has pushed countries to move towards a new post-Kyoto
framework with a focus on ensuring the effective and broad-based
transfer of environmentally sound climate-related technologies.
Transfer of technology is a key pillar of any international
response to global climate change. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto
protocol were built on a basic political bargain. On one side, under
the first commitment period, industrialized countries would take
primary responsibility for emissions reductions. They would demonstrate carbon-free development, while transferring technology
that would enable developing countries to make progress in reaching increasing carbon efficiency. Thus, carbon leakage, i.e. the
shifting of polluting carbon-inefficient industries from industrialized to developing countries, would be avoided. The success of
the first phase would enable developing countries to take on their
own emissions reduction obligations in the second phase.
Industrialized countries, however, have largely failed to provide measurable, reportable, verifiable, and effective transfer of
environmentally sound climate-related technologies. This failure
was a primary bone of contention during the Bali Conference in
December 2007, and it laid behind the refusal of developing countries to agree to take on specific emissions reduction obligations in
the post-Kyoto period. The Bali Action Plan identifies technology
transfer as a key element leading up to 2012 and beyond. However, there are several other challenges underlying the failure to
provide transfer of technology, in addition to the lack of political
will from the industrialized countries. These challenges include:
• A lack of criteria and support for conducting needs assessments and identifying priority technologies for transfer;
• A need to properly address the role of Intellectual Property
(“IP”) with respect to mitigation and adaptation technologies
and to proactively address ways that the IP system can be used
or altered to serve the needs of addressing climate change;
• What lessons and best practices to learn from existing technology transfer mechanisms such as that of the Montreal
Protocol and existing platforms and mechanisms existing
mechanisms for technology transfer in other multilateral
environmental agreements;
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• A lack of institutional mechanisms at the national, bilateral
and multilateral level responsible for implementing transfer
of environmentally sound technologies;
• Insufficient programs to enhance absorptive capacity of technologies appropriate to the level of development of each country; and
• A lack of financial resources and financing mechanisms
properly targeted at all stages of the technology transfer
process, including capacity building.
The fundamental failure in achieving technology transfer
has been a lack of responsible institutions and mechanisms.
The papers in this volume provide a broad overview of the
range of issues that need to be considered if there is to be a real
and sustainable solution to climate change that aims at transforming
production and consumption patterns in both developed and developing countries. The role of outside research in producing information on what has gone on before, what is happening on the ground in
countries such as China, and how approaches to technology, including the role of private investment, should be framed has become
increasingly important to a workable outcome in Copenhagen.
A workable institutional mechanism for measuring, reporting, and verifying the effective delivery of technology transfer
is crucial to reaching and successfully implementing any postKyoto agreement. Some of the elements covered in the articles
in this volume point to the real need for work to be done to:
• Develop methods and criteria for technology identification
and prioritization;
• Identify how modes of technology transfer might be implemented in a multilateral context;
• Outline the institutional mechanisms that will be needed at
the national level and at the multilateral level to enable all the
points in the technology transfer chain from economic actors
in one country to economic actors in another country;
• Identify appropriate financing and funding mechanisms; and
• Ensure compliance and monitoring, reporting and verifying
of technology transfer obligations
There is a lot of work to be done and not much time in which
to do it. I look forward to further research that will contribute to
achieving an effective and equitable multilateral agreement that will
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, address the very real negative
human rights impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations,
and ensure a carbon efficient development path for all countries.

* Dalindyebo Shabalala is the Director of the Center for International Environmental Law’s IP and Sustainable Development Project in Geneva, Switzerland. He
focuses on issues at the intersection of Intellectual Property and Human Health,
Biodiversity and Food Security, as well as addressing systematic reform of the
international intellectual property system.
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China’s Cleantech Landscape:
The Renewable Energy Technology Paradox
by Federico Caprotti*

C

Introduction: China’s Renewable
Energy Technology Paradox1

leantech is playing an increasingly important role as a
sector of investment on the international scale, attracting $8.4 billion in the North American, European,
Chinese, and Indian markets in 2008.2 This represents a thirtyeight percent increase on the $6.1 billion invested in cleantech
in 2007 in the same markets.3
Within cleantech, arguably the
most important area, or sub-sector, of investment is renewable
energy technologies and generation systems, which account for
over thirty percent of cleantech
investment flows.4 However,
the role of renewable energy
technologies at the national
scale is also increasing in importance. This article focuses on
China, where the development
of renewable energy sources is
crucial to energy security and
to providing alternatives to the
carbon economy, which is currently generating many environmental externalities. Renewable
energy technology development
and manufacturing also provide
clear opportunities for the Chinese central government to promote a domestic technology manufacturing base, and to achieve China’s 2020 energy generation
targets, as will be shown below. Therefore, renewable energy
technology will play an increasingly important role in China’s
energy landscape. At the present time, renewable energy is both
a current generation reality and a future technology opportunity: by 2005, renewable energy provided eight percent of the
country’s total energy consumption and sixteen percent of its
total electricity output.5 This is expected to more than double
by 2020.6
At the same time, research reveals that the Chinese renewable energy technology market presents a paradox: a market of
opportunity based on a need for the development of generating
capacity from renewable sources, coupled with the existence
of policy, fiscal, and technological obstacles which hamper the
potential of China’s cleantech market in renewable energies.
China is depicted as a leading cleantech market in the short to

medium term, especially in renewable energy technology, project infrastructure, and manufacturing.
However, many researchers have also highlighted the problems which seemingly go hand in hand with China’s status as a
predominant emergent renewables market in the short term, and
as a projected market leader in the next five to ten years. These
issues are not only restricted to the renewables business; they
extend across the wider political and cultural context, bringing to
light the importance of a network
approach to renewable energy
technology development, manufacturing, and deployment. In
short, China’s renewable energy
market presents an opportunity
with clear challenges. The following provides an analysis of
the main obstacles facing and
currently affecting the renewable energy market in China.

Changes in import duties
need to be stable in
order to truly promote
technology transfer into
China; fiscal policy
stability aids foreign
technology businesses’
long-range strategy
and planning.
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Obstacles: Policy, Tax,
and Long-Term Market
Development

Energy landscapes can be
uneven landscapes. This can
be due to a variety of factors.
However, above all, the existence of obstacles to the development of cleantech landscapes
in a national context can mostly be related to policy, fiscal, and
economic issues which can be deeply local. At the same time,
global economic influences—both at the firm level and at the
level of international economic policies—intersect with national
regulatory and technology landscapes to constitute a complex
environment in which clean energy technologies develop. China’s cleantech landscape, and specifically its renewable energy
market, is an example of the interplay of these forces. The following highlights some of the main issues facing the renewable
energy market in the country today, focusing on energy pricing

* Federico Caprotti is an assistant professor at University College London,
Department of Geography. His research focuses on a comparative analysis of
decision-making in cleantech investment; he is currently engaged in a British
Academy-funded project on cleantech investments in wind power technology in
China and the United States. The author is available by email at the following
address: fkaprotz1@yahoo.co.uk.
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policy, technology transfer, private investment, and the need
for emphasis on energy conservation as well as monitoring and
evaluation.

Pricing Policy Shortfalls
China’s 2006 Renewable Energy Law attempts, among
other things, to set pricing standards for energy generated from
renewable energy sources.7 The law’s broad aims are to increase
the capacity generated from
renewables in the country, and
are part of a wider national strategy aimed at increasing power
supply as well as diversifying
the generating base, as a result
of rising demand and a need
for energy security.8 The law’s
renewable energy pricing mechanisms are based on “feed-in”
tariff models of the kind applied
to European energy markets;9
however, the link between pricing at source and grid distribution in China is proving problematic.10 This is largely because utility companies have, in many
cases, little incentive to connect a renewable energy project, such
as a wind farm, to the grid. Once such projects are connected,
utilities are required to purchase power generated by the projects; the price for renewables-generated power is higher than for
coal-generated power, generally due to government-mandated
subsidies and tariff levels (which are aimed at generating project revenue as well as paying off interest and loan principals
required to build renewables projects in the first place).11 Therefore, the current renewable energy landscape—especially in the
case of wind power—features a backlog of completed projects
which are not actually connected to the grid.12

For example, from 1990 to 1995, import duties were largely
non-existent as the central government attempted to stimulate
partnerships and technology transfer to develop a wind power
base for the country.14 By 1996, the government’s strategic
focus had shifted to the development of a domestic, national,
and localized wind turbine manufacturing market. In order to
stimulate domestic manufacturers, the government levied duties
on foreign wind technology imports. The imposition of duties
was reversed again in 1998, and
a robust domestic manufacturing market is indeed developing: between 2003 and 2005,
local wind turbine production
rose from $26 to $104 million.15
However, during the same
period, the share of imported
turbine technology rose from
$35.9 to $211.9 million.16
Uncertainty remains over
the instability of import duties
and other taxes on foreign technology imports: for example, in
April 2008, the central government changed the import context
again by refunding value added tax (“VAT”) on imported turbine components; this tax refund was backdated to the start of
2008.17 While this specific measure is aimed at easing the cost of
importing wind technology to China, it also inhibits the development of domestic wind turbine manufacturing by providing
incentives for importing essential components. Furthermore,
changes in import duties need to be stable in order to truly promote technology transfer into China; fiscal policy stability aids
foreign technology businesses’ long-range strategy and planning. For example, the VAT rebate measure was accompanied
by the cancellation of China’s tariff-free policy for foreign turbine units with a capacity of less than 2.5 megawatts (“MW”).
Although this is in keeping with the central aim of building wind
farms with a generating capacity of not less than 100 MW,18 the
resulting shifting import duty and tax landscape is not conducive
to transparent cost pricing for importers, domestic manufacturers and, indeed, wind project developers.

Uncertainty over power
prices hinders the inflow
of capital focused on
renewable energy projects.

Technology Transfer: Uncertainty Over Import
Tariffs
Uncertainty also exists over the stability of China’s current
import duties on renewable energy technology and associated
machine components. This uncertainty is an especially important
factor in hampering already established technologies like wind
turbines. For example, ninety-seven percent of large-scale (nonmicro) wind turbines currently installed in China are imported
(this includes components).13 The Chinese government’s import
duty strategy for wind technology has varied widely since the
dawn of large-scale wind generation in 1986, alternatively
imposing high and virtually non-existent taxes (see Figure 1).

Private Investment Shortfalls
At present, wind power technology and project development in China could be improved by enabling more investment
from private sources (see discussion of development needs
above). Government subsidies and preferential loan systems
exist, but uncertainty over power prices hinders the inflow of
capital focused on renewable energy projects. In this respect, the

Figure 1: Timeline of shifting import duties and taxes on foreign technology imports.
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Photo courtesy of Thomas Kraus, released under the GNU Free
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Chinese renewable energy technology market is markedly different from other, more established renewables markets such as
in European countries or the United States:
[P]rivate investment has become the predominant force
in wind farm construction in other countries. For example, around ninety-five percent of investment in wind
farms was contributed by the private sector in India . . . ;
However, unless a new investment mechanism with
incentive policies and regulations is established [in
China], and more financial channels are opened up, it
[will] be difficult to realize the target of wind energy
development.19

A Decline in Energy Conservation Investment
From the point of view of sustainability discourse and policy,
national and regional efforts to promote sustainability in China
cannot be seen as separate from efforts to improve energy conservation capabilities. China is currently adding the equivalent
of a 2,000 MW coal-fired power plant to its generating capacity
every week, and has been doing so since around 2000.20 This
represents a large annual rise in the amount of fossil-fuel generated power, and a resultant rise in environmental externalities.
In 2004, for example, the amount of energy capacity added to
China’s generation system was roughly equivalent to the amount
of energy generated in the whole of Spain or California.21 At the
same time generating capacity has increased on the mainland,
there has been an increased focus
on renewable energy sources,
especially hydroelectric, wind,
and lately, solar power. However, this double trend—large
incremental rises in generation
capacity based on fossil fuels,
and a rising interest in renewable
energy sources—has been paralleled by a decrease in investment
in energy conservation projects.
This has led to the paradoxical
situation that, from 1980 to 2000,
China benefited from an energy
supply surplus; since 2000, even
with the added capacity, China
has suffered from increasing
energy shortages. Indeed, Jiang
Lin, a China energy researcher at
the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory in Berkeley, California, has recently argued that
“support and policy commitments to energy conservation in
China have weakened considerably during China’s transition to
a more market-based economy.”22

have been commissioned and progressed past the project stage.
In particular, recent research has pointed to the need to include
user perspectives both in terms of the efficacy of new energy
technologies, and their wider socio-cultural acceptability within
particular contexts.23 The adoption of effective monitoring and
evaluation (“M&E”) programs can in turn be seen as a solution
to the lack of connections from renewables projects to the grid.
This is because effective M&E programs can be constructed
around a set of key indicators—
such as the number of projects
connected to the grid, or a series
of connections over a specific
time span—which clearly track
progress. However, underlying
grid connection issues, such as
electricity pricing and subsidies
as well as incentives for utilities
to connect renewable generation capacity to the grid, have to
be resolved before M&E can be
effectively applied.

China features several
leading solar power
and photovoltaic
manufacturing and project
companies, active in the
domestic as well as in
the international
cleantech field.

Monitoring, Evaluation, and User Perspectives
A wider issue, applicable across all renewable energy markets, is the need for consistent, transparent, and precise monitoring and evaluation of renewable energy projects after they
Spring 2009

Obstacles or
Challenges?

These factors constitute a
very real threat not to the development of China’s renewable
energy landscape, but to its
progress. It would, in fact, be unrealistic to forecast a stalling of
the Chinese renewables market, especially after the passing of
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law and considering the number
of projects still in the pipeline. Furthermore, the current project pipeline may provide a temporal buffer—a year at most—
in terms of project development, which could help offset the
negative effects of the current credit crisis and oil price declines
on the renewable energy spectrum, from research and develop-
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ment (“R&D”) expenditure to project development and grid
connections.
The main risks posed by the obstacles identified above lie,
instead, in the friction which could be exerted on the Chinese
renewables technology market. This friction can be expressed in
terms of slower growth in what is a dynamic and fast-developing
market; erratic policy interventions, ineffective pricing
mechanisms, and other factors
can be seen as draining the Chinese market of potential energy
just after the achievement of its
take-off phase.24 If China is to
achieve its 2020 target of fifteen
percent of national energy generation from renewables,25 as laid
out in its latest (2006-10) Five
Year Plan, then these obstacles
represent serious challenges to
be faced before the end of the
decade. This is especially relevant in the case of those already
established projects, apart from
hydroelectric power, which are
expected to lead the renewables
generation tables: wind power,
for example, is expected to account for three percent of national
generation capacity by 2020.26 However, the identified obstacles
should be considered challenges, not market conditions that will
negatively affect the Chinese market in the long run. Indeed,
apart from these obstacles, the Chinese renewable energy market is exhibiting signs of vitality, innovation, and opportunity.
This article concludes by focusing, briefly, on these avenues of
future renewables development.

great majority of its turbine technology as well as components.27
However, by 2008, it had become an increasingly important
exporter and manufacturer of other renewable energy generation
technologies. Solar power is a case in point. China features several leading solar power and photovoltaic (“PV”) manufacturing
and project companies, active in the domestic as well as in the
international cleantech fields. For
example, Suntech Power Holdings (“Suntech”), a leading solar
power player, has been involved
in co-developing and investing in
several large overseas projects,
such as Elecnor, a thirty-five
MW solar power plant in Spain,
and Alamosa solar plant in the
U.S. state of Colorado, an eight
MW project. 28 Furthermore,
Chinese solar companies have
been engaged in opening up new
markets for their solar expertise, as seen in the construction
of Katsrin solar power plant in
the Golan Heights, Israel.29 The
fifty kilowatt farm is the largest
in the country to date, and was
constructed by Israeli solar firm
Solarit Doral, in conjunction with Suntech.30 It is where renewable energy technologies are currently in the take-off stage—
such as PV technologies—that Chinese renewables companies
can be best positioned to compete and gain advantage over
non-Chinese rival firms. Government investment in R&D must
be rationalized and increased, however, if niche technology
developments are to be effectively researched, marketed, and
manufactured.31
Secondly, China’s focus on large-scale renewable energy
generation projects provides a clear opportunity for the pooling
of large-scale project expertise; this will be increasingly relevant
internationally, as the focus on renewables shifts to projects with
larger generating capacities. China’s aim of generating thirty
gigawatts of installed wind power capacity by 2020, powering
between thirteen and thirty million homes at full capacity, necessitates large-scale, highly-organized project development.32
By 2020, the Chinese renewable energy project landscape is
increasingly going to feature large-scale projects, generating
more than 1,000 MW in capacity per project, connected to the
grid.33 The lion’s share of these projects’ generation capacity is
likely to come from hydroelectric power and wind farms, with
wind farms accounting for a majority of projects, at least in number.34 Furthermore, offshore wind farms featuring large-scale
wind turbines are going to be an increasingly important feature
of coastal renewable energy generation: in November 2006,
China’s first offshore wind facility, with a capacity of 1.5 MW,
was installed by China National Offshore Corporation using turbines manufactured by Xinjiang Goldwind. By 2009, work was

China’s cleantech
market, especially
in renewable energy
generation technologies,
is set to continue its
take-off phase and
gain altitude and
international traction.

Conclusion: Innovation and Opportunity
As argued above, the main obstacles facing the Chinese
renewable energy market are challenges to be faced in the
realms of policy, pricing, and technology development incentives and subsidies. In terms of sustainability, China needs to be
able to apply innovative policies to energy conservation and an
amelioration of the lived environment, especially in urban areas.
Landmark projects, such as those at Dongtan eco-city, mask the
fact that conservation and emissions reductions are priorities
which are secondary to continued growth. This focus on growth,
in turn, leads to a continued focus on a carbon-fueled economy.
However, there are some areas in which China’s renewables
market is exhibiting clear signs of innovation and leadership, as
opposed to reaction to market conditions.
One of these areas is renewable energy technology exports.
China is traditionally described as a net importer of renewable
energy technology, technical know-how, and project development capabilities. This is especially the case where established
technologies—developed mostly outside China—are concerned.
In the case of wind power, mentioned above, China imports the
9
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underway on large-scale offshore wind farms, including the 102
MW Shanghai East Ocean Offshore Wind Farm.35
The points made in this article show that, in the case of
renewable energy technologies within the Chinese cleantech
market, China stands at a paradoxical waypoint. On the one
hand, the Chinese context and market represent clear investment, development, and generation opportunities. On the other
hand, the policy and fiscal obstacles identified in the article represent clear problems which will slow down development and

sap the potential of this market—and of the development of
China’s energy system towards national 2020 targets—unless
they are faced with clear political will at a central as well as a
provincial level. China’s cleantech market, especially in renewable energy generation technologies, is set to continue its takeoff phase and gain altitude and international traction—unless the
identified obstacles are allowed to slow down or, in the worst of
cases, stall this cleantech trajectory.
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Aquaponics & Landfill Methane Use:
These Fetid Miasmata Smell Like Profitable Conservation
by Blake M. Mensing*

O

n the surface, aquaponics1 (a portmanteau word of
aquaculture and hydroponics)2 and the use of landfill
methane for energy3 have very little in common. However, both utilize waste to power another system while reducing
the net amount of waste generated.4 Reciprocating or symbiotic
technologies are a beneficial alternative to traditional technologies because they reduce waste and mimic the closed ecological
systems that have garnered the attention of some of the world’s
greatest scientific minds and some of the world’s youngest.5
This article outlines the basic
processes involved in aquaponics and landfill methane utilization and then proposes that
more synergistic systems should
be developed and then implemented on a larger scale to minimize total human waste output.
Aquaponics combines fish
farming and soilless vegetable
production to help to eliminate
some of the major shortcomings
of each process.6 The result of this conglomeration is that the only
input required is fish food.7 Water conservation is a particularly
desirable benefit of combining hydroponics and aquaculture. 8
The fish produce an effluent rich in plant nutrients, but toxic to
the fish in high quantities, so the water is filtered by the roots of
the plants and then pumped back to the tanks.9 Leafy vegetables
and spice plants seem to be able to utilize the nitrogen-rich tank
water most efficiently and the crop helps to augment the profits
of a fish farmer by producing another saleable good and reducing
the costs of filtering the tank water.10 Another possible benefit of
aquaponics is that the harvested fish relieve some of the strain on
the world’s fishstock.11 When properly monitored, both the fish
stock and the hydroponic vegetable crop thrive.12
Methane is widely recognized as one of the six major greenhouse gases that are accumulating in the Earth’s upper atmosphere and are contributing to the steady uptick in global average
mean temperatures.13 In the United States, landfills accounted for
twenty-three percent of total methane emissions in 2006.14 The
impact of methane is more than twenty-five times greater than
carbon dioxide, though fortunately its atmospheric concentration
is much lower.15 One method of reducing methane emissions is
to capture and convert the gaseous effluvium from landfills into
usable fuel for electricity generation.16 As the garbage in a landfill breaks down, many different gases are released.17 The gaseous mixture is made of approximately fifty percent methane,

which can be separated from the remaining gases and used for the
generation of electricity.18 The capture and use of methane from
landfills not only reduces the total amount of biomethane generated, but also prevents the release of some carbon dioxide that
would be produced through traditional coal-fired power plants.19
Aquaponics is a sustainable practice because the waste of
one system is used to fuel another symbiotic system and the only
input is the fish food.20 As long as the fish food used is produced
in a sustainable manner, then the pitfalls associated with traditional aquaculture are more easily avoided.21 Similarly, landfill
methane capture for energy production is an efficient utilization
of a gas that would otherwise
be emitted into the atmosphere
without being put to use.22
Aquaponic farms could and
should be placed near landfills
to have their electricity needs
met from the methane generated
during landfill decomposition,
further reducing total wastes by minimizing the costs of transmitting electricity. In order to further the progress towards sustainable development, scientists and engineers need to train their
eyes on systems that use wastes so as to reduce the net impact of
human consumption on the environment. The philosophy behind
both aquaponics and landfill methane capture is based on reducing the net wastes generated by humans through the utilization
of system outputs. When profit maximization and waste reduction collide, both business and the environment benefit.
While neither system is perfect, their underlying foundations are a step in the right direction. Human production processes should be evaluated in light of the success of aquaponics
and landfill methane capture because it is likely that the examination will uncover other wastes that have been overlooked as
possible inputs. In the instances where a pair of systems could
form a symbiotic relationship, humanity should take advantage
of that symbiosis to help to reduce our enormous ecological
footprint. If clean technology can include a profitable use for
fish excrement and the gas gathered from festering garbage, then
the scientific and business communities surely have many more
ecologically sound profit avenues to explore.

When profit maximization
and waste reduction
collide, both business and
the environment benefit.
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Endnotes: Aquaponics & Landfill Methane Use continued on page 59
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Border Adjustment Measures in Proposed
U.S. Climate Change Legislation –
“A New Chapter in America’s Leadership on Climate Change?”

1

by Stephen Kho, Bernd G. Janzen & Holly M. Smith*
“Delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an
acceptable response. The stakes are too high. The consequences,
too serious.”2
—President Barack Obama

A

Introduction

ll legislative proposals for a U.S. greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions cap-and-trade system released to
date have recognized the need to safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. firms that may be required to bear emissions
compliance burdens heavier than those borne by their foreign
competitors. These legislative proposals have included “competitiveness measures” to ensure
that emissions caps imposed
on U.S. industries do not erode
their competitiveness vis-à-vis
imports from jurisdictions with
no or lesser GHG emissions
restrictions. The problem of
“carbon leakage”—the incentive created by declining domestic emissions caps to move
emissions-intensive production
abroad—is particularly acute for
manufacturing industries. Many
such industries compete directly
with imports, and most would
not be able to pass on to their customers the increased costs
of compliance or the acquisition of more efficient production
technology. A properly designed U.S. climate change system
should therefore legally safeguard the competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturing industries, while also minimizing the incentive to
move emissions-intensive production abroad.
Competitiveness measures can take a variety of forms. For
instance, a “border adjustment” measure can impose costs on
relevant goods at the time they are imported into the United
States, assessed on the basis of either differences in the GHG
emission restrictions in the country of origin as compared to
the United States, or the emissions-intensity of the production
process for the imported goods. Other forms of competitiveness
measures include the free distribution of emissions allowances
to industries particularly sensitive to foreign competition, the
exemption of certain industries altogether from domestic emissions caps, the imposition of carbon taxes, and restrictions on

certain production methods or incentives to adopt cleaner production methods.
This article will focus on the use and consequences of a border adjustment measure, given that it is the competitiveness measure that is most consistently proposed in U.S. legislation, and
that seemingly has the most significant exposure to challenges
under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agreements. This
article will first provide some background on the broader climate
change discussion in the United States. It will then discuss the
reasons for including competitiveness measures in U.S. climate
change legislation, the border adjustment measures included
in recent U.S. legislative proposals, and the viability of border
adjustment measures under the
WTO agreements. The article
will conclude with a new proposal for an alternative to the
border adjustment measures
proposed to date.

Domestic competitiveness
measures can ensure
the equal distribution of
costs in the absence of an
international agreement
limiting emissions.

Spring 2009

Background

The year 2009 promises to
be an exciting year for proponents of strong action to combat
GHG emissions in the United
States and internationally. Over
the past few years, broad political support for such legislation
has grown domestically, while international efforts have continued to progress, in large part without the participation of the
United States. Given the recent inauguration of Barack Obama
as President, and the goals of the international community to
conclude a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen in December of this year, real action is expected to be
taken in 2009 to limit carbon emissions both in the United States
and around the world.
* Stephen Kho is Senior Counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, and
formerly Associate General Counsel and acting Chief Counsel on China Enforcement at the Office of U.S. Trade Representative, as well as Legal Advisor at the
U.S. Mission to the WTO. Bernd G. Janzen is Counsel at Akin Gump, and formerly Attorney-Advisor with the Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Holly M. Smith is an Associate
with Akin Gump, and formerly with the Office of the Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs) at the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as with the
Asian Affairs Directorate in the National Security Council, Executive Office of the
U.S. President. The views expressed in this paper are personal to the authors, and
do not necessarily reflect those of their current or previous employers and clients.
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President Obama has made numerous statements to date
expressing his commitment to addressing climate change. In
spite of the uncertainty and turmoil caused by the ongoing financial crisis, he appears to be strongly committed to his original
proposals. Specifically, President Obama has called for the
implementation of an “economy-wide cap-and-trade program”
that will aim to reduce GHG emissions eighty percent by 2050.3
President Obama’s plan is distinguished by his calls for the auction of all emissions credits, unlike other plans, under which a
portion of credits would be provided at no cost to vulnerable
industries as a form of transition assistance. His plan differs further due to his policy of using a portion of the proceeds from
such emissions credit auctions (approximately $15 billion a
year) for investment in the “development of clean energy and
energy-efficiency improvements, including clean vehicles.”4
Importantly, President Obama has also pledged to “reengage”5 the international community through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Since early
2007, international efforts to combat climate change have been
focused on developing a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, which remains in effect until 2012. Rounds of negotiations have been held, both to address the future commitments of
nations that have already been bound by emissions caps, as well
as to reach developing nations and countries such as the United
States that are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. An important
breakthrough came at the negotiations in Bali in December 2007,
where it was decided that developing countries would not necessarily be excluded from future climate change control regimes.6
Other rounds of negotiations have taken place since, leading
ultimately to the negotiation of a final agreement in Copenhagen
at the 15th meeting of all Framework Convention parties in late
2009 that will replace the Kyoto Protocol.
Given the state of the economy, and previous difficulties
in passing legislation to establish a cap-and-trade system, there
are significant doubts over whether meaningful legislation curbing GHG emissions will be passed in the United States in 2009.
Yet the concurrence of the Obama presidency, the pressure to
have emissions limits in place domestically before concluding
an international agreement on emissions caps in Copenhagen,7
and the increased presence of Democrats in the U.S. Congress,
all indicate that the passage of climate change legislation is far
more likely now than at any time in the past.
Currently, Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, and Representatives
Henry Waxman and Ed Markey, Chairs of the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee and the Energy
and Environment Subcommittee respectively, are leading Congressional efforts to develop legislation addressing climate
change. On March 31, 2009, Representatives Waxman and Markey issued a discussion draft of their climate change legislation
entitled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(the “Waxman-Markey draft”). While a draft has yet to come
out of the Senate, on February 3, 2009, Senator Boxer and other
committee members set out six basic principles for legislation
on global warming.8 It is likely that the draft produced in the

Smokestack of a coal-fired power plant in New York.
Senate will rely heavily on the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner substitute amendment (the “Boxer Amendment”) to the LiebermanWarner Climate Security Act of 2008 (“S.3036”), which was
originally introduced on May 21, 2008.9 Although the Boxer
Amendment has never been debated and considered in Congress to a significant extent,10 it represents the most advanced
and comprehensive legislative effort on the Senate side to date
addressing climate change.
Generally, both the Waxman-Markey draft and the Boxer
Amendment propose the establishment of a cap-and-trade system to limit emissions domestically, along with a number of
measures providing incentives for reduced emissions, and, in
the case of the Waxman-Markey draft, the development of clean
energy sources, clean technologies, and increased energy efficiency. Importantly, both bills provide for competitiveness measures in the form of a “border adjustment” requiring “covered
goods” imported into the United States to be accompanied by
purchases of emissions allowances.11

Rationale for Including
Competitiveness Provisions
While commentators have expressed concern over the inclusion of certain competitiveness provisions in climate change legislation,12 there are a number of reasons why such provisions are
useful and should be included in any proposed legislation.
First, competitiveness measures can provide an even playing field for U.S. manufacturers and producers to compete in the
domestic market against importers of goods from countries that
lack emissions caps. Manufacturers in countries such as China
and India, which are heavy polluters but currently are not subject to domestic or international limits on their emissions, would
enjoy a significant production cost advantage over their counterparts in the United States under a U.S. cap-and-trade regime if
no measures were taken to require these manufacturers to compensate for the emissions they created when producing products
for import into the U.S. market. In particular, energy-intensive
industries, such as cement, glass, paper, chemicals, fertilizer,
and metals manufacturers, would be adversely affected by U.S.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

declining emissions caps and their inability to compete with foreign producers who are not subject to such caps.13
The perceived need for protection of domestic manufacturers is so strong that is it highly unlikely that any climate change
legislation could pass the U.S. Congress without competitiveness measures. One reason given for the U.S. refusal to adopt the
Kyoto Protocol was the fact that it did not impose binding commitments on developing countries, which even then was perceived as a threat to the competitiveness of U.S. industries. Given
the uncertainty over whether developing countries will commit
to emissions limits in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. legislation will need to include competitiveness measures to compensate for non-participation by developing nations
in future international climate change agreements.14
In fact, in a white paper produced by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Energy and Air
Quality (the “White Paper”), the
drafters emphasized the need
for competitiveness measures
by linking them to the need
to engage developing countries.15 They reasoned that, in
the absence of an international
agreement binding developing
nations, domestic legislation
needed to be structured in a way
that would encourage developing nations to adopt similar
limitations on GHG emissions
domestically, and that such
“encouragement” could include
border adjustment measures,
performance standards, and carbon market design conditions.16
The above emphasizes a
second reason for competitiveness measures: they can also serve to encourage foreign countries
to adopt their own domestic climate change measures. Foreign
countries can be encouraged to adopt emissions limits by providing them with both positive and negative incentives to do
so through U.S. legislation. Border adjustment measures could
encourage the adoption of emissions limits in foreign countries
in response to foreign manufacturers having to raise manufacturing costs by purchasing emissions credits. Alternatively, U.S.
legislation could create positive incentives for foreign countries
to adopt emissions caps by providing them with greater access to
the U.S. emissions credit trading market, which is expected to be
vast and lucrative for those able to sell credits on it.17
Third, the imposition of competitiveness measures can prevent “carbon leakage,” a situation where the benefits of reducing U.S. emissions would be “offset by increased emissions
elsewhere by foreign competitors that are thriving as a result of
higher costs in the United States.”18 They could also be used as
export adjustments, i.e., by providing emissions credits for free

to U.S. manufacturers to allow them to compete equally in thirdcountry markets with foreign competitors who are not subject to
emissions caps.19
Finally, competitiveness measures would ensure that other
countries share the cost of reducing GHG emissions on a worldwide basis, even if they are unwilling to adopt required limits
on emissions themselves. Given that the ill effects of climate
change are shared globally, the costs and burdens of eliminating
emissions should also be shared globally. Domestic competitiveness measures can ensure the equal distribution of costs in
the absence of an international agreement limiting emissions.20

Existing Border Adjustment Proposals
While a number of border adjustment proposals in draft legislation have been tabled to date, the Boxer Amendment represents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date. Although
Senator Boxer currently is drafting new legislation, it is likely
that her new proposals will
reflect the proposals made in
the original Boxer Amendment.
While the Waxman-Markey
draft and Representative Chris
Van Hollen’s Cap and Dividend
Act of 2009 represent efforts
currently under consideration in
the 111th Congress, neither is as
specific as the Boxer Amendment on the border adjustment
measures.
The border adjustment proposal in the Boxer Amendment
essentially requires that, beginning from January 1, 2014, “covered goods”21 from countries
that have not taken “comparable
action”22 to the actions taken in
the United States to limit GHG emissions, must be accompanied
by an appropriate number of emissions allowances in order to be
imported into the United States.
Specifically, this proposal would be executed by first,
establishing a bi-partisan “International Climate Change Commission” (the “Commission”) consisting of six commissioners
appointed by the President in coordination with the Senate.23 The
Commission’s key role would be to determine annually which
countries have or have not taken comparable action to combat
greenhouse gas emissions and to publish those determinations.
Countries that are found to have taken comparable action, or
that meet certain exemptions,24 are placed on an “excluded” list
by the Commission.25 Importers of covered goods from these
countries would not be required to submit emissions allowances
under these regulations. All other countries would be placed on
the “covered” list, and covered goods would have to be accompanied by emissions allowances when imported into the United
States.26 The Commission would have enforcement powers
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post-Kyoto Protocol
international climate
change agreement without
equivalent obligations
undertaken by all heavy
GHG emitters.
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to penalize companies importing goods without the required
emissions credits.27 Such penalties could include payment of a
penalty and even a prohibition on importing the goods in controversy for up to five years.28
Under the Boxer Amendment, emissions allowances
needed to accompany covered goods would come from a special
reserve of allowances established by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Administrator”), which would also be
responsible for establishing the pricing methodology29 for these
allowances. The Administrator additionally would be responsible for establishing a method for determining the number of
allowances necessary for covered goods entirely manufactured
and processed in one covered country, using a general formula30
for calculating the number of allowances required “on a per unit
basis for each category of covered goods that are entered into
the United States from that foreign country during each compliance year.”31 The Administrator would further be responsible
for establishing the methodology for determining the number of
allowances to be applied to covered goods manufactured or processed in multiple foreign countries.32
Finally, while most emissions allowances would come
from the special reserve mentioned above, the Boxer Amendment also allows U.S. importers to submit allowances issued by
foreign cap-and-trade programs that are deemed to constitute
“comparable action.”33 U.S. importers may also use credits from
international offset projects authorized by the Administrator in
lieu of international reserve allowances.34 These international
offsets would be authorized as part of Title XIII Subtitle B of the
Boxer Amendment, which describes international partnership
programs such as the reduction of deforestation.35
The border adjustment measure of the Waxman-Markey
draft differs from the Boxer Amendment in significant ways.
The principal difference is that while the Boxer Amendment
mandates that the border adjustment become effective from
2014, the Waxman-Markey draft gives the President the discretion to impose a border adjustment, after making a determination that compliance with the U.S. cap-and-trade system
continues to cause significant reductions in domestic production
or domestic jobs, or an increase in greenhouse gas emissions by
foreign manufacturing facilities manufacturing covered goods
in jurisdictions without “commensurate” GHG regulations.36
This determination is expected to be made no later than June
30, 2017, as part of a reporting process by the President with
the EPA.37 If the President decides to impose a border adjustment, he must issue regulations no later than 24 months after the
determination.38 From that point on, covered goods may only be
imported into the United States with the appropriate number of
allowances.39
The Waxman-Markey draft vaguely describes the parameters for the border adjustment program, with the result that there
are only a few points of comparison with the Boxer Amendment
provisions. One similarity is that both drafts specify exemptions
permitted for least-developed countries and countries emitting
less than 0.5% of total global GHG emissions (i.e., a de minimis
rule).40 The differences, however, are numerous. For instance,
15

the border adjustment in the Waxman-Markey draft clearly states
its intent of addressing “competitive imbalance” as a result of
“direct and indirect” costs of complying with both the U.S. capand-trade system and systems of other countries.41 Moreover,
the definition of “covered goods” in the Waxman-Markey draft
for purposes of the border adjustment measure does not broadly
include imports of “manufactured items for consumption,” but
only those designated as “primary products.”42
Another principal difference in the Waxman-Markey draft,
which also has significant bearing on this discussion, is that—in
order to avoid the problem of carbon leakage43 while preserving
the global competitiveness of industries affected by the carbon
caps—the draft utilizes another competitiveness measure in the
first instance to distribute “rebates” (essentially free credits) to
the “owners and operators of entities in eligible industry sectors,” beginning in 2012.44 Under this primary competitiveness mechanism, eligible industries would first be determined
depending on whether they have an energy intensity or greenhouse gas intensity of at least five percent, and a trade intensity
of at least fifteen percent, as calculated by the EPA Administrator according to methods described in the draft text.45 According
to the draft, the number of rebates given to each eligible entity
would equal “the sum of the covered entity’s direct compliance
factor and the covered entity’s indirect carbon factor.”46 The
draft further mandates an annual review of the rebate program,
and allows for the EPA, beginning in 2021, to eliminate rebates
if the Administrator determines that “more than 70 percent of
the global output from a sector . . . is manufactured in countries
subject to commensurate greenhouse gas regulation.”47
Importantly, the Waxman-Markey draft, unlike a number of
earlier proposals, particularly emphasizes the need for the adoption of clean technologies, clean energy sources, and energy efficiency. For example, the draft proposes the adoption of a “smart
grid” to improve energy efficiency; the adoption of technologies
such as carbon capture and sequestration to reduce emissions in
the air; and the provision of U.S. assistance to the developing
world to encourage them to adopt clean technologies.48
The Cap and Dividend Act of 200949 is the most recent legislation to be introduced imposing a border adjustment measure.
The measure differs radically from the Boxer Amendment and
Waxman-Markey draft provisions, in that it requires the imposition of “carbon equivalency fees” on all imports of “carbonintensive goods.”50 The carbon equivalency fee would equal the
dollar value amounts domestic producers have to pay to acquire
carbon permits for the production of their goods, and any carbon
equivalency fees paid by importers for carbon-intensive goods
used in the production of their final manufactured items.51 This
carbon equivalency fee would in turn be paid out to domestic
producers of carbon intensive goods, to make up for the costs
they incur.52 This provision will be terminated in the event that
an international agreement is reached requiring carbon-emitting
countries to adopt similar measures, or when carbon-emitting
countries unilaterally adopt equivalent measures to those of the
United States.53
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Prior and subsequent to the Boxer Amendment last year,
both the Senate and the House of Representatives had introduced
a number of bills containing border adjustment measures, which
differed more or less substantially from the Boxer Amendment.
S.3036, which the Boxer Amendment replaced, for example,
contained significant differences in the timing of implementation, structure of oversight and implementation bodies, and the
definition of certain terms.54
Two pieces of legislation proposed in the House of Representatives also included border adjustment measures: H.R.6186, the
Investing in Climate Action and Protection Act (“H.R.6186”),55
introduced by Representative Markey, and H.R.6316, the Climate, Market, Auction, Trust & Trade Emissions Reduction
System Act of 2008 (“H.R.6316”),56 introduced by Representative Lloyd Doggett.
The terms of the border adjustment measures under
H.R.6186 are very similar to, if more simplistic than, S.3036. If
H.R.6186 is the House’s counterpart to S.3036, then H.R.6316
serves as the House’s counterpart to the Boxer Amendment.
Much of the terms and structure of H.R.6316 replicates the proposals in the Boxer Amendment. The fact that H.R.6316 was
the latest piece of climate change legislation introduced into the
House, and that it so closely echoes the direction and details of
the Boxer Amendment, again reinforces the notion that these
pieces of legislation will likely form the basis of some of the
future legislative efforts to regulate GHG emissions, particularly
on the Senate side.57

Are the Existing Border Adjustment
Proposals Consistent with World Trade
Organization Rules?
This section provides a brief overview of WTO rules that
could be implicated by the border adjustment proposals described
in the previous section, and discusses whether the proposals
would survive scrutiny under those rules. Because the proposals
for U.S. legislation are incomplete and likely to be substantially
revised prior to passage, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about the outcome of any future WTO challenge. However, notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is already quite clear
which WTO rules would be implicated in such a challenge, and
these rules provide an important roadmap for legislators hoping
to “appeal-proof” a final bill.
At least three distinct WTO agreements could come into
play in a challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. The
first is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).58
The relevant GATT provisions can be divided into two groups—
first, the fundamental trade principles that WTO Members must
uphold, and second, defenses that may be asserted to justify a
breach. Thus, a finding of a violation of one or more of the fundamental principles may not necessarily lead to termination of a
challenged measure if a legitimate defense is available.
One fundamental trade principle likely to come into play
if legislation like the Boxer Amendment enters into force is the
most-favored nation (“MFN”) clause of GATT Article I. The
MFN clause at Article I:1 provides, writ large, that if a WTO
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Member gives advantageous treatment to imports of a given
product from one WTO Member, it must provide the same
advantageous treatment to imports of the “like product” from
all the other Members as well. In short, a WTO Member may
not discriminate by providing better treatment to imports from
some countries than to imports from other countries. The obligation set forth in Article I:1 is broad, applying “with respect
to all rules and formalities in connection with imports.” Yet,
the Boxer Amendment at Section 1316(b)(3) would seem to
require this very mode of prohibited discrimination by imposing
the importer allowance requirement on imports from countries
deemed not to have taken “comparable action” to the United
States to combat climate change, while relieving imports from
other countries of this obligation. The MFN clause would thus
seem to present a significant hurdle under the WTO rules for
border adjustment mechanisms like the Boxer Amendment that
treat imports from different countries differently.
Another GATT principle potentially implicated by border measures is set forth in Article II, pursuant to which WTO
Members have agreed to “bind,” or fix, their customs duties on
imports at levels laid out in national schedules of concessions.
Under Article II:1(b), WTO Members have committed not to
impose customs duties in excess of their bound levels. Notably, this obligation extends to “all other duties or charges of any
kind.” The terms “all” and “of any kind” in this provision appear
to encompass an importer allowance requirement of the sort proposed by the Boxer Amendment.
The GATT contains another important prohibition on tradediscriminatory treatment—the national treatment provisions of
Article III. The general thrust of these provisions is that a WTO
Member must accord treatment to goods imported from other
WTO Members that is no worse than the treatment accorded
to domestically produced “like” goods. Any border adjustment
measure that imposes higher compliance burdens on imported
goods than it imposes on domestically produced goods could run
afoul of this national treatment requirement. Two elements of
Article III are most likely to come into play in challenges to border adjustment measures. The first is the requirement of Article
III:2 that imports shall not be subject to “internal taxes or other
internal charges” that exceed those applied to the “like” domestic products. The second is the requirement of Article III:4 that
imports shall be subject to regulatory treatment that is no less
favorable than that accorded to “like” products of domestic origin. A considerable body of WTO jurisprudence helps define
the scope of these obligations—including the perpetually tricky
question of how to define a “like” product.59 Unlike the vulnerability of an importer allowance program under the abovementioned GATT provisions, it seems possible for lawmakers
to craft a program that would impose comparable burdens on
imported and domestically produced goods alike. However,
there is no broad guarantee that such an effort would succeed;
if challenged, compliance with national treatment principles
may have to be assessed on a product-by-product basis, and
any incremental increase in the compliance burden imposed on
importers could render the program vulnerable.
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Yet another GATT provision that may be implicated by
border measures is Article XI:1, pursuant to which WTO Members may impose “no prohibitions or restrictions [on imports]
other than duties, taxes, or other charges.” This proscription
could readily be seen as applying to border measures intended to
deter carbon leakage such as importer allowance requirements—
particularly if the market price for allowances were to rise to a
level rendering importation cost-prohibitive.
As noted, a WTO Member may violate one of these fundamental principles, but still be able to justify the violation. Doing
so would require invocation of one or more of the “General
Exceptions” set forth in GATT Article XX. Two of the enumerated exceptions are generally understood as providing possible
cover for border adjustment provisions in a GHG emissions capand-trade scheme. The first is sub-article (b), for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and the
second is sub-article (g), for measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption.” Both of these exceptions appear sufficiently
broad for lawmakers to craft border measures to fit within their
parameters. Further, as a matter of intent, the GATT appears to
leave room for WTO Members to pursue their own environmental policies and does not attempt to harmonize national policies.
However, fitting a measure within one of the Article XX
sub-articles is not the end of the inquiry. Any defense of a measure under Article XX must also survive the test laid out in the
chapeau of that Article itself, which provides that the measure
may not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” In short, Article XX
does not shield protectionism masquerading as environmentalism. Would border adjustment measures that are, on their face,
intended to safeguard U.S. industries from foreign competitors
deemed to have an unfair cost advantage survive scrutiny under
the Article XX chapeau? Opinions on this question vary, and the
answer would ultimately depend both on the final wording of
U.S. legislation as well as how it is implemented.
Further, a considerable body of WTO jurisprudence now
exists on the Article XX chapeau, and provides some considerations likely to be applied in any challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. For example, in the recent Brazil-Tyres case,
the WTO Appellate Body struck down a Brazilian import ban
on retreaded tires that exempted imports from MERCOSUR60
countries. In a key passage in its holding, the Appellate Body
reasoned that the trade discrimination (i.e., imports were generally prohibited, but not if originating in MERCOSUR countries) at issue was not “rationally related” to the environmental
objective of the import ban.61 Another consideration likely to
arise in any challenge to final U.S. border adjustment measures
stems from the much-cited U.S.-Shrimp case, in which the WTO
Appellate Body explained that the legitimacy of an environmental measure with a trade-discriminatory impact may be shown
through earnest attempts by the importing country to negotiate
an international agreement that would ensure equal treatment of
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all affected trading partners. Under this test, a “serious, good
faith effort” to discuss a global climate change mitigation regime
may be sufficient.62
A second WTO agreement that may be invoked to challenge
U.S. border adjustment measures in cap-and-trade legislation is
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”). The TBT Agreement guides the application of technical
regulations and standards in order to avoid unnecessary obstructions to trade. Technical regulations are defined in Annex 1 of
the TBT Agreement as “document[s] which [lay] down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with
which compliance is mandatory.”63 This definition may extend
to requirements dealing with packaging, labeling, and marking.
In the context of border adjustment measures, if the measures
require that products be produced in accordance with certain
emissions control criteria in order to be imported freely into the
United States, for instance, this could trigger a TBT Agreement
challenge. Although none of the current proposals contain criteria that could be defined as a “technical regulation” for purposes
of the TBT Agreement, the alternative proposal described at
the end of this paper—as well as other proposals by commentators64—could trigger a challenge under these provisions.
There are four possible ways in which a challenge may
be raised against border adjustment measures under the TBT
Agreement. First, like the MFN and national treatment clauses
described in the GATT discussion above, TBT Agreement Article 2.1 requires that technical regulations must apply “no less
favorably” to “like products” of WTO Members than to “like
products” of national origin or of other countries.65
Second, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, technical
regulations must not be drafted or applied in a way that creates
an “unnecessary obstacle to trade,” or more specifically, must
not be “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.”66 However, under Article 2.2, legitimate objectives may include protection of the environment. Therefore, if
the U.S. Government were able to prove adequately that its technical regulations were designed to fulfill the objective of protecting the environment, and did not do so in an overly-restrictive
manner, then the technical regulations could survive a challenge
under this provision.
Third, the TBT Agreement mandates under Article 2.4
that, where international standards exist, they must be used as
a standard for WTO Members’ technical regulations.67 In this
case, no such global standards exist, but if new standards were
adopted pursuant to the UN climate change negotiations, then
these would necessarily have to serve as the basis of any technical regulations adopted in the United States, and if not, U.S.
regulations could be subject to a challenge under this provision
of the Agreement.
Finally, TBT Article 12 requires that WTO Members take
into account developing countries in applying technical regulations, particularly to ensure that such technical regulations do
not impose unnecessary obstacles to trade with these developing countries.68 Although most border adjustment measures
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proposed so far specifically exempt countries designated by the
UN as “least developed” countries, any legislation imposing
technical regulations should take this requirement into account
as well.69
The third WTO agreement that may come into play in a challenge to a U.S. competitiveness provision more generally is the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM
Agreement”).70 Exposure to claims under the SCM Agreement
could arise in several ways. One possibility, applicable to a
competitiveness measure that allocates emissions allowances to
some domestic manufacturing industries (but not others) at no
charge, would be a claim that the provision of free allowances
under such circumstances constitutes an actionable subsidy.71
Such a claim could be premised on a definition of “subsidy,” at
Article 1.1(a)(ii), which covers government decisions to forego
revenue that is otherwise due.72 However, for such a claim to
succeed, the alleged subsidy would also have to be “specific” for
purposes of Article 2—i.e., limited by law or in fact to certain
enterprises or industries. Further, a complaining WTO Member
could only prevail in such a case by demonstrating, under Article 5, that the alleged subsidy is causing “adverse effects” to its
interests.73 The obstacles to success in such a challenge would
be relatively high.
While not directly related to the adoption of competitiveness measures, a second way in which the SCM Agreement
might be implicated in relation to a national cap-and-trade program is through the government’s use of proceeds from the
sale of emissions permits. As noted earlier, President Obama’s
climate change agenda calls for substantial government investment in a range of clean energy technologies. It seems feasible
that such expenditures might be challenged by foreign governments seeking to nurture competing industries as impermissible
or actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Notably, the
SCM Agreement at its inception contained provisions insulating
certain “green box” subsidies described in Article 8.2(c) from
challenge.74 However, these exceptions were of limited duration, and expired in 2000 when the WTO Members could not
agree on their continuation.75 The expiration of these provisions
injects further uncertainty into the WTO risk analysis for any
national cap-and-trade system designed to promote clean energy
technologies.
Finally, the prospect of a WTO challenge to any competitiveness provisions that might ultimately be adopted raises litigation risk questions entirely apart from the application of the
above-mentioned rules. One of the worst-case scenarios would
be the imposition of different types of competitiveness provisions by different jurisdictions, spawning multiple and overlapping WTO challenges. The Director-General of the WTO, Pascal
Lamy, has referred to such a scenario as a “spaghetti bowl,” and
described the institutional problems it could raise for the WTO.76
In this scenario, the WTO’s dispute settlement process may well
be overwhelmed, both by the magnitude and complexity of the
legal issues as well as the unprecedented trade values affected
by the challenged measures. Further, regardless of the results of
any WTO challenge to climate competitiveness measures, the
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imposition of the measures themselves may poison the ongoing
UN negotiations towards a new global accord and invite retaliatory action.
These fears, even if speculative, point to the need for an
international climate change agreement in which all countries—
developed and developing—accept responsibility for reducing
worldwide GHG emissions. Indeed, this is the only viable solution to the climate change problem, and the only “exit strategy”
for countries that have or will unilaterally implement cap-andtrade systems domestically. Even if competitiveness measures
pass WTO muster, they are only temporary measures until
a global solution on climate change is achieved. In the meantime, domestic political reality in the United States (and in other
advanced economies) dictates that no domestic GHG cap-andtrade scheme can achieve adequate political support if it does
not ensure the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing
industries in light of the developing countries’ current stance on
prioritizing “development” over carbon reduction. Thus, designing competitiveness measures—and specifically border adjustment measures—to maximize their chances of surviving a WTO
challenge, to the extent permitted by domestic political reality,
remains the task at hand.

Minimizing the Risk that a Border Adjustment
Measure Will Run Afoul of WTO Rules
The preceding sections show that robust border adjustment
measures are a sine qua non of any final U.S. cap-and-trade system that may be enacted, but also that any such measure could
be subjected to a dizzying array of claims under WTO rules.
How, then, might the risk of reversal in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings be reduced?
As noted in the previous section, one of the key design challenges for border adjustment measures from a WTO risk reduction perspective is how to avoid overt—and unlawful—trade
discrimination. One way to avoid at least the surface appearance
of discriminatory treatment would be to design a measure so that
it does not apply at the border at all, but at the point of consumption within the U.S. economy, for all emissions-intensive goods
deemed to be vulnerable to carbon leakage.
Ideally, such a mechanism—which could take the form of
a requirement to submit certain standardized amounts of GHG
emissions allowances or offsets per quantity of the products at
issue77—would apply to all GHG-intensive products, regardless of country of manufacture. Refunds or rebates would then
be provided to suppliers able to certify that the products were
produced subject to a requirement to submit such allowances
or offsets (regardless of jurisdiction of submission).78 In other
words, this adjustment measure would be geared to an objective
emissions standard that is not, on its face, based on the country
of manufacture of the product. The difficulty, of course, would
be in the determination of the amount of allowances or offsets
required per product, which could raise concerns under the TBT
Agreement as previously noted.
The appearance of discriminatory treatment could be further
reduced if suppliers would be permitted to satisfy the standard
18

based on the emissions intensity of the manufacturer of the product at issue, as opposed to average emissions intensity for the
sector in the country of manufacture, as currently envisioned
under the Waxman-Markey draft. This would have the added
benefit of encouraging the adoption of more efficient manufacturing technologies—regardless of the country in which they are
deployed.
The above approach, while reducing the chances of being
found to violate the GATT’s non-discrimination principles and
border requirements, could also help buttress a defense under
GATT Article XX. As noted in the previous section, a GATT
Article XX defense can succeed only where the challenged measure does not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised trade restriction. Succeeding with
such a defense is more difficult where the measure at issue, on
its face, distinguishes between products based on their country
of manufacture. In such cases, the measure would likely have
at least the appearance of unwarranted trade discrimination—
especially if the ostensible purpose of the provision is to safeguard the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries.
However, if the operation of the competitiveness measure can be
moved from the border to the point of consumption in the U.S.

economy, as proposed above, and where it operates based on
an objective standard of manufacturing emissions intensity, it
should be easier to demonstrate that the measure truly advances
an environmental goal covered by one of the Article XX exceptions, and does not constitute a disguised trade restriction.

Conclusion
It is our hope that this article generates additional thought
and discussion as part of the U.S. legislative process in 2009
to craft an effective domestic cap-and-trade system, including
the ability to successfully safeguard the competitiveness of U.S.
firms that would likely have to bear heavier emissions compliance burdens than most of their foreign competitors. Carbon
leakage is a real concern in light of the possibility of a postKyoto Protocol international climate change agreement without
equivalent obligations undertaken by all heavy GHG emitters.
An effective and WTO-consistent adjustment measure (whether
applied at the border or at the point of consumption)—among
all of the competitiveness measures—appears to stand the best
chance of encouraging developing countries to meaningfully
participate in a global solution to a global problem.

Endnotes: B order Adjustment Measures in Proposed U.S. Climate
Change Legislation

1

Bryan Walsh, Despite the Economy, Obama Vows to Press Green Agenda,
Time Magazine, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1860431,00.html (quoting President Barack Obama, Taped Remarks at
the Governors’ Global Climate Summit (Nov. 18, 2008)).
2 Id.
3 WhiteHouse.gov, The Agenda – Energy and Environment, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
4 Barack Obama: New Energy for America: Reduce our Greenhouse Gas
Emissions 80 Percent by 2050, http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy_more (last visited Dec. 9, 2008).
5 Id.
6 The Bali Action Plan states that countries will act to enable the full implementation of the UNFCCC, through “measurable, reportable and verifiable
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions . . . by all developed
country Parties” and through “nationally appropriate mitigation actions by
developing country Parties….” Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from Dec. 3–15, 2007,
Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its
thirteenth session, ¶¶ 1.(b)(i)-(ii), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1* (Mar.
18, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.
pdf#page=3.
7 See Kent Garber, On Climate Change, Environmental Groups Want Obama
to Reverse Troubled Bush Legacy, U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 19,
2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/11/19/on-climatechange-environmental-groups-want-obama-to-reverse-troubled-bush-legacy.
html.
8 The six principles are:
1. Reduce emissions to levels guided by science to avoid dangerous
global warming. 2. Set short and long term emissions targets that
are certain and enforceable, with periodic review of the climate science and adjustments to targets and policies as necessary to meet
emissions reduction targets. 3. Ensure that state and local entities
continue pioneering efforts to address global warming. 4. Establish
a transparent and accountable market-based system that efficiently

19

reduces carbon emissions. 5. Use revenues from the carbon market
to: Keep consumers whole as our nation transitions to clean energy;
Invest in clean energy technologies and energy efficiency measures;
Assist states, localities and tribes in addressing and adapting to global
warming impacts; Assist workers, businesses and communities,
including manufacturing states, in the transition to a clean energy
economy; Support efforts to conserve wildlife and natural systems
threatened by global warming; and Work with the international community, including faith leaders, to provide support to developing
nations in responding and adapting to global warming. In addition
to other benefits, these actions will help avoid the threats to international stability and national security posed by global warming. 6.
Ensure a level global playing field, by providing incentives for emission reductions and effective deterrents so that countries contribute
their fair share to the international effort to combat global warming.
Senator Barbara Boxer, Principles of Global Warming Legislation (Feb.
3, 2009), http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.
View&FileStore_id=14dc734d-74c9-4fb3-8bf2-6d5d539226d1.
9 The Boxer Amendment was proposed as a substitute to S.3036, a piece of
legislation which was originally introduced into the Senate in October 2007
as S.2191, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008. S.2191 was
considered, and a revised version later reported to the Senate on May 20, 2008,
by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. On the same day,
a nearly identical version of S.2191 was reported by Senator Boxer, containing a slight amendment to render the legislation budget-neutral. This version
was renumbered from S.2191, becoming S.3036. Brent D. Yacobucci & Larry
Parker, Climate Change: Comparison of S.2191 as Reported (now S.3036)
with Proposed Boxer Amendment (Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress No. RL34513, 2008), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/
abstract.cfm?NLEid=2127.

Endnotes: Border Adjustment Measures in Proposed U.S. Climate
Change Legislation continued on page 59

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Avoiding the Derailment of Wind Power
Development: Why Federal Siting Regulations Are Necessary
Now for U.S. Wind Development
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

I

n the United States and around the globe, governments are
responding to climate change and energy security concerns
by shifting their energy policies to facilitate the rapid development of renewable energy.1 Today, wind energy is the fastest growing renewable technology,2 but in the rush to combat
climate change, officials have often ignored another brewing
conflict which looms larger with every turbine erected. It is a
conflict between two would-be allies, wind developers and wildlife conservationists, which if left unchecked has the potential to
derail wind energy development in the United States.3
The dispute centers around the dark secret of the wind
industry: the fact that poorly sited turbines can kill large numbers of birds and bats.4 As wind farms spread across the country, many scientists and conservation groups are concerned that
the cumulative effect will be devastating to already threatened
bird and bat populations.5 Pressure is growing from conservation groups to enforce wildlife protection laws that the government has only lightly enforced against wind farms so far.6 To
date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”), which is
responsible for protecting bird and bat populations, has refused
to initiate legal action against wind developers for their illegal
taking of endangered bird species.7 Three federal statutes under
the FWS’s jurisdiction—the Endangered Species Act, the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act—could all be enforced against wind farm developers that
illegally kill endangered or protected birds and bats.8 However,
even the threat of such litigation could potentially be enough
to end wind energy development in the United States by making development too costly or too risky for investors.9 Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, for example, every knowing illegal
taking of a migratory bird could lead to a $250,000–$500,000
fine and up to two years in prison.10
While conservation groups agree that protecting wildlife
from the unnecessary danger posed by turbines is a significant
concern, most agree that climate change poses a greater threat
to wildlife and their habitat than do wind farms.11 Stopping all
wind development is not a viable solution to the problem. Fortunately there may be a middle ground.
Studies show that bird fatalities are extremely varied from
wind farm to wind farm and even between turbines in the same
site, with some turbines producing almost no fatalities and others killing hundreds.12 The Altamont Pass in California is the
site of one of the oldest wind farms in the United States and is
also a migratory bird route and home to North America’s largest
Spring 2009

population of Golden Eagles.13 It is estimated that every year
4,700 birds are killed by turbines at Altamont Pass, compared
to less than a hundred at similarly sized wind farms sited with
avian impacts in mind.14 This provides strong evidence that a
wind farm’s impact on birds and bird habitats can be greatly
mitigated through proper siting, design, and management.
Globally, avian mortality has typically not been part of wind
farm impact assessments, but in 2003 the Council of Europe for
the Bern Convention responded to this growing issue with recommendations and guidelines for including avian impact assessments in wind farm development proposals.15 Since then, wind
farm planning in the EU has included avian impact assessments
and a number of wind farms have been rejected due to their
potential deleterious impact on birds and bird habitat.16 European conservation groups are also creating bird impact maps to
help planners assess the potential impacts of specific wind projects on birds and bird habitat.17
The United States now needs mandatory federal regulations that provide clear wind farm siting guidelines that include
bird impact assessments. Unfortunately, there are currently no
mandatory federal guidelines, and few state or local guidelines,
regulating turbine siting. However, in 2007 the FWS convened
a Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Committee to develop recommendations regarding minimizing the impacts of wind farm
development.18 In March 2009 the Committee came back with
its recommendations which include conducting pre-development wildlife impact studies and avoiding locations identified
as having a high potential risk to birds or bats, establishing nondisturbance bird and bat buffer zones, and not locating turbines
between daily roosting, feeding, and nesting sites.19 The Committee’s recommendations are expected to become the basis of
new federal turbine siting guidelines.20 Such strategies will help
reduce the building pressure between wind developers, conservation groups, and officials by giving them a common means
of collaboration without resorting to legal actions that have the
potential to significantly impede wind energy development in
the United States.

Endnotes: Avoiding the Derailment of Wind Power Development
continued on page 62
* Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University, Washington College of Law. He is also the founder of Valkyrie Energy LLC,
a renewable energy development firm focusing on new and developing markets.
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The Clean Technology Fund and Coal:
A Cautionary Tale for Copenhagen
by Steve Herz*

I

Introduction

n the absence of concerted action, global greenhouse gas
emissions are projected to almost double by 2050. Much of
this increase will come from industrialization in developing
countries.1 Due to resource constraints and the conviction that
developed countries must take responsibility for their historical
emissions, most developing countries are unlikely to act aggressively to restrain their emissions growth without substantial
help from the developed world. Accordingly, the Bali Action
Plan calls for a global deal in which developing countries take
enhanced “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” supported
by technology, financing, and capacity building from the developed world.2 This will require a substantial transfer of resources
and capacity. The Stern Review estimated the incremental costs
of necessary low-carbon investments in developing countries to
be at least $20–30 billion per year.3 So far, however, little assistance has been forthcoming. One of the most important potential outcomes of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) negotiations at Copenhagen will
therefore be the creation of a publicly-funded mechanism that
can provide sufficient concessional resources to help developing
countries transition to lower carbon growth trajectories.
A critical issue that the negotiators will have to resolve is
how to define the mechanism’s funding criteria to ensure that
its concessional funds are used most effectively. This poses an
important strategic choice: will the mechanism focus exclusively
on initiatives that can help catalyze transformational changes in
existing emissions patterns, or will it also provide support for
marginal improvements in the efficiency of existing technologies and practices? While the case for targeting concessional
public funding towards emerging low-carbon technologies is
compelling, there undoubtedly will be significant political pressure from developing countries to allow support to also be used
for incremental improvements in high-emitting sectors.
The recent decision by the World Bank-administered Clean
Technology Fund (“CTF”) to authorize support for certain
coal-fired power plants may provide some insights into how
the UNFCCC may resolve this issue. The CTF has an explicit
mandate to finance “transformational action” to help developing
countries transition to a low-carbon development path.4 Nevertheless, its new financing criteria authorize support for coal
technologies that may be only slightly more efficient than those
that are already preferred by the private-sector, and that include
carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) readiness criteria that have
little chance of ever resulting in the capture or storage of any
carbon dioxide (“CO2”).
21

The CTF’s willingness and ability to contravene its mandate to catalyze transformational change with regard to coal
does not bode well for Copenhagen. The World Bank is likely
to have some influence in the structure of a UNFCCC mechanism, and has an institutional interest in promoting the CTF
standards. Regardless of whether the World Bank plays a role in
the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may look to the CTF
standards as precedent.
Moreover, many of the broader political forces that produced the CTF standards will also be at play in Copenhagen.
Participating countries have not called the CTF to account for
its incrementalism because it largely reflects their policy preferences. Many participating countries are not yet ready to concede
that the Earth’s dwindling carbon sink capacity can no longer
support development strategies based on the relentless expansion of fossil fuel consumption. Unless this political dynamic is
altered at Copenhagen, there is little reason to expect the Parties
to agree to markedly more ambitious criteria for a new UNFCCC
mechanism.

The Clean Technology Fund
The Clean Technology Fund is one of two Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) created by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (“MDBs”) to provide an interim
source of concessional financing while the UNFCCC mechanism is being negotiated.5 The CTF will support public- and
private-sector investments that contribute to “the demonstration, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies with
a significant potential for long term greenhouse gas emissions
savings.”6 Eligible investments include low-carbon power and
transportation projects, and large-scale energy efficient initiatives and other demand management projects.7
Although the CTF is administered by the World Bank, its
decision-making process is partly independent of the governance structure of the Bank and the other MDBs. Every project
funded by the CTF must be approved by both the board of the
implementing MDB and a separate Trust Fund Committee of
the CTF.8 Unlike the weighted voting at the MDBs that heavily
favors donor governments, votes on the Trust Fund Committee
are equally apportioned between eight representatives selected
by the donor countries and eight representatives selected by the

* Steve Herz is Climate Finance Advisor for Greenpeace International. Mr. Herz
is also the founder of Lotus Global Advocacy, a legal and policy consultancy based
in Oakland, California that advises non-governmental organizations on international environmental and human rights law and policy. He can be reached at
steve.herz@sbcglobal.net.
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recipient countries. The committee also includes a non-voting
representative from the World Bank, the other participating
MDBs, and the host country of any investment proposal that is
under consideration.9

The CTF’s Focus on Transformational Change
The stated objective of the CTF is to support “transformational” actions that represent a “step change” over current
practice.10 Towards this end, the CTF provides support for lowcarbon technologies that are approaching the point of “market
take-off,” and that have the potential to significantly reduce
emissions.11 Two categories of technology are eligible for assistance. As a matter of priority, the CTF focuses on technologies
that are already available commercially, but need incremental
assistance to compete with conventional options in the recipient country.12 It will also finance
technologies that have been
proven to be technically viable,
but have not yet been commercially deployed at scale. The
CTF will not support technologies that are still in the research
stage.13
In theory, this is a sound
strategy for targeting public subsidies. Left to their own devices,
private markets may let important new technologies languish
in the “valley of death” between
laboratory success and commercial viability.14 Innovations that
mitigate social costs are particularly vulnerable to getting
bogged down at this stage of
development. Well-targeted public subsidies can provide a critical push to accelerate their commercial uptake.15 Accordingly,
the CTF should target its scarce concessional funds at assistance
that can help accelerate “near market” renewable energy technologies down the cost and learning curves to the point where
they are competitive with fossil fuels.16 And to its credit, the CTF
has recognized that the potential to reduce deployment costs and
increase learning for future investments should be key considerations in its decision to support a proposed investment.17

relatively scarce. Instead of squandering these limited resources
on incremental efficiency improvements for incumbent technologies, the CTF should focus on helping zero-emission alternatives, such as base-load solar, become cost competitive. Indeed,
using concessional public money to subsidize coal—however
efficient—does nothing to hasten the day when low-carbon
technologies can reliably out-compete coal and other fossil fuelbased energy sources.19
The CTF has compounded this strategic error by adopting
permissive criteria for efficiency and CCS-readiness. The CTF
ostensibly precludes the use of its funds to support sub- or supercritical coal power plants.20 Its financing criteria, however, are
not adequate to the task. The Criteria for Financing Low-Carbon
Opportunities in Coal and Gas Power Investments (“Criteria”)
note that “typical” supercritical coal-fired power plants with
emission factors of 0.80 tons
CO2 per megawatt hour (net) (t
CO2/MWh (net)) are now “the
system of choice for new commercial coal-fired plants in many
countries.”21 Nevertheless, the
Secretariat has set the proposed
baseline carbon-intensity threshold for CTF investment at 0.795
t CO2/MWh (net), a mere 0.005 t
CO2/MWh (net) below the emission factor for the current “system of choice.”22 In addition to
being incredibly incrementalist,
this standard may not be consistent with the commitment not to
finance super-critical plants. As
the World Bank’s own private
sector lending arm has noted,
super-critical coal plants can achieve even lower emissions
factors.23
Worse, the 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) threshold is only an initial benchmark; it can be adjusted upward based on specified siteand country-specific conditions.24 This flexibility is not clearly
constrained in the CTF Criteria. The Criteria do not (a) explain
the circumstances in which these upward adjustments will be
allowed; (b) propose any guidelines for MDB staff to implement
them; or (c) establish maximum allowable adjustments. Under
the Criteria, then, the CTF could presumably finance coal projects that are substantially more carbon-intensive than the baseline 0.795 t CO2/MWh (net) would appear to require, or even
than the super-critical plants that the Trust Fund Committee has
excluded.
The Criteria also fail to require the use of control technologies for capturing other air pollutants, such as flue gas desulfurizers (“FGD”), selective catalytic reducers (“SCR”), and
low-nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) burners. These technologies are
not necessarily required in developing countries, and their use
reduces the efficiency (and thus increases the CO2 intensity)

Many participating
countries are not yet ready
to concede that the Earth’s
dwindling carbon sink
capacity can no longer
support development
strategies based on the
relentless expansion of
fossil fuel consumption.

An Incrementalist Approach to Coal
Yet, in practice, the CTF has subverted its strategy of facilitating the uptake transformational technologies by authorizing
support for certain coal-fired power plants. Under its new guidelines, the CTF may provide subsidies for coal-fired plants that
meet specified energy efficiency standards and are considered
to be “ready” to capture and store carbon.18 This is a conspicuously ill-advised use of scarce concessional financing for climate
mitigation. Any coal plant financed by the CTF will emit enormous quantities of CO2 for the foreseeable future. Concessional
funds for bringing transformational technologies to market are
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of a coal-fired plant.25 In the absence of specific pollution control standards, the Criteria may allow (or implicitly encourage) operators to meet CO2 emissions standards at the cost of
increased emissions of other pollutants. This, too, is hardly
transformational.

The False Promise of Carbon Capture
and Storage-Readiness
Arguably, the CTF could finance coal projects while meeting its strategic objectives by limiting eligibility to CCS demonstration projects that would help drive innovation and force
down costs. However, the CTF has explicitly eschewed such a
role. Because CCS technology is currently at the research and
development stage, it is not eligible for CTF co-financing, even
on a pilot or demonstration basis.26 Instead, a new coal-fired
power plant need only be “CCS-ready” to be eligible for CTF
financing. Under the CTF Criteria, a plant will be considered
CCS-ready if the project sponsor
has:
a) provided adequate space
in the design of the facility
for the equipment needed to
capture CO2;
b) identified feasible options
to transport CO2 to a storage reservoir that is large
enough to hold the lifetime
emissions of the plant; and
c) conducted an analysis of
CCS options and the viability of plant with CCS operation.27
Due to cost considerations, capital investment in CCS technology is not required.28
The most likely outcome of this approach is that CTFfinanced coal plants will remain “ready” for CCS indefinitely,
but will never actually capture or store any CO2. As one wit has
put it, calling these plants CCS-ready is like calling my driveway “Ferrari-ready:” my driveway can certainly accommodate
a Ferrari, but the chances of one being parked there are vanishingly small.29 Although the basic technology is well understood,30 commercial-scale CCS is not expected to be widely
available for at least 15–20 years.31 In the best-case scenario,
then, these plants will spew CO2 for the first third to half of their
operational lifetimes. In reality, however, there is little reason to
believe that CTF-financed plants will be early adopters of CCS
technology. Since the CTF does not actually require retrofitting,
and since CCS is expected to be extremely expensive and reduce
plant efficiency by as much as a third,32 operators will not retrofit on their own. Only strong regulatory requirements, a steep
price on carbon, or a robust concessional financing regime will
have the potential to induce a plant operator to undertake such
an investment.
None of these potential drivers of CCS uptake currently
exists in the developing world, or is likely to be implemented

in the near to middle term. Few if any developing countries are
seriously considering carbon emissions regimes that would be
stringent enough to eventually induce or require plant operators
to retrofit their facilities with CCS technology. And assuming
such regulations were to be enacted, there is little reason to be
confident that they would be well-enforced. Even in countries
with relatively effective regulatory and enforcement regimes,
utilities have proven to be remarkably adept at avoiding or
delaying mandates to upgrade their facilities to improve environmental performance.33
It is also unlikely that any country that might host a CTFfinanced coal project would implement policies to internalize
the cost of carbon. In the current political environment, such a
proposal would be a non-starter. But even if that were to change
over time, the cost of carbon emissions would have to rise significantly before it would make economic sense to implement
CCS technology. A recent study
by McKinsey estimates the cost
of emissions reductions through
CCS to begin at about $75–115
per ton, and to decline by half
after 2030 when the technology has matured.34 By way of
comparison, the price of carbon
emissions under the European
Trading Scheme is currently
about €13 per ton (approximately U.S. $17 per ton).35
The most likely way that
CTF-financed projects would
ever implement CCS technology, then, is by accessing further concessional funds to finance
the retrofit. But even this is highly speculative and, at best, a
distant prospect. First, CCS is not currently eligible for credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,
the most important existing conduit for such financing.36 While
this would likely change if the technology matured, the availability of carbon credits would not provide sufficient incentives for operators to retrofit until the cost of abating emissions
through CCS falls below the price of carbon credits. This is not
expected to occur until at least 2030.37 Second, it is also possible
that a new UNFCCC financing mechanism could support the
retrofit CTF-financed projects. But even if concessional funds
were made available for CCS retrofits, there is little reason to
believe that CTF-financed projects would be the best candidates
for these funds. Commercial scale CCS is so embryonic that it
is too soon to say which of the currently available coal combustion technologies will prove to be the most cost-effective to
retrofit.38

Although the basic
technology is well
understood, commercialscale CCS is not expected
to be widely available for
at least 15–20 years.
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Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale
for Copenhagen
The best that can be said for the CTF’s willingness to finance
coal-fired power plants is that, on its own terms, it is not likely
to have a momentous impact on international efforts to redirect
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developing countries toward lower-carbon development paths.
To date, donors have pledged relatively small sums of money,39
some of which may not be disbursed. And at least some of the
money that eventually reaches the CTF will go to more appropriate technologies. Indeed, the first three loans under consideration
by the CTF, totaling U.S. $900 million, will support renewable
energy and urban transport initiatives, not coal.40 In any event,
the CTF is intended to be a short-term mechanism that will wind
down its operations once the new UNFCCC financial architecture has been put in place.41
The critical question raised by the CTF’s embrace of coal,
then, is what that decision may portend for the criteria to be
adopted by the UNFCCC financing mechanism that is to be
created in Copenhagen in December 2009. That mechanism is
expected to be the primary conduit for developed countries to
meet their obligations to finance the deployment and diffusion
of low-carbon technologies in developing countries. Moreover,
under the Bali Action Plan, the mitigation efforts that developing countries will be expected to undertake will be explicitly
linked to the kinds of financing and support that is provided by
developed countries.42 As a result, the financing criteria adopted
by the UNFCCC mechanism will be a key component of the
effectiveness of the Copenhagen agreements.
The CTF’s affiliation with the World Bank is likely to
enhance its relevance in the Copenhagen negotiations. The
World Bank will continue to be an influential player in Copenhagen, and appears to be positioning itself to play a key role in
the implementation of the UNFCCC mechanism. But even if the
World Bank is not afforded a direct role in the UNFCCC mechanism, the negotiators may consider the CTF standards to be an
important precedent for the UNFCCC’s financing criteria. Historically, there have been numerous examples of World Bank
internal environmental and social standards being widely treated

as international best practice, regardless of their substantive
shortcomings.43
Apart from the World Bank’s role, there are other reasons to be concerned that the criteria adopted by a UNFCCC
mechanism may not be demonstrably better than those of the
CTF. Some developing countries are skeptical of renewable
alternatives—particularly those technologies that are not yet
commonly employed in developed countries. These countries
would prefer to continue to rely on coal despite its environmental disadvantages.44 This preference was expressed in the Trust
Fund Committee’s deliberations over the proposed standards, in
which influential recipient country representatives endorsed the
inclusion of coal and questioned the need for CCS-readiness criteria. It has also been expressed by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. At the CoP-11/CMP-1 in Montreal, the Parties instructed
Annex II countries, and Annex I countries “in a position to do
so” to give priority to “[c]ooperating in the development, diffusion and transfer of less greenhouse-gas-emitting advanced fossil-fuel technologies, and/or technologies relating to fossil fuels
that capture and store greenhouse gases, and encouraging their
wider use . . . .”45
It remains to be seen whether the same political forces
that shaped the CTF criteria will define the parameters of the
UNFCCC mechanism. There is some reason to believe that
the dynamics may be shifting. The U.S. Congress for example,
recently refused to fund the CTF out of concern by some members over the coal financing criteria.46 And perhaps the leadership
of the new U.S. administration, or the urgency and heightened
public scrutiny of the Copenhagen meetings, will create space
for negotiators to take a more ambitious approach to mitigation
financing than was evidenced by the CTF. But unless the political dynamic is changed, there is little reason to expect that the
outcomes will be any different.
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The Importance of Venture Capitalism to
Clean Technology and the Government’s
Role in Fostering its Development During
the Recession
by Janet Hager*

T

echnological advancement in clean energy has become
a key U.S. initiative because of its potential for spurring
economic growth and creating energy independence.1 Any
attempt to encourage the development of clean technology in the
United States must also foster venture capitalism in the sector.2
Venture capital plays an important role in the U.S. economy
by creating jobs and revenue.3 Venture capital firms pool the
resources of many investors, which include individuals, pension funds, corporations, charities, and college endowments. 4
The firms then invest the pooled fund into new companies.5
Venture capital has backed some of the most successful and
innovative companies in the United States, including Apple,
Google, Starbucks, and Whole Foods.6 Venture capital is particularly important to technological innovation for two reasons.
First, venture capital funds innovative projects that cannot gain
access to traditional banking funds.7 Second, venture capital
drives technology forward by financing projects that will not be
funded by larger companies because of their disruptive nature in
the marketplace.8
Encouragingly, venture capital firms have already begun to
tap into the new market of clean technology.9 Market trends indicate a continual pull away from unsustainable sources of energy
like petroleum and natural gas, so venture capitalists have begun
to favor investments in renewable energy.10 The clean technology sector has seen an extraordinary boom in investment capital
in recent years.11 In 2001 venture capital in clean technology
made up less than one percent of total venture capital investments.12 By 2008 however, venture capital in clean technology
made up fifteen percent of the total venture capital invested.13
Unfortunately, there are signs that the recession has finally
caught up to venture capital investments in the industry.14 In the
first quarter of 2009, investments in the clean technology sector
fell by forty-eight percent from the first quarter of 2008.15
The government does have the power to indirectly curb the
effects of the recession on the clean technology venture capital
market by implementing policies that make investments in the
sector more attractive.16 On February 17, 2009 Congress enacted
the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes
eighty-three billion dollars of clean technology incentives.17 The
act emphasizes clean technology as a way to drive the economy
and create jobs.18 It will promote investments in clean technology in three key ways: direct grants, tax incentives, and loan
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guarantees.19 The incentives are primarily targeted at “smart
grid technologies, advanced batteries, fundamental renewable
energy research and a host of energy efficiency projects.”20 Further, because venture companies in clean technology stand to
benefit from the new influx of funding from the government, it
is likely that investments of venture capital into these benefited
companies will also be spurred.21
However, in order for the various new stimulus funds to be
effective in helping the survival of clean technology companies
struggling in the recession, the funds must be distributed quickly
and effectively.22 The ability of the government to meet this
goal is questionable. For example, one loan guarantee program,
established in 2005 by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) under
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, was plagued by a four-year hold
on disbursement, where none of the available grant money was
distributed.23 The stimulus bill allotted an additional six billion
dollars to this same loan grant program.24 The new funds in the
stimulus need to be distributed much more quickly than they
have been under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 if they are to
stand a chance at preventing “a raft of potential bankruptcies or
crippling retrenchments through 2009” among clean technology
companies.25
Quick disbursement is all the more essential as other countries enter the race to develop the best new clean technologies.
Recently, China announced that it intended to become the world’s
leader in hybrid and all-electric vehicles.26 This announcement
comes at the same time as the United States’ first all-electric
mass-manufactured vehicle is waiting for federal aid from the
DOE’s loan guarantee program.27 Encouragingly, however, there
are signs that the inertia in federal government to disburse funds
is coming to an end. The DOE has gained momentum with the
arrival of Stephen Chu, the new Secretary of Energy.28 Chu has
made disbursement of the loan guarantees a priority, and the first
alternative energy loan was finally awarded.29 If more releases
of stimulus funds into clean technology follow, there is reason
to be optimistic that venture capitalism in clean technology will
recover as the funds put new life into the industry.30
Endnotes: The Importance of Venture Capitalism to
Clean Technology continued on page 64
* Janet Hager is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University Washington
College of Law.
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Overcoming Institutional Barriers to
Biomass Power in China and India
by Craig A. Hart & M.L. Rajora*

B

Introduction

iomass offers a potentially ideal source of fuel for
cleaner power generation and the support of sustainable
development in developing countries.1 It is the fourth
largest source of primary energy in the world and the largest
source of renewable energy, supplying about ten percent of
2004 total primary energy supply.2 Biomass could account for
in excess of thirty percent of the world’s primary energy by the
year 2050.3
Biomass power generation technology is mature, yet deployment of this technology on a wide scale faces significant institutional barriers related to the
difficulty associated with sourcing a reliable and affordable supply of biomass. Biomass power
production at a large scale also
poses significant water and food
security issues if not managed
properly.
The authors review China
and India’s laws and policies
regarding biomass supply in
order to assess their institutional arrangements for application of biomass technology.
We selected China and India
for study because they are the
world’s largest countries in
terms of population, their economies and energy demand are rapidly growing, and they have
large agricultural sectors. Biomass will be increasingly important to these countries as they seek to meet energy demand in a
sustainable manner.
This article examines the advantages of biomass energy for
developing countries; the barriers posed by difficulty in obtaining an economical, adequate, and reliable supply of biomass;
and how China and India have prepared for biomass generation
by addressing these barriers through legislation. It describes policies and programs developed by China and India to encourage
expansion and integration of this important technology into the
existing energy infrastructure.

number of countries can reach fifty to ninety percent of total
energy supply.4 In these countries, biomass is used as the primary source of energy for home heating and cooking in rural
areas.5 However, the burning of biomass, which typically occurs
in enclosed areas, poses threats to human health, and is a primary cause of respiratory diseases in developing countries.6
Biomass electricity generation can provide household
energy without the adverse health impacts of using biomass
directly in homes. Further, biomass power generation can significantly reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides, mercury,
particulate emissions, and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
compared to coal power plants.7
Coal currently supplies eighty
percent of China’s power,8 and
sixty-nine percent of India’s
power.9 As is well-known, pollutants from coal power plants
cause serious health effects,
such as birth defects, as well as
cancer and respiratory illness;
they also pollute land and water
and poison food supplies.10
Biomass power generation
can also help reduce the use of
chemical fertilizers in agricultural production and promote
the development of organic
agriculture. The ash product of
a biomass power plant can be
processed into fertilizer for use by farmers. In turn, the greater
reliance on organic fertilizers can reduce the negative effects of
chemical fertilizers on soil and ultimately significantly promote
water conservation.11
For China, estimates for the amount of agricultural biomass
available range from approximately 250 to 376 million tons per
year, out of a total of approximately 726 million tons of crop
residue generation.12 This could supply cooking fuel for over
half a billion people.13 China’s forests produce additional bio-

Biomass power
generation can
significantly reduce sulfur
dioxide and nitrous oxides,
mercury, particulate
emissions, and greenhouse
gas emissions.

Advantages of Biomass for
Developing Countries
In developing countries, biomass typically accounts for
as much as twenty to thirty percent of energy supply and in a
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Crop

Production
Million Tons
of main crop

Rice

90

Types of
Residues

Production of
main crop to
residue ratio

Quantity
of residues
in Million
Tons/yr

Straw

1.3

117

Used as cattle feed in Southern and Eastern India.
Generally burnt in the fields in the North.

Husk

0.3

27

Used as a fuel by small industry.

Typical Uses of Residues

Wheat

80

Straw

1.5

120

Used mainly as cattle feed.

Coarse Cereals

30

Straw and
Husks

1.8

54

Used as cattle feed and as fuel.

Sugarcane

320

Bagasse

0.3

96

Mainly as a captive fuel by sugar plants,
partly as raw material for papermaking.

Tops

0.05

16

Used as cattle feed

Trash

0.07

20

Mostly burnt in the fields.

Shell
Fibre

0.13 kg/nut
0.2 kg/nut

0.2
2.8

Partly as domestic fuel.
Used partly, for making mattresses, carpets, etc.

Pith

0.2 kg/nut

2.8

No productive use. Disposal is a problem.

Stalks

3.0

10.5

Partly as domestic fuel

Gin Waste

0.1

0.35

Used as a fuel for brick making and by small
industry.

Coconut

Cotton

14 billion nuts

3.5

Oilseeds

20

Straws and
husks

1.1

22

Pulses

14

Straws

1.3

18

Partly as a domestic fuel

Jute/Mesta

2.0

Stalks

2.0

4

Used partly as fuel for processing tobacco
leaves/domestic fuel

Total

499

Figure 1: India’s Estimated Annual Biomass Production
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. Note: Based on 2006–2007 production.

mass residue of about 24.77 million cubic meters per year using
sustainable forest management practices.14
For India, biomass has long been the main energy source for
cooking and heating. India produces approximately 500 million
tons of biomass per year.15 Biomass has emerged as an increasingly attractive option for power generation due to the growing
demand for power, recurrent power shortages throughout the
country, a projected shortage of coal for power generation, and
the high cost of diesel and other fossil fuels.
Biomass electricity generation plants could potentially help
farmers by providing supplementary income from their farm
waste to aide in stabilizing farming communities and land use
patterns and provide permanent and seasonal employment in
rural areas. Biomass for electrification should be integrated into
existing property and cultural patterns without requiring the consolidation of small farms into larger operations.
If planned properly, biomass power plants should be able to
use only waste biomass that would not require additional water or
displace food crops. Further, biomass plants using waste should
favor food security by increasing income to rural farmers and
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keeping land in production. However, if the adoption of biomass
power generation changes indigenous agricultural practices, the
biomass power plant could potentially require additional water
resources or require land that otherwise would produce food to
convert to fuel production.

Barriers to Biomass as a Fuel for
Power Generation
The primary barrier to biomass power generation is the ability to obtain adequate supply of biomass at an economical price.
In developing countries, there is typically no organized market
for biomass fuel.16 As a result, there is no price consistency for
biomass material. Lack of transportation infrastructure and the
cost and availability of transportation fuels limit the development of regional markets, resulting in fragmented and localized
biomass markets.17 The seasonal nature of biomass material,
the variation in quantity, and the low density of such material
further complicate the development of an organized market for
biomass.
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Biomass also faces significant transaction costs resulting
from the quantities of biomass required to be collected from
large numbers of farms.18 Contracts with small farmers for a
guaranteed supply of biomass would not likely be commercially
practicable or enforceable, given that natural conditions play a
major factor in biomass production and enforcement costs would
be prohibitive.
Further, biomass electricity generation competes with many
other uses of biomass. As noted, in developing countries, biomass is commonly used for home heating and cooking in rural
areas, and it is burnt by farmers to help fertilize growing fields.19
Other sources of competition include use by ranchers as a source
of feed for livestock, use as a source of supply for construction
materials such as bricks and roofs, and use by the paper industry
as a source of material for making paper.
In addition to market barriers to biomass, there are also
environmental and resource barriers. For example, the availability of water for growing crops such as sugarcane or for cooling a
power plant can limit the introduction of biomass power generation in certain geographic areas.20

Biomass Supply and Cost Impacts on Project
Financing
Biomass supply requirements for a small-size power plant
are substantial. The financial performance of a biomass plant is
highly sensitive to the cost of biomass supply. In order to assess
the risks associated with fuel supply, we conducted a financial
analysis based on the retrofit of a coal plant to a biomass-fueled
combined heat and power plant in China.
The financial analysis assumes electricity is priced based
on preferential rates provided pursuant to China’s Renewable
Energy Law, but that no additional subsidies are considered. The
project financial analysis further assumes that Clean Development Mechanism certified emission reduction certificates are
sold by the project for 90 renminbi (“RMB”)21 per metric ton
carbon dioxide for a three-year period.
We calculate that a combined heat and power biomass
power plant with energy capacity of 24 Megawatts (“MW”)
requires 270,000 tons of straw (assuming a moisture content of
twenty-five percent) per year. Such a power plant would require
three ten-ton truckloads of biomass every hour continuously in
order to operate at full capacity.
Based on the average size of farm in China (approximately
3 mu, or 0.002 square kilometers), we estimate that each farm
produces 1.2 to 1.8 tons of straw per year, and that the power
plant will require straw from an average of 180,000 farms. In
our example, supply must be sourced within a 75 km radius of
the plant so that transportation costs are acceptable, however the
cost and risk to the plant increases with distance. A plant operator would likely require much shorter distances to ensure profitability. Further, in terms of sustainability, we estimate that more
than half of all transportation related carbon emissions in biomass production can be avoided if the supply is located within
25 km of the power plant.
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In rural China, the average annual income in 2005 was 3,255
RMB per year. If straw could be sold for 125 RMB per ton, we
estimate that the average farm supplying 1.5 tons of straw per
year could increase their annual income by almost 200 RMB/
year, an increase of almost six percent that could be very helpful
to a low-income household.
The project’s financial performance is highly sensitive to
the price of straw. For our hypothetical 24 MW project, a 25%
increase in the price of straw reduces the project’s the internal
rate of return (“IRR”) on equity from 28.4% to 21.5% and the
debt service coverage ratio (“DSCR”) from 2.25 to 2.02, assuming a 70% debt-to-equity ratio. In contrast, a one million RMB
increase in initial costs slightly decreases IRR on equity from
28.4% to 28.3%, and the DSCR from 2.25 to 2.24.
While our example still shows very good returns, the
increase in straw price can result in a significant reduction in
profit, and ultimately cause a marginal project to fail. If the market is thin or fragmented, as is typical, the potential for local biomass prices to spike as a result of the introduction of a biomass
power plant are real and could render the project uneconomic.

Plant Size

3
MW

6
MW

12
MW

24
MW

Best Case (assumes Straw Price 130 RMB/Ton)
IRR Equity %

27.8

14.2

23.0

28.4

DSCR

2.19

1.69

2.03

2.25

Initial Cost (RMB
millions)

114

183

315

547

IRR Equity %

24.3

8.9

17.0

21.5

DSCR

2.07

1.52

1.83

2.02

Straw Price Increases 25%

1 Million RMB Increase in Initial Costs
IRR Equity %

27.5

12.1

22.2

28.3

DSCR

2.15

1.60

2.00

2.24

Effect of each 1 million
RMB increase on IRR

–0.3

–2.1

–0.8

–0.1

Effect of each 1 million
RMB increase on DSCR

–0.4

–0.9

–0.2

–0.1

Figure 2: Financial Analysis of Combined Heat and Power
Biomass Power Plant in China
Source: Craig Hart, China Biomass Combined Heat & Power
Multi-Stakeholder Negotiation, Energy + Environment OpenCourseWare, http://eeocw.org/environmental-negotiation/china-biomasscombined-heat-and-power-multi.
Note: The improvement in financial results for a 3 MW power plant
results from the use of more efficient technology that is currently only
available on smaller scales.
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Policy and Regulatory Frameworks
in China and India

CASE STUDY: CHINA

We review China and India’s laws and policies regarding
biomass supply in order to assess their institutional arrangements for application of biomass technology.

China
China’s National Development Reform Commission set
targets for development of renewable energy, including 30 GW
of biomass renewable energy to be built by 2020.22 In support
of this goal, the country has developed a series of laws, regulations, and policies with the intention of achieving this substantial increase in biomass use.
China’s Renewable Energy Law supports various kinds of
renewable energy, including biomass, through a system of preferential electricity prices that vary on a regional basis.23 The law
also provides additional payments for electricity generated with
low sulfur emissions.24 Subsidies for biomass electricity and
desulfurization abatement equipment terminate after 15 years.25
The Renewable Energy Law guarantees sale of renewable electricity to the power grid.26
China also offers various financial incentives for biomass.
This includes subsidies supporting R&D, low interest loans to
projects, and grants to rural households for wood-stoves and
bio-gas systems.27 China also provides tax incentives, including
reduced customs taxes for imported equipment and an income
tax holiday for industries whose main inputs are wastes.28
All land and natural resources in China are owned by the
state, and leased to land users. China’s property laws and regulations do not, to our knowledge, contain any provisions providing for biomass to be supplied to power generators. China does,
however, forbid the direct burning of crop residues within the
vicinity of roads, and railway and transportation infrastructure.29
The measure is intended to increase the utilization of crop residues as fertilizer, materials for industrial use, and straw and stalk
gasification.
China’s Ministry of Finance issued the Interim Measures for
Administration of Special Funds for the Development of Renewable Energy in May 2006 to fund studies, standards formation,
resource surveys, production of equipment, and construction of
projects in remote areas in the field of renewable energy, including biomass and biofuels.30 The funds provide both cash appropriation and subdidized loans. The Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Construction issued the Interim Measures for
Administration of Special Funds for Using Renewable Energy in
Construction in September 2006.31 This fund provides financial
support to renewable energy, including biomass, used in construction of buildings, such as biomass energy to be used for
heating and cooling systems, hot-water supply, electricity for
lighting, and cooking.32
The Ministry of Finance issued the Notice of Interim Measures of Administration on Subsidy Funds for Using Straw as
Energy Resource in 2008.33 This “Special Fund for Straw” supports enterprises that convert crop straw into energy, including densification briquetting fuel, straw gasification, and straw
29

China’s Microturbine Approach to
Biomass Technology1
The Research Center for Energy and Power of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences is developing an innovative approach to distributed biomass utilization for
rural electrification, heating, and cooking by adapting
the technology to conditions in the biomass market.
The approach uses local small-scale pyrolysis facilities
to convert biomass to synthetic gas and active carbon
(“char”). Pyrolysis is a thermo-chemical process that
breaks down biomass, waste, or other substances by
heating it to high temperatures (e.g., 300°C to 500°C
for various types of biomass), leaving only carbon residue at certain temperatures.2
The synthesis gas produced from the pyrolysis process would then be used for home heating and
cooking (replacing direct burning of biomass), and as
a fuel source for distributed electric power generation.
The approach relies on distributed power plants using
micro-scale gas turbines (approximately 100 KW in
size) and gas engines. We estimate that a 100 KW gas
turbine could require less than approximately 1,500
tons of biomass per year to operate (assuming biomass
has twenty-five percent moisture content). The much
smaller biomass supply required for a microturbine
reduces the risks associated with larger biomass power
generation facilities. The active carbon produced from
the pyrolysis process can then be used as a natural fertilizer, replacing chemical fertilizers. In addition to
increasing agricultural productivity, active carbon also
increases the soil’s carbon absorption.
1

Source: Interview with Dr. Xiao Yunhan, Professor of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and China’s Ministry of Science & Technology (Apr. 17, 2009).
2 Pyrolysis is widely used to convert waste into safely disposable
substances, to produce various chemical products, to crack hydrocarbons in the refining processes, and to produce biofuels from animal wastes.

carbonization. In Chinese law, straw includes paddy rice, wheat,
corn, legumes, vegetable material that can be pressed to extract
oil, cotton, and tuber crops and remains produced during the
initial processing of crops. To be eligible for support from the
Special Fund for Straw, the following requirements must be
satisfied:
• Enterprise must have registered capital of RMB 10 million
or more;
• Enterprise’s utilization of straw as energy resource conforms
to local regulations governing general utilization of straw;
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

• Enterprise’s annual straw consumption is at least 10,000
tons; and
• Enterprise’s products are commercialized and has stable
customers.
China’s energy technology subsidies programs are intended
to increase the efficiency of biomass power generation and integrate it with buildings (a major power user), which will help
make biomass power generation less expensive and more financially stable. The Special Fund for Straw is intended to directly
address the risks associated with biomass supply. However,
these subsidies are likely to be temporary in nature. Thus, the
long-term strategy should be to increase efficiency of biomass
technologies, and to adapt technologies to the conditions of the
biomass market.

India
In 1981, India created a government commission with overall responsibility for developing renewable energy and a separate
Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources in the Ministry of Power that eventually evolved into the Ministry of New
and Renewable Energy.34 The Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy issued the Renewable Energy Power Purchase Guidelines to all States in 1993, followed by the Energy Conservation
Act of 2001, which mandated adoption of standards and procedures and prescribed measures for energy conservation.35 The
Electricity Act of 2003 guaranteed interconnection for renewable energy sources and provided recommendations for preferential tariffs and quotas for renewable generation.36 Almost all
states have implemented some form of preferential tariffs for
renewable energy generation, and have set general quotas for
renewable energy, but have not specified quotas by energy type.
The amount of subsidies depends upon the type of technology
used in the project and the equipment’s level of efficiency.37
These measures have been strengthened by the National Electricity Policy of 2005, the Tariff Policy of 2006, the Rural Electrification Policy of 2006, and the Integrated Energy Policy
Report of the Planning Commission of India in 2006.38 Today,
India’s power market mostly comprises regulated prices with a
few states introducing open bidding on electricity through ten to
fifteen year power purchase agreements.
In addition to preferential rates specified by the state regulatory authority39 and guaranteed grid access, a number of cash
and tax subsidies are available to aid in the development of biomass. Federal subsidies are available to developers of biomass
power plants. The amount of the subsidy depends upon the efficiency rating of the plant. The government exempts imported
and domestic equipment from excise duties, and offers accelerated depreciation treatment for energy efficiency and biomass
power generation equipment. Finally, the government offers a
10-year tax holiday that applies to biomass power plants.40
Regarding the natural resources available for the facilitation of biomass development, abundant sugarcane bagasse is
the main raw material for biomass power generation in India.
India is the world’s second largest sugarcane producing country, following Brazil.41 In India, bagasse electricity production
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CASE STUDY: INDIA
Water-Efficient Sugarcane
Farming in India1
Sugarcane is traditionally a water-intensive crop,
requiring steady irrigation for a full eighteen-months to
two-year growing period. Without abundant local water
resources, sugarcane requires extensive irrigation that
competes against other food crops and can be costly both
financially and ecologically. Conventional sugarcane
farming also relies heavily on fertilizers and pesticides.
An innovation pioneered by a local farmer in Karnataka, India, replaces the practice of soil flooding with
providing enough water to maintain soil moisture. The
method involves reducing the number of irrigation
channels, building up the soil’s organic content and
earth fauna, eliminating synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and adopting no-till practices. Elimination of the
water flood and these other changes enhance soil aeration and fertility, and reduce susceptibility to disease.
The method reduces water requirements by as
much as seventy-five percent compared to conventional
sugarcane farming, increases farming profits by eliminating costs of fertilizer and pesticides, better preserves
the soil, and produces comparable or better yields.
Farming associations, such as the Organic Farmers
Club, teach these and other techniques; however, these practices have yet to be institutionalized in government policy.
1

See Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, UN Development
Programme, Water-efficient sugarcane farming; India, in Examples
of Successful Economic, Environmental and Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives in the South 102 (Sharing Innovative Experiences
Series, vol. 3, 2000), available at http://tcdc.undp.org/Sie/experiences/vol3/Water-efficient.pdf; Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, Farmers Innovations, Community Development and the Ecological Management in Organic Agriculture, Case
Study 1: No-till sugar cane cultivation with alternate row irrigation,
Belgaum, Karnataka, India, in Organic agriculture, environment
and food security (Nadia El-Hage Scialabba & Caroline Hattam,
eds., 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
Y4137E/y4137e07.htm.

is generally combined with the production of sugar, with a portion of the electricity used to power the mill, and the excess sold
into the grid. The cogeneration of power with sugar production
strengthens the overall financial condition of the project.
In order to promote sufficient biomass supply for each
facility, sugarcane mills are required to be located a minimum
distance from each other by state law. For example, in Uttar
Pradesh, India’s leading sugar cane growing region,42 mills may
not be located within a 15 km radius of each other.43
30

The Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (“IREDA”), a government-owned corporation that promotes,
develops and finances renewable energy and energy efficiency
projects, requires biomass power plant seeking financing to
demonstrate that, for each MW of nameplate capacity, a plant
will have access to at least 10,000 tons of biomass material each
year in close proximity to the plant, and an additional 10,000
tons of surplus in the surrounding area. As a general guideline,
in order to ensure supply of biomass, IREDA prohibits more
than one biomass power plant in a single district and a minimum distance of at least 50 km between power plants. IREDA
further requires that the quality of the biomass material have at
least 2,000 kilocalories per kilogram. Finally, to be eligible for
financing, the cost of the plant may not exceed U.S. $800 per
KW nameplate capacity, depending upon boiler configuration
and cooling system.
In the context of a private market, India’s laws provide a
degree of protection from over-competition for supply of biomass;
this is particularly important where land ownership is predominately private, as it is in India. Even with these protections, power
plant owners still have ample incentive to pay a competitive rate
for biomass supply, and to maintain good relationships with farmers. We are aware of examples of power plant owners providing
their farm suppliers with financial assistance to purchase fertilizer,
offering education on agricultural techniques, and even access to
company health care facilities, schools, and other services.44

Conclusions
China and India both plan for biomass power generation to
increase significantly. Both countries have provided preferential electricity tariffs and guaranteed sale of biomass and other
renewable energy to the power grid. Beyond these steps, the
approaches taken by the countries diverge.
India has developed an innovative institutional approach
that is appropriate to its market economy and legal system. It
relies on private sector generation of power and limiting (without
eliminating) competition for the supply of biomass through state
law and IREDA’s lending guidelines. In contrast, China’s efforts
focus on financial support of developing biomass resources and
technology and financial support for the purchase of biomass.
China’s technology development efforts include research and
development to increase the efficiency of traditional biomass
technologies and an innovative program to develop microturbine biomass facilities in an effort to adapt to the institutional
and market conditions facing biomass technology in China.
Notably, China and India’s policies focus primarily on the
promotion of the use of biomass. Our survey did not identify
laws or policies designed to address water and food security
issues. Both China and India will need to more fully integrate
water resource planning into their energy policies as biomass
power generation is scaled up to meet energy demand.

Endnotes: O vercoming Institutional Barriers to Biomass Power
in China and India

1

Biomass includes crop residues, waste by-products of crop processing
(e.g., rice straw, husk, wheat straw, coarse cereals, straws and husk, sugarcane
baggasse tops, etc.), woody produce of forests and plantations, and biomass
acquired from growths in wastelands.
2 International Energy Agency, Renewables in Global Energy Supply: An
IEA Factsheet (2007), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2006/
renewable_factsheet.pdf.
3 See V. Dornburg & A.P.C. Faaij, Assessments of future global biomass
potentials and their linkage to specific local conditions such as water, land-use,
biodiversity, food production and economy, 2007 Proceeding Eur. Biomass
Conf. Eur. & Exhibition 383; see also International Energy Agency, Energy
to 2050: Scenarios for a Sustainable Future (2003), available at http://www.
iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/2050_2003.pdf; Thomas B. Johansson et al.,
Renewable Fuels and Electricity for Growing World Economy, in Renewable
Energy Sources for Fuel and Electricity 1 (Thomas B. Johansson et al. eds.,
1992).
4 See generally Veronika Dornburg et al., Biomass Assessment, Assessment
of global biomass potentials and their links to food, water, biodiversity,
energy demand and economy (2008).
5 See, e.g., Martin Donohoe & Emily P. Garner, Health Effects of Indoor Air
Pollution From Biomass Cooking Stoves, Medscape Today, May 19, 2008,
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/572069?src=mp&spon=42&uac=5243EK.
6 Id.
7 New Mexico Biomass Information Clearinghouse, Benefits of Using Biomass, http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/emnrd/biomass/benefits.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009).
8 U.S. EPA Combined Heat & Power P’ship & Asia Pacific P’ship on Clean
Development & Climate, Facilitating Deployment of Highly Efficient Combined Heat and Power Applications in China 10 (2008), available at http://
www.epa.gov/chp/documents/chpapps_china.pdf.
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World Coal Institute, Coal Info: India, http://www.worldcoal.org/pages/
content/index.asp?PageID=402 (last visited April 20, 2009).
10 See Fact Sheet, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Dirty Coal Is Hazardous to Your
Health: Moving Beyond Coal-Based Energy (2007), available at http://www.
nrdc.org/health/effects/coal/coalhealth.pdf.
11 E. M. Morrison, Ash back: Research Looks at Recycling Waste Ash for Fertilizer, Apr. 11, 2008, http://www.farmandranchguide.com/articles/2008/04/11/
ag_news/production_news/pro17.txt.
12 See Eric D. Larson, Modernizing Biomass Energy, in Climate Change
and Development 271, 284 (2000), citing J. Li et al., Assessment of Biomass
Resource Availability in China (1998), available at http://environment.yale.
edu/topics/786; see also Center for Renewable Energy Development et al.,
Biomass Support for the China Renewable Energy Law: International Biomass
Energy Technology Review 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter CRED], available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/40626.pdf.
13 See Larson, supra note 12, at 284.
14 See CRED, supra note 12, at 2.
15 See infra, Table 1.
16 See, e.g., N.H. Ravindranath & D. O. Hall, Biomass, Energy & Env’t
14 (1995) (examining several challenges to developing markets for renewable
energy in India, including ensuring the maintenance of a sustainable supply of
biomass).
17 See generally Stéphane Straub, Infrastructure & Growth in Developing
Countries: Recent Advances & Research Challenges (World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4460, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1080475# (examining the connection between
development of transportation infrastructure and economic growth).

Endnotes: Overcoming Institutional Barriers to Biomass Power in
China and India continued on page 64

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act and a New Role for Government in Clean
Technology Project Financing by James Hunter*

A

s a result of the current global economic crisis and credit
crunch, financial institutions, governments, and companies recognize that traditional project finance regimes
in the realm of clean technology are potentially outmoded.1
For example, traditional tax incentives that once spurred major
financial institutions towards investing in clean technology projects no longer fuel the sector’s financial development, as the tax
incentives for those investments dried up along with banks’ profits in 2008 and 2009.2 Additionally, investors are shifting their
focus from capital-intensive projects like solar energy technology towards less capital-intensive projects like emerging smart
grid technologies.3 Revisions to tax incentives and the revitalization of the Department of Energy (“DOE”) Loan Guarantee
Program are two innovative responses introduced by the Obama
administration and the U.S. Congress through the passage of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) that
address this realignment.4 With these programs, the new administration is signaling that the development and success of a clean
technology sector is both the litmus test and poster-child for economic recovery.
The Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)5 and
the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (“PTC”)6 are
among the most important tax incentives for institutional investment into clean technologies. The ITC provides a tax credit on
up to thirty percent of expenditures for investment in alternative
energy sources, such as solar power, fuel cells, and small wind
turbines.7 Similarly, the PTC institutes a “per-kilowatt-hour tax
credit for electricity generated by qualified energy resources
and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person” for a specified
period of time—usually 10 years.8 These corporate tax incentives
worked so long as the financial institutions had profits and tax
liabilities to be offset by the tax credits; unfortunately, since the
financial crash in 2008, this system is no longer sustainable.9
In light of this development, Congress and the Obama
administration enacted important revisions to the incentive
structures of both the ITC and the PTC through the ARRA. The
credits now provide for the option to take either the PTC or ITC
credit, or to receive an equivalent cash grant from the Treasury
Department.10 Further, the ARRA extended the deadlines of
PTC credits and removed an ITC provision limiting the credit
for new projects that also receive subsidized financing.11 Critics
have applauded this revision, noting that the ability for investors
to receive federal cash almost immediately “is much simpler and
more affordable than the old periodic tax credit schemes favored
by Congress” and will “significantly lower the cost of financing.”12 Effects of the revised tax incentive structure and the
Spring 2009

credit crunch are leading some businesses to reassess traditional
project financing and business models. For example, the California based utility Pacific Gas & Electric recently announced it
would install solar power facilities using its own capital to take
advantage of the ITC.13
On March 20, 2009, DOE announced the first clean-energy
loan guarantee for the California solar company, Solyndra.14 The
$535 million loan guarantee is the result of a $39 billion appropriation in the ARRA to DOE for direct investment in backing
renewable energy projects.15 This loan guarantee program is
not new—in fact the Energy Policy Act of 2005 first authorized
DOE to issue these loan guarantees16—however, DOE, for various reasons, has failed to disburse any funds until now.17 Not
only will the loan guarantee program assist in revitalizing projects that may have lost financing as a result of the credit crisis,18 the program will also aid in allaying the fears of risk averse
investors who may see potential in projects, but have shied away
from investing in capital-intensive and unproven technologies.
Several other noteworthy projects are awaiting review of
their loan guarantee applications, including the highly anticipated all-electric Tesla Motors Model S sedan. Tesla requires
$450 million in government funds—$250 million of which would
come from the DOE loan guarantee program, and the remainder
from a 2007 Congressional bill authorizing $25 billion for electric vehicle technologies—in order to continue production of the
car.19 Energy Secretary Steven Chu aims to streamline the loan
application process and disburse seventy percent of the ARRA
funds by the end of 2010.20
The latter ARRA provisions represent a significant shift
from traditional bank backed project finance and help to keep
capital-intensive projects afloat in these tough economic times.
Additionally, the provisions help stabilize the incentive structure
surrounding clean technology investment in order to avoid the
historical cycle of “unnecessary fluctuation in tax credits, leading to alternating periods of investment followed by instability
when the federal credit terminates.”21 Despite the controversies
surrounding the expenditures required by the ARRA, the provisions regarding clean technology are sound policies in uncertain
times.

Endnotes: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
continued on page 65
* James Hunter is a J.D. Candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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The Montreal Protocol Must Act to
Prevent Global Climate Change While
Restoring the Ozone Layer
by Mark W. Roberts*

Introduction
“Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing
can be changed until it is faced.”
—James Baldwin

T

he Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) has forced the phaseout of more than ninety-five percent of several classes of
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer in developed countries
and approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of these ozone
depleting substances (“ODSs”) in developing countries.1 As a
consequence of these phase-outs, a significant portion of ODSs
that are used as refrigerants and foam-blowing agents are now
being replaced with hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”). Although
HFCs are not ODSs, they are extremely powerful greenhouse
gases (“GHGs”) that exacerbate climate change. Most HFCs
have a global-warming potential (“GWP”)2 hundreds to thousands of times greater than carbon dioxide (“CO2”). The Montreal Protocol must respond to climate impacts of HFCs by
encouraging the use of other energy-efficient ODS substitutes
with low GWP.
A second issue that the Montreal Protocol must address is
that, although existing stockpiles of ODSs have been taken out of
service, ODSs in discarded stockpiles, equipment, and products,
collectively referred to as “Banks,”3 are rapidly emitting powerful GHGs into the atmosphere.4 The emissions from Banks are
delaying the recovery of the ozone layer and exacerbating global
climate change. Banks are currently not regulated by either the
Montreal Protocol or the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The
Montreal Protocol must take responsibility for the Banks, created by the use and effective phase-out of ODSs, before these
GHGs are emitted to the atmosphere. The International Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) and the Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) estimated in 2002 that approximately 21 gigatons (“Gt.”) of CO2 equivalent (“CO2-eq.”) are
contained in Banks.5 Unless action is taken now, the IPCC/
TEAP Special Report predicts that total direct emissions of
CO2-eq. are expected to reach 2.3 Gt. per year by 2015, nullifying
all of the reductions in GHGs achieved under the Kyoto Protocol.6
The history of the Montreal Protocol is one of a dynamic
and evolving treaty that responds quickly to changes in ozone
and climate science, technology, and the needs of industries and
countries dependent on ODSs and their substitutes. Following
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in this tradition, and consistent with the purpose and spirit of
the Montreal Protocol to protect the global environment, decisions should be made to include high-GWP HFCs among the
categories of regulated chemicals and to expand the Montreal
Protocol’s mandate by covering the destruction of Banks. Critically-necessary actions to achieve these goals include:
1. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to add high-GWP
HFCs as controlled substances.
2. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to discourage the production and consumption of high-GWP HFCs and to finance
the incremental costs that developing countries must incur
to avoid using high-GWP HFCs.
3. Expansion of the Montreal Protocol’s activities to include
the management and destruction of Banks worldwide.
4. Coordination with the UNFCCC to: (a) have the phase-out of
high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be incorporated into post-Kyoto Protocol institutions for other GHGs;
and (b) develop effective funding mechanisms for destroying Banks before they are released to the atmosphere.
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have repeatedly recognized the need to address the full environmental implications of
their actions.7 Regulation of high-GWP HFCs, a class of chemicals that was commercialized directly due to the phase-out of
ODSs under the Montreal Protocol, and managing and destroying
the Banks of ODSs are the next steps in fulfilling this mandate.

The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol has been widely touted as the most
successful international environmental treaty to date, having
phased out the production and consumption of the vast majority of ODSs in accordance with set timeframes. The Montreal
Protocol includes the innovative approach of having developed countries (“non-Article 5 countries”) phase out ODSs on
a faster schedule than developing countries (“Article 5 countries”), thereby acknowledging both developed nations’ larger

* Mark W. Roberts is a partner at the law firm of McRoberts & Roberts, LLP
in Boston, Massachusetts and specializes in environmental, energy, and land use
law. He has been actively involved in international environmental issues and has
participated at the Montreal Protocol as an NGO representative. J.D., University
of Denver, B.Sc. McGill University. Portions of this article are reproduced from
the report “A Climate Briefing” with permission from the Environmental Investigation Agency. The report can be found at http://www.eia-global.org/PDF/report
--Climate--Jan09.pdf.
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contributions to historic emissions and developing nations’
need to provide for their own future economic and environmental development. Additionally, the Montreal Protocol includes
proven mechanisms to assist Article 5 countries in meeting their
ODS reduction goals by facilitating technology transfer and providing financial assistance to ensure compliance and the creation
of necessary infrastructure.
The most basic tenet of the Montreal Protocol is the Parties’
obligation to limit “consumption” and “production” of “controlled
substances.”8 By definition, “controlled substances” include any
substance listed in the annexes to the Montreal Protocol, regardless of whether it exists alone or within a mixture.9 To enable the
Parties to meet their mandate to
restore the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol can add a substance
to the annexes of controlled substances when it is recognized as a
significant ODS.10 Additionally,
the Montreal Protocol permits
Parties independently to regulate substances not included in
the Protocol or undertake more
stringent control measures than
required under the Montreal
Protocol.11
It is important to note that,
while the Montreal Protocol sets
specific timelines for the phaseout of ODSs, it does not specify
the manner in which the phaseout goals are to be achieved.
This flexibility allows Parties
to meet the targets in a manner
best suited to their individual
situations.12 Parties are permitted to utilize materials that have
been stockpiled, produced, or used as a feedstock in the production of other chemicals.13 Moreover, trade in recycled and used
chemicals is not included in the calculation of consumption to
encourage the recycling of materials as a means of satisfying
consumption needs while facilitating phase-out of production.14
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, entitled Special Section
of Developing Countries, was negotiated to establish a grace
period for compliance with the control provisions to phase out
consumption and production of ODSs ranging between ten and
fifteen years, depending on the chemical, beyond the deadlines
for developed countries.15 Only those nations with an annual
per capita consumption of ODSs of less than 0.3 kilograms per
year can take advantage of the more lenient extended phase-out
schedule.16 Article 5 charges developed nations with the responsibility to provide financial and technological assistance to the
developing nations in the implementation of technologies and
processes with less ozone depleting effects.17
Under Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol, non-Article 5
countries are required to transfer “best available, environmentally

safe substitutes and related technologies” to Article 5 nations at
“fair and most favorable trade conditions.”18 This commitment
to facilitate the access of developing countries to relevant scientific information, data, training, and technology was reasserted
in the Helsinki Declaration adopted at the First Meeting of the
Parties in 1989.19

Financial Mechanism/Multilateral Fund
To address the hesitancy among developing nations to ratify
the Montreal Protocol due to concerns over resources required
for compliance and impacts on their development,20 mechanisms were incorporated into the Montreal Protocol to provide
the financial resources necessary for developing nations to meet
their shared obligations. The
dominant feature of the financial
mechanisms is the Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of
the Montreal Protocol (“Multilateral Fund”),21 designed to
cover incremental costs incurred
by developing countries as a
result of the phase-out of their
consumption and production of
ODSs.22
Every three years, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
determine the budget for the
Multilateral Fund for a threeyear “triennium,” with contributions from over forty developed
nations based on a United
Nations assessment scale.23 The
Multilateral Fund is managed by
an Executive Committee comprised of seven industrialized
nations and seven developing
countries, which reports annually to the Meeting of the Parties.24
At the 56th Meeting of the Executive Committee in Doha, Qatar
in November 2008, the Executive Committee approved 116 projects and activities for sixty-five countries totaling $57,347,247
plus $9,956,600 support costs for bilateral and implementing
agencies.25
The Multilateral Fund has helped industry in developing countries replace chemicals and equipment and reorganize
production processes, effectively stimulating the redesign of
products.26 The Multilateral Fund has played a pivotal role in
facilitating the transfer of technology and enhancing capacity
building and development capabilities, thereby contributing to
the overall success of the Montreal Protocol.

The Montreal Protocol’s
continued condoning of
the use of high-GWP
HFCs conflicts with its
precautionary and holistic
approach to phasing
out ODSs by creating
altogether different, but no
less dire, environmental
consequences.
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Recognition of the Interplay Between
ODSs and Climate Change
The Montreal Protocol has already significantly benefited
international climate change mitigation. It is estimated that the
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and other ODSs will
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have reduced GHG emissions by 135 Gt. of CO2-eq. between
1990 and 2010.27 Both the text of the Montreal Protocol and subsequent decisions by the Parties make clear that the phase-out
of ODSs should not occur in a vacuum; rather, relevant scientific information and environmental impacts, including climatic
effects, should be considered. The Parties supported this concept
by adopting Decision V/8 in 1993,28 requiring Parties to consider ODS substitutes in light of their environmental impacts.
The following year, the Parties further expanded their mandate
to consider environmental impacts other than ozone depletion
by adopting Decision VI/13.29
That requires the TEAP to “consider how available alternatives
compare with hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), with
respect to such factors as energy
efficiency, total global warming
impact, potential flammability,
and toxicity.”30
The interplay between the
phase-out of ODSs and climate
change was again explicitly
recognized at the Tenth Meeting of the Parties in 1998 when
forty Parties issued a statement
making it clear that climate
impacts should be considered in
the work of the Montreal Protocol. The Parties stated that there
are “scientific indications that
global warming could delay the
recovery of the ozone layer” and
“environmentally sound alternative substances and technologies
are available for virtually all HCFC applications.”31 The Parties
urged:
all Parties of the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS
replacement technologies, taking into account their
total global-warming potential, so that use of alternatives with a high contribution to global warming should
be discouraged where other, more environmentally
friendly, safe and technically and economically feasible
alternatives or technologies are available.32
The Montreal Protocol’s contribution to climate change and
the high GWP of many ODSs and their substitutes are widely
recognized.33 As a result, in 2007, the Parties decided to accelerate substantially the phase-out of HCFCs, primarily due their
emissions contribution to global climate change.34 It is estimated that the more rapid phase-out of HCFCs will result in the
following:
• A reduction of potential emissions of HCFCs by approximately forty-seven percent from what would have been
emitted if the accelerated phase-out had not been adopted,
avoiding the emission of nearly one million tons of ODSs; and
• A transition to low-GWP substitutes for HCFCs that are
currently commercially available and under development,

avoiding between 3 and 16 Gt. of CO2-eq. emissions into
the atmosphere.35
The role of the Montreal Protocol in controlling GHGs was
explicitly affirmed in the 2007 G8 Summit Declaration, which
pledged: “We will also endeavor under the Montreal Protocol
to ensure the recovery of the ozone layer by accelerating the
phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency
and climate change objectives.”36 Following the historic agreement to accelerate the phase-out of HCFCs, the Leaders Meeting
of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change
reaffirmed their commitment to
helping the climate by declaring
on July 9, 2008: “[R]ecognizing
the need for urgent action . . .
we commit to . . . actions under
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer for the benefit of the
global climate system.”37 The
explicit focus on climate benefits and energy efficiency, in
addition to ozone benefits, when
assessing the overall impacts
of ODS substitutes and other
strategies adopted by the Montreal Protocol, is consistent with
the Montreal Protocol’s history
of basing actions on sound science and objective technical
assessments.
At the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties in November
2008, the impact on the global climate of ODS substitutes was
recognized in Decisions XX/7 and XX/8, which began the process of evaluating the management and destruction of Banks
and the availability and feasibility of low-GWP alternatives to
ODSs.38

The regulation and
phase-out of high-GWP
HFCs under the Montreal
Protocol would ensure
a more comprehensive
approach by all significant
producers and users
of HFCs on an
equitable basis.
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Preemptive Action Encouraging the Use of
Low-GWP Alternatives to ODSs Will Have
Significant Climate Benefits
The timing is right for the Parties to control the use of highGWP HFCs as ODS substitutes, even if these substitutes are
not ODSs themselves, as the commercialization of high-GWP
HFCs is the direct result of the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of
ODSs. The UN Conference on Environment and Development
calls on the Parties to “[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone depleting
substances, consistent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing
that a replacement’s suitability should be evaluated holistically
and not simply on its contribution to solving one atmospheric
or environmental problem.”39 The Montreal Protocol’s continued condoning of the use of high-GWP HFCs conflicts with its
precautionary and holistic approach to phasing out ODSs by creating altogether different, but no less dire, environmental consequences. This is particularly true where substitutes for ODSs
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with low-GWP, including carbon dioxide (GWP = 1), hydrocarbon and hydrocarbon blends (GWP < 3), and HFC-152a (GWP
= 140) are all technically- and economically-feasible replacements for high-GWP HFCs currently used in both automotive
and stationary air conditioning and refrigeration units.40
The Montreal Protocol has historically regulated refrigerants, foam-blowing agents, aerosols, firefighting chemicals,
specialty medical chemicals, and a limited number of other
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer. As a result, the Parties
have acquired an in-depth understanding of these industries and
the uses of ODSs. HFCs are now being used as replacements for
ODSs in the same sectors41 or are being created as by-products
of the production of these ODSs.42 Therefore, regulating HFCs
would be a logical extension of the Montreal Protocol’s mandate
and consistent with its holistic approach to sectors interacting
with and affected by the phase-out of ODSs.
Decision XX/8, adopted in November 2008, requested that
the TEAP report on the status of alternatives to HCFCs and
HFCs include a description of the various use patterns, costs,
and potential market penetration of alternatives.43 The results of
the TEAP’s investigation are going to be presented at a workshop before the next Open-Ended Working Group Meeting in
Geneva, Switzerland in July 2009.44 The meeting will address
technical and policy issues related to ODS alternatives, with a
particular focus on how the Montreal Protocol can address the
impact of high-GWP HFCs while maximizing the ozone and climate benefits of the early phase-out of HCFCs.45 The UNFCCC
has been invited to participate, as HFCs are within the “basket”
of GHGs being controlled by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It is anticipated that the results of the investigation and
workshop will lead to concrete measures to encourage the use of
low-GWP substitutes for ODSs.
Unless the use of high-GWP HFCs is promptly curtailed
globally, their rapid emergence as the primary substitutes for
HCFCs and other ODSs could significantly negate the climate mitigation benefits achieved by the historic phasing-out
of ODSs, offsetting reductions of other GHG emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. Absent coordinated global action under the
Montreal Protocol in consultation with the UNFCCC, emissions
of ODS substitutes will exacerbate the global climate crisis. The
Montreal Protocol has the technical and funding mechanisms
in place to implement control measures in order to address the
prompt phase-out of high-GWP HFCs and demonstrate how
classes of GHGs within specific sectors can be effectively controlled and eliminated. However, having the phase-out of HFCs
occur under the Montreal Protocol will require substantial international support. The control of HFCs by the Montreal Protocol
would be a model for a UNFCCC sectorial approach to control
of GHGs after 2012. The Parties must act with urgency once
again to strengthen and expand the scope of the Montreal Protocol by amending it to control high-GWP HFCs before their use
and production are widespread and the cost to transition to lowGWP substitutes increases exponentially and becomes potentially prohibitive.
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Emissions From Banks Pose an Immediate
Climate Threat
Emissions from Banks threaten to delay the recovery of the
ozone layer and dramatically impede global efforts to combat
climate change. While the use and production of many ODSs
have been drastically reduced over the past two decades, ODS
Banks still remain in products and machinery throughout the
world. ODSs in Banks are continuously being released to the
atmosphere, either through leakage or when ODSs or products containing them are disposed of at the end of their useful
lives.46 However, the Montreal Protocol defines “consumption”
as imports plus production minus export, thus excluding the
regulation of ODSs in Banks from the Montreal Protocol.47 This
does not include the atmospheric release of ODSs from Banks
and as a result ODSs have not been regulated by the Montreal
Protocol to date. Nonetheless, potential solutions exist to remedy this problem.

Banks Can Be Effectively Maintained and
Destroyed
The mandate for the Montreal Protocol must be immediately
expanded to implement a comprehensive program to address the
maintenance and destruction of Banks. The TEAP has estimated
that the potential cumulative savings if ODSs were recovered
and destroyed across all sectors would be approximately six
billion tons of CO2-eq. between 2011 and 2050, noting that a
sizeable portion of those ODSs would require significant collection efforts.48 To put this into perspective, this large a release
of GHGs would offset all of the gains accomplished under the
Kyoto Protocol.49 If the world’s Banks of ODSs in refrigeration,
stationary air conditioning, and mobile air conditioning (i.e.,
those that are most easily and cost-effectively recovered) were
destroyed, it is estimated that the release of approximately 2.8
Gt. of CO2-eq. would be prevented by 2015.50 As these emissions are already occurring continuously throughout the world,
the gains that could be achieved by preventing these “super”
GHGs from being emitted to the atmosphere are available
immediately.
Approximately forty percent of Banks are installed in the
refrigeration and stationary and mobile air conditioning sectors,
while the remaining sixty percent are in foams, medical aerosols, fire protection, and other sectors.51 Furthermore, Banks are
continuing to increase as the complete phase-out date for ODSs
approach52 and the phase-out of HCFCs is being expedited.
Therefore, Banks will become an increasing problem in the near
future.
The Montreal Protocol and the Parties to it have recognized
the risk to both the ozone layer and global climate from emissions from Banks. As a result, the scope of the problem and the
destruction options and their associated costs have been evaluated for many years.53
In November 2008, at the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties,
the Parties took the first concrete steps to manage and destroy
Banks. In Decision XX/7,54 the Parties agreed to a broad range
of actions to evaluate the management and destruction of Banks,
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including: (1) evaluating ways to mitigate emissions of ODS
from Banks through the Montreal Protocol or by national and/
or regional legislative strategies; (2) authorizing pilot projects to
evaluate collection, transport, storage, and destruction of ODSs
to generate data on how these measures will protect the ozone
layer and achieve climate benefits; and (3) evaluating and adopting best practices and performance standards to prevent emissions from Banks, whether by recovery, recycling, reclamation,
reuse as feedstock, or destruction.55 The Parties also commissioned the TEAP to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of destroying
banks of ODSs versus recycling, reclaiming, and reusing such
substances, taking into consideration the relative economic costs
and environmental benefits to the ozone layer and climate.56
Additionally, recognizing that financial constraints limiting the
ability to manage and destroy Banks are going to be the decisive
factor as to whether emissions from Banks can be effectively
destroyed, the Parties scheduled a meeting of experts from funding institutions, such as the UNFCCC, the Global Environment
Facility, the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, and the World Bank, to assess possible funding opportunities before the next meeting of the Open-Ended Working
Group.57
Twelve technologies have been approved to date under the
Montreal Protocol for the destruction of CFCs and halons.58 In
developed countries, different technologies are in use for CFC
destruction on a commercial basis. For instance, in Japan, more
than ten technologies were being used in approximately eightytwo ODS destruction plants in operation as of 2006.59 Commercial ODS destruction facilities using technologies approved by
the TEAP are in operation in twenty countries worldwide.60 ICF
estimates that ODS destruction capacities range roughly from
forty to six hundred metric tons per year.61 The cost to destroy
ODS at these facilities varies by country, technology, capacity,
and ODS type. Overall, it was estimated that ODS destruction
costs range between two and thirteen dollars per kilogram, with
an average of about seven dollars per kilogram.62 The pilot studies approved by the Montreal Protocol and a similar study being
undertaken by the World Bank63 are intended to determine what
technologies work best for which ODSs, to identify ODSs that
are actually recoverable, to devise a plan to address ODSs in
Article 5 countries, to ascertain the recovery costs for different
ODSs, and to suggest methodologies for validation and verification of the destruction of ODSs. These findings can then be
incorporated into international carbon off-set regimes.
Tackling the destruction of Banks will require a multi-faceted approach. In non-Article 5 countries, feasible regulatory
approaches include requiring producer/retailers to collect and
destroy ODSs, providing incentives for ODS destruction, and
creating industry-lead programs for this purpose.64 Most nonArticle 5 countries have available infrastructure and facilities
to destroy ODSs effectively in a validated and verifiable manner.65 In Article 5 countries, however, there will be a need for
financial and technology transfers to store and maintain existing
Banks, create destruction facilities, and transport ODSs to existing facilities for destruction, all activities consistent with those
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traditionally occurring through the Multilateral Fund. Infrastructure building and personnel training in these countries will also
be necessary so that the ODS destruction can be validated and
verified.

Funding the Destruction of Banks
To encourage and finance the destruction of Banks in the
short available time frame, funding the Multilateral Fund at traditional levels will not be adequate. One way to generate additional funding would be to tap into the funding from Global
Environment Facility (“GEF”)66 and the carbon trading systems
(e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Chicago
Climate Exchange (“CCX”), and Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (“RGGI”)). As of September 2008, the CCX is the
only carbon-trading platform that has an established protocol
for generating credits for the destruction of ODSs.67 The CCX
has developed a protocol to measure and verify GHG emission
reductions resulting from the destruction of ODSs.68
Currently, the destruction of ODSs has not been approved as
an acceptable offset project under the CDM and therefore cannot
generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) under the
Kyoto Protocol. Under current CDM rules, however, an international body such as the Montreal Protocol can apply to generate CERs by coordinating a Program of Activities comprised of
numerous CDM programs. By applying and taking control of
ODS destruction programs, the Montreal Protocol could issue
CERs and generate significant funds for the Multilateral Fund
to distribute to Article 5 countries to ensure the expeditious and
controlled destruction of Banks. If the Montreal Protocol takes
on the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs, this could generate revenues not only to fund the phase-out and destruction of Banks
but also of HFCs as well.69
Obtaining funding from the various carbon trading platforms
would result in substantial revenues that could be used to facilitate widespread and rapid Banks destruction. However, allowing
the destruction of ODS Banks into the carbon trading system has
to be structured carefully to maintain the stability of the markets,
ensure that the ODSs destruction results in real climate impact,
and prevent the increased production of ODSs or high-GWP
substitutes simply to profit from the carbon market. Due to the
extremely high GWP of many ODSs, the destruction of small
volumes of ODSs can result in the potential issuance of very
large numbers of CERs. For example, the most common CFCs
in reachable refrigeration and air-conditioning are CFC-11 and
CFC-12 which have GWPs of 5000 and 8500, respectively.70
Therefore, destruction of one ton of these substances would
result in the generation of thousands of CERs. It was estimated
that there were 218,318 tons of CFCs in refrigeration and air
conditioning banks in 2002.71 Destruction of a fraction of these
CFC banks and the resultant issuance of CERs could significantly destabilize the carbon markets and divert funding from
other projects that reduce the emissions of other GHGs or to prevent deforestation. These problems could be avoided by having
the CERs issued for ODS destruction controlled by the Montreal Protocol and having the number of CERs issued correspond
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to the actual cost of destroying the Banks. By tying the CERs
issued to the actual cost of destruction, the Multilateral Fund
would have the sales proceeds from the CERs to promote quick
and comprehensive Banks destruction. This would not create a
disproportionate number of CERs or destabilize the carbon markets; rather, it would ensure that the CERs issued were directly
tied to the climate benefit achieved.
Destruction of only banned ODS Banks should initially be
eligible for CERs in order to prevent the creation of a perverse
incentive to produce more ODSs with high GWP simply for the
value of the CERs. This problem has already been identified
arising from the production of
HCFC-22 (GWP = 1780 72),
used widely in window unit air
conditioners and small refrigerators, which produce HFC-23
(GWP = 14,31073) as a byproduct. CERs can be earned for the
destruction of HCF-23 through
the CDM. However, as the cost
of destroying HFC-23 is very
low, approximately $0.20 per
ton of CO2-eq.,74 and the price
of CERs is typically between
$5 and $15 per metric ton of
CO2 -eq. reduction,75 huge profits could be made from HFC-23
destruction. It has been calculated that the cost of the direct
installation of equipment to
destroy HFC-23 would only be
$100 million compared to $6
billion worth of CERs that have
been issued.76 The CERs for the
destruction of HFC-23 are sufficiently profitable that industry
observers have suggested that new HCFC-22 production facilities can be financed on the expected profits from the CERs from
the HFC-23 destruction alone.77
Bank destruction can be incorporated into the carbon markets without creating such perverse incentives by limiting the
issuance of CERs to ODSs that are banned. It will be important
to also ensure that funding is available to investigate and prevent
illegal production of banned ODSs given the sizeable profits that
can be made if CERs are given for their destruction.

level by the year 2012.79 The Kyoto Protocol has currently been
ratified by 118 countries, including 32 industrialized countries,
collectively representing only 44.2% of 1990 emissions.80 Conversely, all the major ODS and HFC-producing and consuming
countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol, which has the
ability to impose phase-out requirements on all of these Parties.
Therefore, at this stage, the regulation and phase-out of highGWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol would ensure a more
comprehensive approach by all significant producers and users
of HFCs on an equitable basis, thereby substantially reducing
the likelihood of illegal trade in
HFCs by creating an even economic playing field as a result of
the global regulation of HFCs.
In international law, successive treaties on the same subject matter are commonplace, as
recognized by the Vienna Convention.81 International law principles allow a treaty that covers
the subject matter of an historic
treaty to be entered into force,
subject to established rules of
interpretation.82 To the extent
the successive treaties are compatible, the provisions of both
treaties are enforceable. When
they are incompatible and where
the subject matter and parties
to the treaties are the same, the
language of the later treaty or the
more specific treaty generally
controls.83
The Parties to the Montreal
Protocol have the expertise to
regulate high-GWP HFCs by
controlling and phasing out their
production and consumption. This is compatible with and complementary to the UNFCCC’s regulation of emissions of HFCs.
The technical expertise, mechanism for technology transfer,
and Multilateral Fund to assist developing countries make the
Montreal Protocol uniquely suited to control and phase out highGWP HFCs. The Montreal Protocol HFC phase-out would act
as a mechanism for developed countries in UNFCCC to achieve
deep emissions cuts and act as a technology transfer mechanism
to help developing countries reduce their GHG emissions in a
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner. As the UNFCCC
negotiates to extend efforts to control GHGs past 2012, it can
work in collaboration with the Montreal Protocol to use an HFC
phase-out as a tool for Parties to meet strong emissions reduction targets and to ensure that high-GWP HFCs are not needlessly substituted for ODSs in developing countries.
The UNFCCC’s Bali Action Plan84 makes it clear that the
post-2012 climate framework will emphasize technology transfer for developing countries and sectorial emissions reduction

A successful collaborative
effort between the
UNFCCC and Montreal
Protocols could alleviate
some of the tensions
in the current climate
negotiations. The
Montreal Protocol has
demonstrated effective
technology transfer and
funding mechanisms for
developing countries.

Coordination of Regulation of HFCs Under
the Montreal Protocol With the UNFCCC
HFCs are in the “basket” of gases regulated by the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol.78 The current regulation of HFC emissions
under the UNFCCC should not impede complementary regulation under the Montreal Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol requires
industrialized countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to
cut their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% from the 1990
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approaches. Recent submissions by developing countries concerning mechanisms for technology transfers have included
the creation of technology assessment panels and encouraged
capacity building to enable these countries to address GHGs
effectively. These techniques have already been deployed by the
Montreal Protocol; therefore, a phase-out of high-GWP HFCs
under the Montreal Protocol would serve as a model to demonstrate that these techniques can be usefully applied to control
other GHGs.
A successful collaborative
effort between the UNFCCC
and Montreal Protocols could
alleviate some of the tensions in
the current climate negotiations.
The Montreal Protocol has demonstrated effective technology
transfer and funding mechanisms for developing countries.
If applied to HFCs under the
post-Kyoto Protocol regime,
this could build trust between
developed and developing countries within UNFCCC negotiations and instill confidence that
reductions in all GHGs would
occur in an equitable manner, without disproportionately disadvantaging the economies of the developing countries.

of the potential climatic effects of” ODSs and that they were
“[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary
measures to control equitably total emissions of [ODSs] . . . on
the basis of developments in scientific knowledge.”88 The text
has to be interpreted in the context of all of the decisions made
and actions taken by the Parties under the Montreal Protocol.89
These actions include all of the decisions cited above,90 where
the climatic effects of ODSs have been recognized and where
the reduction and phase-out of
ODSs have been required to be
viewed in the context of broader
environmental consequences,
including the environmental
impacts of ODS substitutes, and
the latest scientific and technological knowledge. These
actions also include all of the
work performed to evaluate the
non-ozone implications of the
phase-out of ODSs.91
Expand the Montreal Protocol’s Mandate to Control
Management and Destruction
of Banks
Developing countries want
predictable and sustained financing if they are going to be obligated to maintain and destroy Banks. The Montreal Protocol ties
financial assistance to specific goals and projects.92 The Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund is one of the mechanisms that
has created good relations between developed and developing
countries as they have worked to phase out ODSs. By keeping
HFCs within the “basket” of GHGs regulated by the UNFCCC,
funding for the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol could become available through the funding
mechanisms created by or in conjunction with the UNFCCC to
defray some or all of the costs of the phase-out. Financing from
the funding mechanisms currently being negotiated within the
UNFCCC climate talks, as well as approving the destruction of
ODSs to generate CERs, could create substantial new sources
of funding for the Montreal Protocol to take on this important
work. A phase-out of high-GWP HFCs would again act as a
model to demonstrate the efficacy of certain aspects of its financial mechanisms.

The objectives of the
Montreal Protocol obligate
the Parties to complete the
task of restoring the ozone
layer without exacerbating
the global climate crisis.

Actions Needed to Address High-GWP
HFCs and Banks
Decision to Add HFCs as a Class of Chemicals Regulated
and Phased-Out Under the Montreal Protocol, Including a Pledge
Not to Use High-GWP HFCs Where More Environmentally Suitable Alternative Substances or Technologies Are Available
To date, the Montreal Protocol has only regulated substances that directly deplete the ozone layer. However, the language of the Montreal Protocol does not so limit its authority,
and the Parties should amend the Montreal Protocol to expand
its mission to include combating climate change associated with
ODSs and their substitutes.85 Simple amendments would allow
the Parties to ensure that the phase-out of ODSs is accomplished
without exacerbating climate change.86 The need for the Montreal Protocol to continue its work to find low-GWP substitutes
for ODSs is particularly apparent with the projected massive
increase in the use of high-GWP HFCs as the result of the phaseout of the ODSs. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol will
not be achieved until ODSs have been replaced by substances
with minimal adverse impacts to the global environment.
An amendment of the Montreal Protocol specifically to
combat climate change caused by high-GWP HFCs, even though
they are not ODSs, is consistent with international law principles for treaty interpretation. The first place to look for the intent
and scope of a treaty is the text itself, including the Preamble.87
When the Montreal Protocol was adopted, the Parties included
in the Preamble both the concept that they were “[c]onscious
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Conclusion
Some of the recent reductions in ODS use have been
achieved by unnecessarily replacing ODSs with high-GWP
HFCs. It is now well-established that high-GWP HFCs are adding to the global climate crisis. Likewise, to date, the Montreal
Protocol has focused on regulation of production and consumption of ODSs and has not regulated the management or destruction of Banks. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol obligate
the Parties to complete the task of restoring the ozone layer
without exacerbating the global climate crisis. The Parties can
accomplish this by: (1) committing not to use high-GWP HFCs
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as substitutes for ODSs if other more environmentally-suitable
alternative substances or technologies are available; (2) amending the Montreal Protocol to make clear that the protection of the
ozone layer is not going to be accomplished through measures
that exacerbate the global climate crisis by (a) actively phasing
out the production and consumption of high-GWP substitutes
and providing financial incentives for the use of low-GWP substitutes for ODSs, and (b) expanding the mandate of the Montreal Protocol to include the management and destruction of
Banks; and (3) coordinating with the UNFCCC to (a) have the
phase-out of high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be
incorporated into post-Kyoto institutions for other GHGs and (b)
develop effective funding mechanisms for Banks management
and destruction.

The climate crisis can be effectively combated if it is disaggregated into smaller, manageable components where the
strengths of international, regional, and national organizations
and entities can be brought to bear. The Montreal Protocol has
the unique capacity to regulate and promote the phase-out of
high-GWP HFCs used as ODS substitutes and to manage and
destroy Banks. Both the transition to the use of high-GWP HFCs
and the emissions from Banks are occurring as of the writing of
this article, and the opportunity to control both of these serious
threats to the global environment is time limited. The Montreal
Protocol must be amended promptly to meet these urgent global
challenges.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Jennifer
Bernazani-Ludlum, Heather Spurlock Kennealy, Fionnuala Walravens, and Sean Toohey for their assistance with this paper.
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Cleaning Up the Problem of
Post-Combustion Coal Waste
by Amanda King*

W

hen a dike at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s
(“TVA”) Kingston Fossil Plant failed on December
22, 2008, 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash spilled,1
covering an area forty-eight times larger than the 1989 Exxon
Valdez oil spill.2 Families in the East Tennessee area filed a
lawsuit against TVA for medical monitoring, testing, treatment
and procedures, and environmental monitoring and clean-up
costs, alleging TVA knew the coal ash containment pond was
in danger of releasing the coal waste and had already failed on
prior occasions.3 While much of the recent focus on “clean coal
technology” has been on lowering the greenhouse gas emissions
from coal power plants,4 the recent coal ash disaster in Tennessee has shifted attention to the environmental impacts of coal
combustion waste. Unlike the capture and sequester technology
for reducing global warming emissions from coal fired power
plants, which currently is far from achieving any significant
impact,5 clean technology for coal waste disposal can achieve a
large impact today, but only if our regulatory structure encourages it. By classifying coal waste as a hazardous waste and creating stricter standards for disposal sites, we can prevent future
coal waste environmental disasters.
Coal waste is typically disposed of in surface impoundments,
minefills, landfills, and recycled into other products. Although
there has been a recent trend away from disposal of coal wastes
in surface impoundments and towards landfills,6 according to an
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) estimate as many as
three hundred sites still use surface impoundments.7 Unlike a
landfill, which only holds dry wastes, a surface impoundment
is an uncovered area of hollowed land, made of mainly earthen
material, which holds liquid wastes.8 Under Subtitle C of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), surface
impoundments must have a double liner system to prevent the
liquid waste from leaching through the ground to local water
supplies.9 Due to an exemption in Subtitle C, coal waste is not
currently regulated as a hazardous waste, and the regulation of
coal waste surface impoundments is left to the states.10
Although EPA concluded in a 2000 report that coal waste
disposal in surface impoundments, underground mines, and
landfills should be regulated under Subtitle C as a hazardous
waste, EPA reversed its recommendation just a few weeks
later.11 In the second regulatory determination, EPA stated that
some regulation of coal wastes under RCRA would be necessary to protect human health, but did not state whether Subtitle
C regulation was required.12 Post combustion coal waste is a
threat to human health because it contains numerous chemicals
including aluminum, arsenic, boron, cadmium, chromium, lead,
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manganese, molybdenum, selenium, and sulfate, which can
cause health problems such as cancer, birth defects, and central nervous system damage.13 Furthermore, with stricter toxics
emissions standards for coal-fired power plants, the waste will
contain increased levels of arsenic, thallium, boron, barrium, and
other harmful chemicals.14 Although clean technology to reduce
emissions will help the environment, new emissions technology
will make regulating coal waste disposal more important as coal
waste becomes dirtier and more toxic.
On March 9, 2009, EPA announced that it planned to propose regulations for coal waste by the end of the year.15 However,
EPA was silent on whether the regulation would be under Subtitle C as a hazardous waste or under Subtitle D’s less stringent
standards.16 Subtitle C hazardous waste regulations differ from
Subtitle D in that, under Subtitle C, the federal government is
authorized to do the permitting for the hazardous waste sites and
has set specific standards.17 Because design criteria of coal waste
surface impoundments is not regulated at all under either Subtitle C or Subtitle D, the regulation of landfills provides insight
into the difference between the two types of regulations. Under
the Subtitle C requirements, landfills must have multiple liners,
be made of materials chemically resistant to the waste, and have
a system in between liners for collection and removal of liquid
leaching from the landfill.18 In contrast, for Subtitle D landfills
EPA specifies only minimum standards, including a composite
liner with two components, and gives states the authority to issue
landfill permits and set more specific standards.19
Of the fifteen states that create nearly three-quarters of all
the coal combustion waste in the United States, only one requires
liners for surface impoundments and only three require liners for
landfills for coal waste.20 Although regulating coal waste under
Subtitle D could help by creating minimum standards for surface
impoundments, based on current regulation of coal waste by the
states it is unlikely many would require high enough standards.
Coal waste must be recognized and regulated for what it is—a
hazardous waste. Regulation of coal waste under Subtitle C
and use of currently available technology to contain coal waste
are needed to reduce environmental contamination and prevent
future disasters.

Endnotes: Cleaning Up the Problem of Post Combustion Coal Waste
continued on page 68
* Amanda King is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Clean Technology Transfer and
Intellectual Property Rights
by Nitya Nanda & Nidhi Srivastava*

I

Introduction

t is generally agreed upon that an efficient diffusion and
deployment of technology has the potential to mitigate the
adverse impacts of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and
to reduce emissions.1 If developing countries were able to use
available technologies to reduce their energy consumption by
twenty percent, the currently projected increase between 2000
and 2020 in carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from developing countries could be cut by almost half.2 Although the role of
technology transfer in reducing emissions is widely recognized,
effective wide-scale transfer has been hindered by a number of
factors, including international property rights regimes.
Transfer of technology in the international context commonly refers to sale or licensing of intellectual property, but
the term includes any process by which users in one country
gain access to and utilize technology developed in another
country.3 The term technology implies any practical application of knowledge in a particular area,4 but it is usually associated with machines and related infrastructure, and technology
is often discussed in this constricted sense. This narrow view
combined with developing countries’ large-scale import of
knowledge based machinery, products, and process licenses
creates the perception of developing countries as “technology users” and “passive recipients” of developed country
technologies.5
In a globalized world, technology may be transferred
from developed countries to developing or between developing countries, based on cost or other considerations, even if
similar technology is locally available. Hence, using a foreign
source of technology does not necessarily mean a “transfer of
technology” has occurred. An analysis of the sixty-three Clean
Development Mechanism (“CDM”)6 projects that were registered on January 1, 2006 offers a picture of the current state of
technology transfer.7 Of the twenty-nine overall CDM projects
that involved foreign technology, the largest number (twelve)
were in hydropower, and the technology for them came from all
over the world, including several developing countries like Brazil, China, India, Panama, Peru, and Sri Lanka.8 Technology for
hydropower is fairly standardized and the use of a foreign source
of technology in many CDM projects may not mean that transfer
of high value technology was involved.
This paper provides an overview of barriers to technology transfer and specifically examines problems posed by both
strong and weak international property rights (“IPR”) regimes.
Whether and how IPR regimes act as limiting factor in effective
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Number
of
projects

Emission
reduction
[Ton of
CO2-eq]

Share of
total
emission
reduction
[%]

Biogas

6

387,591

1.4

Biomass

10

302,735

1.1

Energy
efficiency

1

6,580

0.0

Fuel switch

1

19,438

0.1

HFC-23
destruction

3

8,233,566

28.9

Hydropower

22

775,471

2.7

Landfill gas

10

2,712,395

9.5

Methane capture

3

410,378

1.4

N2O destruction

2

15,111,165

53.0

Wind energy

5

573,013

2.0

Total

63

28,532,332

100

Technology

Figure 1. Emission Reductions by Technology in the 63 Registered
CDM Projects.9

diffusion are considered and a range of mechanisms to improve
technology transfer are proposed.

Factors Restricting Technology Transfer
Despite clear recognition of the benefits technology diffusion offers to mitigate climate change, not enough has been done
to advance that role. There are various factors acting as barriers
to efficient and useful technology transfer from advanced and
developed countries to recipient developing countries.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
has listed high capital costs, limited access to capital, poor access
to information, institutional and administrative difficulties in
developing technology transfer contracts, lack of infrastructure to absorb riskier technologies, absence of economic incentives, and intellectual property rights as hurdles for technology

* Nitya Nanda is a Fellow and Nidhi Srivastava is a Research Associate with
the Centre for Global Agreements, Legislation and Trade at The Energy and
Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi. This paper draws heavily from the work
done under the project titled “Building an Energy Secure Future for India through
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transfer.10 Causes may vary not only from country to country,
but technology to technology as well.
Both developed and developing countries accept that transfer
of technology has been slow and ineffective, but they attribute it
to different causes. The Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (“IGES”), in Asian Aspirations for Climate Change beyond
2021, has highlighted the contrasting perspectives of developed
and developing countries with regard to technology transfer.11
The developed countries hold lack of robust legal mechanisms
and domestic institutions in developing countries responsible.12
Since most of the CDM technologies are developed and owned
by a few private companies, developed countries cite the need
for friendly domestic policies, institutions, and strong intellectual property rights protection in developing countries to encourage technology diffusion.13
On the contrary, from the perspective of developing countries, the failure of developed countries to meet their obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”), and their lack of awareness and willingness to
do so, are cited as primary reasons for inadequate technology
transfer.14 Other reasons often cited are the lack of programs and
initiatives at the government level, as well as high capital and
licensing costs.15

Intellectual Property Rights (“IPR”)
Intellectual property is a category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of human intellect.16 It
refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic
works, as well as symbols, names, images, and designs used in
commerce.17 The impact of IPR on technology diffusion is context specific and complex. IPR in the hands of a few has the
ability to create a monopolistic situation where dissemination of
knowledge is restricted on account of limited access and higher
prices for climate friendly technologies. Strongly protected IPR
held by supplier firms may also prevent users or recipients from
obtaining access to technologies in order to adapt them to suit
their own needs and requirements. However, an assurance of
one’s IPR being protected may encourage the owner to transfer
his technology to another country. Therefore, a lack of adequate
protection for IPR in the recipient country can also inhibit transfer of technology.

Lack of IPR Protection
In its Special Report on Climate Change, the IPCC observes
that a “major requirement for successful agreement in technology transfer is the guarantee of intellectual property rights.”18
An effective and enforceable IPR law provides an incentive for
private companies to disseminate or transfer their technology.
A strong IPR protection may also facilitate transfer of technology through increased trade in goods and services, foreign direct
investment (“FDI”) by private companies, technology licensing,
and joint ventures.19 IPR protection may result in larger trade
flows, “albeit mainly for countries with imitative capability”
involving “substitution of domestic innovation for technology
produced abroad.”20
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It is generally believed that most developing countries do not
fully enforce their IPR protection laws.21 Hence, one may hasten
to conclude that the lack of adequate IPR protection might have
been a factor inhibiting transfer of technologies. Though much is
unknown about the actual extent of weakness in the IPR protection regimes in developing countries by way of comprehensive
survey, the annual “Special 301” reports, prepared by the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative on the adequacy and effectiveness of IPR protection by U.S. trading partners, can shed some
light.22 Along with many developing countries, the EU has been
on the list of countries that infringes on IPR and only recently
moved off of the list in 2007.23
It is difficult to infringe on the IPR of a sophisticated
technology that requires extensive scientific and technical
knowledge. In some cases, the basic scientific knowledge of
patented technologies is accessible—what is not available
is the right to use such knowledge. If developing country
companies are not using such technologies, they are either
respecting the patent rights or they are not technologically
capable of using them.

IPR-Based Market Power
A technology protected by a strong IPR regime is less likely
to reach a vast number of users in developing countries as there
may be high licensing costs.24 In some cases, the owner may
refuse to grant a license altogether, halting the spread of the
technology. DuPont, for example, refused to grant licenses for
the production of chlorofluorocarbon substitutes to Korean and
Indian firms that sought to use the substitutes to meet the phase
out requirements for ozone depleting substances.25 When a particular technology is not licensed to other users and the owner
sells it in the form of products and equipment, a monopoly is
created. Monopoly production is often inefficient and pushes
prices even higher.26
In the context of most technologies, especially climate
change mitigation, gaining access or ownership of the IPR
is not the sole and sufficient requirement for a successful
diffusion and deployment of technology. The licensing of a
technology may have to be accompanied by large investments
in developing the skills and know-how to incorporate, adapt,
and develop further the technology obtained. Some experts
opine that IPR regimes should address factors such as absorptive capacity and tacit knowledge in addition to technology
access issues.27 The importance of this assertion can be highlighted through two examples in India, light-emitting diode
(“LED”) manufacture and Integrated Gasification Combined
Cycle (“IGCC”) power plant technology. Without technological capacity, IPR ownership would not have improved India’s
ability to manufacture LEDs.28 Similarly, the main barrier to
the use of IGCC technology is lack of knowledge about its
performance with low quality Indian coal, rather than IPR
ownership.29
The present IPR regime has a limited scope for improving
transfer of technology to developing countries in this respect.
Lynn Mytelka, former director of the United Nations University
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Institute for New Technologies, suggests that the possibility
for the transfer of technical assistance and capacity building to
developing countries in areas capable of meeting local development needs and global environmental concerns should be
enhanced through the patent system itself.30
The stage of commercialization of a technology determines
the extent to which the developer needs and expects returns.31
The level of a country’s development is also a determining factor
for the IPR impact on technology
transfer. In cases of developed
and technologically advanced
countries, strengthening IPR can
increase innovation and technology diffusion. In middle-income
countries, a stronger IPR regime
may encourage both domestic
innovation and technology diffusion through foreign patenting
and international trade, both of
which can encourage growth. But
the beneficial impact of stronger
IPR protection on domestic innovation and technology diffusion
can offset the growth-enhancing
benefits otherwise obtained from
imitation.32
Apart from IPR, a range of
other factors, including the level
of development, nature of technology, and technical know-how
to adapt and develop technologies, affect transfer of technology. These factors also determine
the manner in which IPR impacts technology transfer for fighting climate change in developing countries.

An old IPR concept, the term compulsory licensing is not
explicitly incorporated into the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) regime of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”). However, compulsory licensing can be
read into the provision of TRIPS Agreement on “Other Use [of
the patented subject matter] Without Authorization of the Right
Holder.”35 Articles on “Exceptions to Rights of Conferred”36 and
“Principles,” including reference to measures “needed to prevent
the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders” and
“the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or
adversely affect the international transfer of technology”37
also provide reasonable flexibility for countries to use compulsory licensing. Drawing from
TRIPS and the Doha Development Declaration, a compulsory
license can be granted to meet
government requirements, overcome an abuse of patent rights,
in a national emergency, for
public non-commercial use, and
for a technical advance of considerable economic significance
over the existing patent.38
Article 31(c) of TRIPS also
provides that a country can use
such a measure “to remedy a
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.”39 Hence,
countries can invoke their competition law where “abuse of
dominance” is included as one of the anti-competitive practices
and the source of dominance is an IPR.40
Similarly, Article 40 of TRIPS, dealing with control of anticompetitive practices in contractual licenses, states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying
in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may
in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market.”41 Hence, refusal to give license can also be included as
an anti-competitive practice and may be remedied with compulsory licensing.

IPR in the hands
of a few has the
ability to create a
monopolistic situation
where dissemination of
knowledge is restricted
on account of limited
access and higher prices
for climate friendly
technologies.

Addressing IPR as a Challenge
It is difficult to determine the precise impact that IPR has
on technology transfer, either by way of reduced access or
increased prices. To do so would require a detailed product-byproduct and country-by-country analysis. There have been many
suggestions in the recent past to address IPR as a challenge to
efficient transfer of climate change fighting technologies. Suggestions range from compulsory licensing, to joint ownership, to
technology acquisition, and knowledge repository funds. Some
of these are discussed below as possible mechanisms to mitigate
the negative impact of IPR.

Compulsory Licensing
A compulsory license is a statutorily created license that
allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an invention without the patentee’s permission.33 Ordinarily, compulsory licensing refers to the government authorizing itself to use otherwise
protected intellectual property without having to obtain the permission or authorization of a patent holder in cases of national
emergency or for public good.34
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Compulsory Licensing in Public Health
Rights of the TRIPS member countries to make use of
compulsory licensing in the interest of public health have been
explicitly recognized in the Doha Declaration on Public Health.
In order to make use of compulsory licensing in the CDM context, climate change mitigation must be treated as a public good.
Here, we briefly examine the issues of compulsory licensing in
public health and then we will look at clean technology.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health clarified the rights of member countries with regard to
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the compulsory licensing system by recognizing that each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.42
Subsequently, Thailand issued a compulsory license in late
2006 for five years on Efavirenz, a patented AIDS drug from
Merck.43 More recently, Brazil issued a compulsory license in
May of 2007 for the same product.44 However, countries still
face difficulties with compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals.
For example, Brazil came under tremendous pressure from the
United States—which filed and later withdrew a complaint to
the WTO—to repeal a law that allowed the government to issue
a compulsory license when patent holders do not manufacture
the drug in Brazil. Although Brazil successfully defeated the
challenge by the United States,
many smaller countries are not
able to do so.45
Although some steps have
been taken in this direction,
the declaration and the subsequent TRIPS amendment have
left many issues untouched and
lack guidelines for eligibility
for compulsory licensing.

Compulsory Licensing in
Clean Technologies

The fact that the
companies holding
[climate-related]
technologies are
powerful companies
from powerful countries
makes technology transfer
difficult for politically
weaker developing
countries.

At the UN Climate Change
Conference in Poznanń in
December 2008, developing
countries advocated a paradigm
shift in the way climate mitigation technologies are subject
to intellectual property rights
protection. Many suggested
a strategy similar to affordable medicines.46 For example,
India proposed an approach
analogous to pharmaceuticals: creating a mechanism that would
ensure that privately owned technologies are available on an
affordable basis, including through measures to resolve the barriers posed by intellectual property rights and addressing compulsory licensing of patented technologies.47
TRIPS has recognized countries’ freedom to determine for
themselves what constitutes national emergency for the purposes of compulsory licensing. Although countries have some
flexibility to determine when and in which cases to make use of
compulsory licensing, confusion and conflict will likely result
without guidelines or directives. As mentioned above, to make
use of the provisions of compulsory licensing, first and foremost
climate change mitigation has to be treated as a public good.
Detailed guidelines and specifications to help a country identify
a technology that can be eligible for issuing of a compulsory
license are needed. Similarly, an eligibility criterion for countries should be created because many developing countries lack
domestic capabilities for production and may not be able to use
45

a technology unless there is an amendment in TRIPS in line with
the one made for pharmaceutical products.48
Even if compulsory licensing is adopted for climate change
technologies, it may not alone solve the problem as incremental
costs for adapting and putting the technology to use in local context may also be high.
It is not an easy task to accommodate the interests of the
developer of the technology (and indirectly incentives for further research and development) on the one hand and the need to
address rapid climate change on the other. This balance has to be
met in a manner that is diplomatic and as minimally politically
contentious as possible. There have been only few instances
of compulsory license issuing, and instances of compulsory
licensing by a national authority
where the IPR-owner is a foreign
national or domiciliary are even
less common.49 It is a very political issue.50

Other Flexibilities in the
Existing Regimes

In addition to compulsory
licensing, other measures beyond
the TRIPS regime, such as cooperative research and development
and technology acquisition funds,
could be used to reduce the high
costs resulting from strong IPR
protection. Creation of a technology acquisition fund has been
proposed within the framework
of the UNFCCC.51 Such a fund
could be managed by a multilateral organization or a trust,
which serves to acquire or buy
out patented technologies that
are climate friendly and make
them available to developing countries in need of technology to
reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.
Most of the clean technologies are owned by a handful of
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) countries. The largest environmental corporations in
the world are from Germany, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who export equipment, technology,
and services worldwide.52 These large corporations typically
provide integrated products and services and account for about
fifty percent of the global market.53 If one considers the market for technology only, their share is likely even higher. Within
specific segments of the environmental industry, a few large
corporations virtually dominate.54 Three countries—Germany,
Japan, and the United States—submit about sixty-four percent
of the patent applications related to environmental technology
in the European Patent Office.55 A patent buy-out mechanism
is an option that could avoid the need for compulsory licensing, thereby accounting for the patent owners’ concerns as well.
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It is likely the “most diplomatic alternative” to compulsory
license.56
Kevin Outterson, a law professor at Boston University who
focuses on achieving equitable access to pharmaceuticals while
still encouraging innovation, has outlined a detailed process for a
suitable buy-out mechanism.57 He suggests that it may be owned
or purchased by an intergovernmental organization or a philanthropic foundation and should not be limited to any one technology or region. To make the provision attractive to developers of
technology as well, the compensation to be paid in an acquisition
could be determined by the net present value of expected future
profits.58 Such a proposal has also been advocated by Mytelka,
suggesting a knowledge fund as the repository of patents dealing
with environmentally sound technologies.59
In setting up a technology acquisition or repository fund,
many details will have to be considered. These may include
how to gain the knowledge required to work the acquired patents locally, whether the patents will be in public domain or the
purchaser would have exclusive rights, what the grounds and
conditions for transfer will be, what modes of acquisition will
be used, and how much will be adequate compensation to the
patent holder.
Another possible mechanism is mandatory price negotiation. This is very common in many countries, both developed
and developing, in pharmaceutical products.60 Price regulation
can be imposed even as a competition-remedy measure. Since
countries are empowered to act under their competition regimes,
such a mechanism is legally possible. However, for many
developing countries, it would not be easy to enforce when the
companies in question are large transnational companies from
powerful countries. There are very few cases of a country taking action on a foreign company under competition law, even in

the developed world. In the developing world such an action is
almost non-existent.61

Conclusion
Transfer and diffusion of technology from developed to
developing countries is happening at a very slow pace. Transfer is even slower in climate-related technologies. The intellectual property rights regime can be an important factor. In the
developed world, compulsory licensing has often been used to
make technology readily available. Mandatory price negotiations, as well as price regulations, are also used in some measure
especially in pharmaceutical products. However, what is legally
possible is not always practically feasible. The fact that the
companies holding such technologies are powerful companies
from powerful countries makes technology transfer difficult for
politically weaker developing countries. Thus, the economic and
political factors make it difficult to invoke the basic legal instruments to access these technologies.
Given this, it appears that a global technology acquisition
fund is the most promising means to spread these technologies.
This is, of course, not in lieu of other available instruments, but
in addition to them. It would be difficult to create such a mechanism given the present global geo-political context. It is often
said that developed country governments cannot control technology transfer, as it is private companies, not governments, that
actually own the technologies. However, the governments may
be able to pay their companies adequate compensation in order
to make the technologies available to developing countries. But
merely making the technologies available may not be enough.
The use of technologies may be expensive and difficult in developing countries without the necessary capacity. Generous financial assistance would also be required, even for deployment of
technologies that are available at concessional rates.
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Analysis of Multilateral Agreements, PublicPrivate Partnerships, and Tax Incentives Driving
International Trade in Clean Technology
by Alexander C. Hoover*

I

nternational trade in clean technology is still a nascent market
and requires encouragement from multilateral agreements,
public-private partnerships, and tax incentives. This article
will survey various drivers of North-South and North-North
cleantech trade including the Clean Development Mechanism,
the Private Financing Advisory Network, and tax incentives, and
explore potential issues involved in their implementation.
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) aims to incentivize North-South trade of clean technology. A provision of the
Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows developed countries to gain carbon credits by funding clean technology projects in the developing world.1 In theory, the CDM lowers the cost of reducing carbon
emissions for developed countries,2 while stimulating an influx
of clean technology into developing countries.3 As of 2008, the
CDM’s 3,296 proposed projects represented $95 billion in potential
investments.4 However, the money currently invested in approved
projects does not exceed $5 billion.5 On average, thirty-six percent
of CDM projects require technology transfer.6 This percentage
increases dramatically when examining different types of projects.7
For instance, ninety-two percent of agricultural CDM projects benefit from cleantech trade.8 Based on the amount of money spent
through CDM and the percentage of projects that encourage clean
tech trade, the CDM is responsible for roughly $1.8 billion of actual
clean technology trade.9 If the trends continue, the CDM could
potentially encourage roughly $34 billion in cleantech trade.10
In spite of its potential to encourage cleantech trade, the
destination of CDM financing raises questions about the equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects.11 Currently,
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia account for eighty
percent of the total number of CDM projects.12 These countries
also have some of the lowest rates of clean tech transfer,13 which
indicates that the CDM is increasingly encouraging projects that
draw from the host country’s domestic technology. As countries
like China, India, and Brazil internalize clean tech, countries
financing CDM projects should invest in countries that have less
advanced technology to increase the rate of clean tech trade.
Further encouraging clean tech trade is the Private Financing
Advisory Network (“PFAN”), a public-private partnership that
finances clean tech projects in countries where clean tech is currently unavailable.14 PFAN is supported by the Clean Technology
Initiative, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (“UNFCCC”) Expert Group on Technology Transfer,
government agencies such as the U.S Agency for International
Development (“USAID”), and various private companies.15 PFAN
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provides guidance on clean technology projects in the developing
world, matches investors, and arranges financing directly from
PFAN members.16 PFAN primarily benefits developers working on
mid-size projects who would not otherwise have access to financial
advisory services.17 PFAN’s projects include a twenty-megawatt
(“MW”) wind farm in Chile, a 9.3 MW geothermal plant in Georgia, and a bio-ethanol plant in the Philippines.18 Over the next three
years, PFAN will leverage roughly $500,000 in government funds
to generate $255-550 million in private sector financing for thirty
to forty-five clean tech projects.19 PFAN is still a small initiative
compared to the CDM and may not adequately address the need for
clean tech trade with the developing world. Although the partnership plans to expand over the next few years,20 PFAN’s members
should invest more money so that as the economies of the developing world grow, they can grow with clean tech.
Tax incentives largely drive the North-North clean tech trade.
In the United States both federal and state governments offer industry support, tax incentives, loans, and rebates to encourage the use of
clean tech.21 For instance, the United States provides tax credits to
individuals who buy qualified hybrid vehicles,22 which historically
have been foreign hybrids.23 Additionally, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act provides tax credits to consumers for the first
200,000 plug-in electric vehicles sold by a company.24 The credit
may range from $2,500 to $7,500 depending on the vehicle’s battery
capacity.25 This tax credit could encourage more North-North clean
tech trade as Toyota, Mercedes-Benz, and Mitsubishi have announced
plans to produce plug-in electric vehicles in 2010.26 A problem with
these tax incentives is that they often complement protectionist policies.27 Many countries want to foster domestic growth of clean tech
industries by placing tariffs on imported clean tech.28 Protectionism
and tax incentives could result in governments encouraging domestic growth in clean tech over international trade because tariffs effectively exclude foreign clean tech from developed markets.29
Although the Clean Development Mechanism, the Private
Financing Advisory Network, and tax incentives in developed countries are key components in driving international trade in clean technology, each driver could be improved to better promote clean tech
trade. These improvements would include broadening the geographic
distribution of CDM projects, increasing funding for public-private
partnerships, and eliminating barriers to trade in clean tech.
Endnotes: Analysis of Multilateral Agreements continued on page 69
*Alex Hoover is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington
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Evolving U.S. Clean Tech: Legislative Trends
by Ursula Kazarian*

“C

Introduction

lean tech” developments are widely recognized as
critical to the fight against climate change. However, putting climate change rhetoric into action
has often proven both complex and controversial. One clear
global necessity is the transformation of energy production from
a hydrocarbon-based paradigm to one comprised of “clean”
energy that emits little or no greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). One
of the most pressing elements of the realization of this transformation is power production and transmission project funding.
The burgeoning field of renewable energy finance is rife with
experimental finance options.
Although the recently passed
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) provides $4.5 billion to update the
U.S. electricity grid and another
$16.8 billion for broad energy
efficiency and renewable energy
(“RE”) measures,1 the bulk of
the costs of bringing new energy
sources online necessitate a
more sustainable finance structure. Net metering programs,
the voluntary U.S. cap-andtrade market, and, most recently,
feed-in tariffs, have become central to the debate in finding—
and funding—a way toward a greener energy infrastructure in
the United States. This Article briefly surveys current finance
options for RE to supply the main electrical grid and examines
current U.S. legislative trends aimed at meeting national goals
in an international context to combat climate change through the
increased implementation of RE generation and distribution as
part of a new national “smart grid.”
The transition to clean energy in the United States has
inched its way forward through the incremental establishment of
regulations encouraging state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”) and tax incentives for RE production. Particularly in light of the Obama administration’s call for a nationwide
renovation of the energy grid, a clearly-defined and uniform
finance structure has never been more appropriate or necessary.
The market for renewable energy was effectively launched in
1978 by the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, which mandated that utilities purchase energy from “qualifying facilities”
such as cogeneration plants and small power production plants at
“avoided cost” rates that were often above market prices.2 Since
then, state-level legislative development regarding renewable

energy production has been widely varied, with some states
embracing progressive energy programs more than others.3 Perhaps as a consequence of the somewhat scattered and spasmodic
policy development across the country, implementation methods
are also diverse, not the least of which are the financial mechanisms that fund RE development.
While the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPACT2005”)4
extended existing tax incentives5 to encourage the integration
of RE production within state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards, no federal legislation has yet mandated a specific financial
mechanism to implement clean technology in the energy sector, leaving states to construct
their own solutions. However,
it is widely anticipated that the
Obama administration will continue its stated goals to develop
a national “smart grid”—a
nationally interconnected network of electricity generation
and transmission lines, updated
with the latest digital technology for optimal efficiency and
cost savings. Such a broad new
regulatory plan would necessarily include finance options
as a primary consideration, and
the political trend appears to be moving toward cost allocation
systems that spread the costs of new electricity generation and
distribution to ratepayers. However, the specific cost allocation
structure continues to be a topic ripe for discussion.
The GHG emissions reduction rhetoric offered over the last
several years by the Bush administration largely relied on “voluntary” market measures that presupposed an inclination of private
operations to contribute to the implementation of clean technologies, including RE production. The dearth in domestic implementation mirrored the disinterest in international involvement in
forming mandatory regulations. Consequently, the United States
currently lags behind the rest of the industrialized world in the
development of RE production. The new direction of the Obama
administration effectively reverses the position of the federal
government both internationally and domestically and gives new
hope to the development of national-level legislation to regulate
the transition to a clean and modern energy infrastructure.

The transition to clean
energy in the United
States has inched its way
forward through the
incremental establishment
of regulations.
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Market Mechanisms for U.S. Clean Tech
Implementation
A variety of market mechanisms have been developed over
the past few decades to encourage green technology through economic benefit. Compulsory cap-and-trade programs such as the
European Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) that promote
the reduction of GHGs through emissions credits have enjoyed
some success among polluting businesses.6 However, in the
United States, such options have not yet been made mandatory.
Despite the popularity of emissions trading worldwide, criticism
has been directed at the tendency to “shift” the emissions and
reward the heaviest polluters rather than actually reduce total
emissions.7 Conversely, proponents argue that the overall reductions target can be reduced on a set schedule over a period of
years, effectively creating a positive market mechanism while
tackling global warming.8 In any case, emissions trading will
likely continue to be used as a means of reducing GHG emissions in an economically appealing way for emitters.
In addition to emissions
trading, which takes a systemwide approach to reducing overall existing emissions, rather
than directly mandating the
replacement of GHGs with clean
energy production, other mechanisms have been developed in an
attempt to create a more individual approach to encouraging RE
generation. Net metering, which was introduced by EPACT2005
and which requires all public utilities to be offered to consumers upon request, encourages homeowners and small electricity
generators by providing retail credits for on-site RE generation.9
Thus, net metering has become recognized as a reliable way to
reward small-scale RE production. However, the demand for a
dramatic increase in RE production encourages the creation and
integration of other clean tech policies.
Another financial mechanism, variations of which have
been adopted throughout most of the EU and introduced for discussion throughout the world to boost the installation and transmission of RE, has been the feed-in tariff (“FIT”).10 While there
are several structural variations, the German model has been
used to construct other FITs throughout Europe. The German
model requires utilities to pay a fixed premium price to small
renewable energy producers and homeowners for the clean
energy they contribute to the grid. The price is sector-specific
and based on the cost of production. The FIT policy is credited
with the dramatic growth in renewable energy resources in Germany, which is now the world’s largest market for photovoltaic
and wind energy. Spain, having adopted a similar FIT policy,
has also seen explosive growth in the renewable energy sector.
The German model has since been applied in many countries
throughout Europe as well as in Canada, so far largely successfully.11 Other adaptations of FIT policy have been adopted in
China, Thailand, and parts of India.12

Perhaps not surprisingly, the European Commission found
in 2005 that FITs were a highly effective finance mechanism to
promote new RE production.13 Echoing this and referencing the
European model, the World Future Council’s (“WFC”) Policy
Action Climate Toolkit Project has suggested that feed-in tariffs are the most promising finance mechanism to promote RE
generation worldwide.14 Accordingly, a WFC-funded report
supports the idea of a U.S. national feed-in tariff to expedite the
transition to a clean energy infrastructure.15
Despite the success of FITs throughout the world, the United
States has not yet adopted a national strategy to finance the shift
to a clean energy economy. However, several states have begun
to consider FIT policies, in many cases to complement existing RPS requirements that focus on percentage-oriented reduction targets.16 As is so often the case in the environmental field,
California has led the way in the United States for developing
feed-in tariff legislation for renewable energy projects. Assembly Bill 1969 of 200617 established feed-in tariff systems
that offered the same price for
all technologies but varied from
Germany’s system in that the
determining factor is whether
the energy is delivered during peak hours, rather than the
cost of generation per technology. To date, no other state has
passed legislation requiring any
form of feed-in tariff; however,
the city of Gainesville, Florida
launched a feed-in tariff system similar to that of Germany and
Spain in March 2009 and is already reporting economic success
through its implementation.18 Several other states, including
Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, are considering or have
introduced similar bills. In 2008, U.S. House Representative Jay
Inslee introduced legislation for a national-level FIT that also
included the basic uniform minimum standards;19 although the
bill did not pass, it perhaps helped to set the scene for legislation
to come. Especially given the new national push to implement
green policies, it is quite possible that a federal feed-in tariff
bill will pass relatively soon, despite the fact that some political
opposition is expected in many states.20

The idea of an electrical
“smart grid” focuses on
reliability, efficiency,
and safety.
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The Role of the Coming “Smart Grid”
Technology in Increasing Energy Efficiency
and Boosting Cost Savings
The idea of an electrical “smart grid” focuses on reliability,
efficiency, and safety. However, it is generally accepted that a
longer-term strategy should include RE as the energy source to
power a smart grid. According to a recent report from the Center
for American Progress (“CAP”):
Federal incentives for new renewable energy transmission
projects should be strengthened—through accelerated
depreciation schedules, increasing Private Activity Bond
authority for states, or other federal tax incentives—directly
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

involving taxpayers in the fulfillment of the clean-energy,
reliability, and national-security benefits of an updated
grid. Smart distribution investments warrant public investment due to their broad public benefits. While in most
cases transmission projects will be financed by the private
sector, some lines will also need public financing or incentives to ensure they are built.21
CAP thus argues that updating the electricity grid is a matter of national security as well as environmentally sound policy,
and as such it is reasonable to increase public funding of relevant
projects. Policy trends across the states seem to reflect a similar
perspective, resulting in a myriad of implementation mechanisms to push forward progressive energy policies. CAP further
suggests that it may be procedurally more prudent to spread the
costs of a group of new electricity generation projects to all ratepayers, rather than take the more specific but more complicated
approach of directing project-specific costs to ratepayers according to load-specific consumption in addition to an assumed taxpayer contribution—in effect creating a uniform FIT.22
Along the same vein, a federal legislative proposal to build
a national smart grid is now being considered. In March 2009,
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced the Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, which requires the
construction of a smart grid based on reliable transmission fed
by RE generation through the designation of “renewable energy
zones” that will integrate RE into the mainstream electrical
transmission grid.23 The bill also provides that the cost recovery
plan will include a federal surcharge24 in addition to cost recovery plans submitted by regional planning entities.25 Given the
current state-level push for FITs, it is quite possible that the cost
allocation plans submitted by regional planning entities could
incorporate such policies, even if no national mandatory standard for FITs is implemented. The bill has been referred to the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The timing is well
planned. The Obama administration’s recent endorsement for

a national smart grid makes the creation of a national standard
to increase the integration of RE production and transmission
likely. The Department of Energy has already collected a number of documents and reports concerning the development of a
smart grid, and seems poised to implement any relevant legislation that may be passed.26

Conclusion
The new direction of the Obama administration gives hope
to several concurrent initiatives integrating digital technology,
green energy, and economic benefit to RE generators. The need
for such progressive policy is increasingly recognized as critical to national security and energy reliability and is more urgent
than ever in the larger fight against global climate change. Thus
far, the United States has developed RE technology in a patchwork fashion, with some states taking the legislative lead while
others are doing little to nothing to integrate RE, despite incremental federal-level encouragement. The passage of the legislation such as that recently introduced in the U.S. Senate to create
a national, “green” smart grid will create a uniform national
standard for RE generation and distribution as well as the cost
recovery mechanisms so critical to implementation.
The timing for such policy harmonization could not be better. The UN Conference on Climate Change meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009, where the follow-up framework to the
Kyoto Protocol is expected to be drafted, will address the finance
implementation strategy of energy projects among other critical
facets of a climate change mitigation strategy. UN climate chief,
Yvo de Boer, has cited numerous challenges to financing new
RE production, including the current economic crisis.27 Thus,
in order to push forward with the fight against global warming
and climate change, establishing uniform financial mechanisms
to facilitate domestic level realization of the international goals
set forth by Kyoto and its successor will remain paramount in
the policy formation process at all levels of implementation.
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Intellectual Property Rights to Enhance
International Clean Tech Transfers
by Anastasia Lewandoski*

T

he international transfer of clean technology has the ability to promote positive human rights, such as the right to
health care and the right to enjoy scientific advancements
to one’s benefit. Although human rights appear to be inapposite
to intellectual property rights, the protection of intellectual property rights will lead to increased clean technology transfer, which
will thus increase the quality of life for many. Under the lens
of climate change, the access to scientific advancements could
protect those at risk to the adverse effects of climate change as
technology to protect against droughts, flooding, water temperature changes, habitat deconstruction, and irrigation problems can
protect people from famine, dehydration, and forced migration.1
These rights take the shape of positive human rights, or those that
are a guarantee that a government or other provider will supply a
citizen with something. In the case of technology transfer, these
positive human rights may compete with negative human rights,
which require governments to enforce a right, such as the intellectual property right of the technology. Although seemingly
at odds with each other, a middle ground can be reached that
promotes human rights and intellectual property rights for the
benefit of all. While a great deal of countries protect intellectual
property to promote the advantages that come with new technology, other countries such as China lack strong protections for
intellectual property; this may harm the clean tech trade.2 For
example, some clean tech producers are reluctant to sell in China
because a producer there may simply copy without fear of copyright penalties.3
While intellectual property may be a young field, the intent
to protect intellectual property rights is present in many historic
legal documents. The United States Constitution contains language which may be interpreted to protect intellectual property
rights.4 Intellectual property rights are recognized worldwide by
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),5 and scientific productions are protected by the United Nations in its 1948 Declaration
of Human Rights.6 However, many international documents also
adopt positive rights, like the right to health care, food, shelter,
and the benefits of scientific advancements.7 The United Nations
has recognized the conflict between intellectual property rights
and the promotion of human rights, particularly in light of the
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Property Rights
(“TRIPS”).8 The UN’s response, described as “an antagonistic
approach,”9 called for “the primacy of human rights obligations
over economic policies and agreements.”10
Some argue that for innovation in technology fields to even
exist, one must protect the property right first, so that future
profits remain as an incentive to innovate. Some economists
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point out that this argument is not persuasive because in many
fields where there is no intellectual property protection, such as
fashion, innovation continues.11 This argument may not hold as
true in regards to the high cost of research and development for
clean technology, however.12 Due to the investments necessary
for innovation in clean technology, protecting intellectual property rights may be imperative to ensure technological advances
continue to be made, even if for some time the technology may
not be transferred for others to use. To err on the side of caution,
the protection of intellectual property rights should exist in all
countries where clean technology is needed most, if even for a
limited time under a patent system.
Intellectual property rights and human rights can be reconciled in a system that recognizes patent protection for a limited
time. A limited period allowing for intellectual property protection provides incentive to innovate but still allows for the people of the world to enjoy the benefits of these advancements.
Although this still prevents some of the poorest people from
having access to this technology for some time,13 the incentive remains to produce the advancements at all and provides
for incentive to make the product available to all in order to
enjoy economies of scale. An international patent system may
enhance clean tech transfer to less developed countries. Indeed,
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), a specialized agency of the UN, is working towards such a system by
drafting a substantive patent law treaty.14 Although WIPO has
not yet reached an agreement, the group’s existence is nonetheless indicative of a worldwide interest in protecting intellectual
property rights. WIPO has worked with the UN’s Office of the
Commissioner of Human Rights by hosting a panel discussion
in 1998,15 and continued discussions between these two groups
may help bring about a solution. As technology transfer in the
past by willing companies in foreign direct investment led to
more jobs in less developed countries,16 clean technology transfer can help provide jobs, reduce dependence on carbon fuels,
and advance in their own protection from the effects of climate
change.17 In order to guarantee continued progress in the clean
technology fields, intellectual property rights should be protected
initially for the benefit of all.

Endnotes: Intellectual Property Rights to Enhance International
Clean Tech Transfers continued on page 70
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A Stop on the Road to Copenhagen:
Implications of a U.S. Climate Bill
by Lisa Novins*

A

Introduction

s the world prepares for the December 2009 UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen, Parties are far from
focused on any singular issue that will make or break the
negotiations over a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.
The U.S. role in international talks has been a topic of discussion
for many years and the Obama administration’s reengagement
on the issue has been an important development both domestically and internationally.1 The fate of the recently released discussion draft on domestic climate legislation will certainly have
an ongoing impact on negotiations taking place in preparation
for Copenhagen.2 The discussion draft incorporates a number
of provisions that may impact
U.S. positioning in the coming
months. Of particular note are
the international clean technology and international adaptation
provisions which are important
because: (1) they reflect the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities that
is essential to the existing international climate framework and
(2) they are considered essential to balancing the continuing
needs of developed countries
with the growth and development of emerging economies.3
Together these two provisions
offer a unique preview of the
U.S. position on important
issues as well as some insight into the U.S. posture on the governance structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”), the Kyoto Protocol, and the international
climate discourse generally.

our dangerous dependence on foreign oil, and combat global
warming.”5 Although the draft legislation may offer less concrete technology investment than previous climate bills or than
the Obama administration has advocated,6 it is real a starting
point for constructive U.S. engagement in both domestic and
international climate debates.7
In its 648 pages, the proposed bill includes two provisions
which can provide insight into the U.S. position on the international deployment of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies during post-Kyoto negotiations.8 First, the Exporting Clean
Technology subtitle creates the
International Clean Technology
Fund (“ICTF”) which acknowledges the importance of clean
technology export for combating climate change. It provides
“assistance to encourage widespread deployment, in developing countries, of technologies
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions”9 by funding projects that
“achieve substantial reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions
through deployment of low- or
zero-carbon technologies.”10
Second, the Adapting to Climate Change subtitle includes
an International Climate Change
Adaptation Program (“ICCAP”).
The ICCAP encourages and
facilitates the “deployment of
technologies that would help
the most vulnerable developing
countries respond to the destabilizing impacts of climate change
and encourage the identification and adoption of appropriate
renewable and efficient energy technologies that are beneficial
in increasing community-level resilience to the impacts of global
climate change in those countries.”11
The requirements and objectives of the Clean Technology
Fund and the Climate Adaptation Program shed some light on the
potential U.S. position in the upcoming post-2012 negotiations
which will likely include extensive discussion of international

The most vulnerable
developing countries
will likely be the hardest
hit by the impacts of
climate change. The
instability caused by the
disproportionate impacts
could potentially be a
threat multiplier for
global instability.

An Emerging Paradigm for the United States
in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations
On March 31, 2009, U.S. House Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman and Energy and Environment Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey released a discussion draft of the American Clean Energy and Security Act,
frequently referred to as the U.S. climate bill.4 They touted the
bill as “clean energy legislation that will create jobs, help end
Spring 2009
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adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer. In this context,
it is informative to consider the impacts of the discussion draft’s
basic framework in terms of the existing UNFCCC governance
structure and financial additionality requirements. This, in turn,
may provide some insight into the discussion draft’s implicit
statement on the successes and failures of the expiring Kyoto
Protocol.

Exploring the Climate Bill: Exporting Clean
Technology
The text of the discussion draft outlines the ICTF’s establishment, governance, country eligibility, funding, and reporting requirements.12 It would be administered by an interagency
group including: the Secretary of State as chairperson, the Secretaries of Energy and the Treasury, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and any other agency head
or executive branch appointee that the President designates (the
“interagency group”).13 Any project receiving money from the
ICTF must serve an identified purpose, be in an eligible country,
meet certain criteria, and funds must be distributed through a
specific mechanism. Depending on the fund distribution mechanism, the reporting and approval requirements are slightly different in form if not in function.14
As noted, the Fund’s purpose is to encourage widespread
deployment of GHG reducing technologies and assist that effort
in a way that encourages countries to adopt their own measures
to reduce emissions.15 Any funded project should “achieve
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through
the deployment of low- or zero-carbon technologies” and must
be included in one of several categories.16 Those categories
include: deploying carbon capture and sequestration technologies, deploying renewable electricity generation technologies,
achieving increases in energy efficiency, or reducing transit sector emissions.17 The interagency group would develop project
selection criteria that both achieve these goals and include certain required and preferred components.18 See Figure 1.
Any country eligible to receive assistance from the Fund
would first have to be identified as a developing country by the

World Bank.19 It must then be included on a list of countries
established by the President no later than January 1, 2012 based
on criteria including that the country “has signed and ratified an
international treaty or agreement that requires [it] to undertake
nationally appropriate [GHG] mitigation activities [and] . . . has
undertaken nationally appropriate mitigation activities that will
achieve substantial reductions in [GHG] emissions, relative to
business-as-usual levels, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner.”20
To achieve these goals, funding would be distributed by any
one or a combination of the following three mechanisms:
• Direct assistance;
• Agreements with the World Bank, multilateral development
banks (“MDBs”), or international development institutions;
and/or
• A UNFCCC fund or agreement negotiated under the
Convention.21
If distributed directly, the Secretary of State would be authorized to select projects and provide funding for eligible countries in
the form of grants, loans, or other aid.22 However, for funding distributed either through a MDB or UNFCCC fund, a mechanism would
be established that would apply and enforce the ICTF’s requirements including selection criteria.23 Regardless of who approves and
funds the project, rigorous reporting requirements would begin with
an initial report no later than March 1, 2012.24 Finally, it appears
that the Secretary of State would have the ability to unilaterally suspend funding for any project—funded by a domestic or international
fund—through a yet to be determined process.25

Exploring the Climate Bill: International Climate
Change Adaptation
The International Climate Change Adaptation Program is
clearly written with a different purpose than the International
Clean Technology Fund. Aside from the obvious distinctions
between funding clean technology and adaptation programs,
the underlying findings and purposes of the sections explicitly
touch on different objectives and needs. The Adaptation Program
is based on two general findings: (1) that the most vulnerable

Criteria for Project Selection: Clean Technology Fund
Required Criteria

Preferred Criteria

substantial, measurable, reportable, verifiable reductions in
GHG emissions relative to business as usual

maximize GHG emissions per dollar of assistance

no significant adverse effects on human health, safety, or
welfare, the environment, or natural resources

promise to achieve large-scale GHG reductions at the sectoral or
cross-sectoral level

the project owner/operator has demonstrated capacity to imple- have the potential to catalyze a shift within the host country towards
ment and maintain any technologies purchased or installed
widespread deployment of low- or zero-carbon energy technologies
the project will not cause any nret loss of U.S. jobs or
displacement of U.S. production
the project meets other reuiremnts of the interagency group
the project will be co-financed by the host coutry government,
private sector institutions, or a MBD
Figure 1. Criteria for CTF Project Selection.
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developing countries will likely be the hardest hit by the impacts
of climate change and (2) instability caused by these disproportionate impacts could potentially be a threat multiplier for global
instability.26
More explicitly, the ICCAP finds that the most vulnerable developing countries, with their lack of resource capacity to adapt, may experience extreme increases in poverty and
social and economic destabilization.27 Consequently, it is in the
national security, economic, and environmental interests of the
United States28 to assist these countries in developing resilience
to impacts on “water availability, agricultural productivity, flood
risk, coastal resources, timing of seasons, biodiversity, economic livelihoods, health and diseases, and human migration.”29
Furthermore, it is a U.S. obligation under the UNFCCC to provide funding that is “predictable, sustainable, and additional to
international agreed levels of overseas development assistance”
to aid in the cost of adaptation.30
Under the direction of the Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (“USAID”)31 the Adaptation Program would have two primary functions. One would be to engage
in research and fund aid programs with the goal of carrying out
adaptation programs in the most vulnerable developing countries.32 The second would be to mandate community engagement
through full disclosure of information, public participation, a
locally tailored consultation process, and, to the extent practicable,
alignment with the recipient country’s broader development, poverty alleviation, and natural resource management objectives.33 In
executing these functions, the program would establish fairly substantial and immediate reporting requirements.34
Interestingly, these reporting requirements would apply not
only to monies directly distributed by USAID but also to assistance through international adaptation funds35 “created pursuant to the [UNFCCC] . . . or an agreement negotiated under the
Convention.”36 Any project eligibility requirements would also
apply to a hypothetical UNFCCC fund. In order to comply, any
fund would be required to:
• Specify the terms and conditions under which the United
Sates is to provide monies to the fund and under which the
fund will disburse monies to recipient countries;
• Ensure that U.S. assistance to the fund and the fund’s principal and income are disbursed only for purposes adhering
to those specified in the Adaptation Program;
• Require a regular meeting of the fund’s governing body that
includes representation from the most vulnerable developing countries and provides full public access;
• Require that local communities and indigenous peoples in
areas where activities or programs are planned are engaged
through full disclosure of information, public participation,
and consultation;
• Spend not more than ten percent of the amounts available to
the fund in any single country in any year; and
• Require the international fund to prepare and make public
an annual report adhering to specific requirements.37
Examining the ICTF and ICCAP provides insight into preCopenhagen U.S. positioning not only by simply highlighting
Spring 2009

priorities but also through an evaluation of the implicit criticisms
of the existing framework’s governance structure and Party participation. Whether or not a climate agreement moves forward
this year, a frequent theme is present throughout both sections of
the discussion draft: preparation for participation in a UNFCCC
post-2012 climate negotiation and agreement.38

Existing International Framework:
UNFCCC & The Kyoto Protocol
The UNFCCC creates “an institutional framework for the
progressive development of the [climate] regime through protocols or amendments.”39 The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol, which
sets emission reduction targets for developed country Parties,40
expires in 2012. It has faced criticisms of its substance, enforceability, and the impact of its key market and its flexibility mechanisms, which include emissions trading, the Clean Development
Mechanism, and Joint Implementation.41
The UNFCCC “sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate
change.”42 Its objective is to stabilize GHG “concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”43 In order to
achieve this objective, Parties should protect the climate system
“on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”44 The
concept of equitable, global protection is reflected in the allocation of Parties’ voting rights. Unlike many other international
instruments or funding mechanisms, the UNFCCC gives each
Party to the Convention one vote—regardless of population or
financial status.45
Consistent with the concept of common but differentiated
responsibilities, the UNFCCC requires developed country Parties to “provide new and additional financial resources to meet
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in
complying with their obligations.”46 This financial additionality requirement should lead to increased support for technology
development, transfer, and deployment from developed to developing countries.47 In fact, many developing countries expect that
developed country Parties will increase their funding because of
the “moral and practical claim that [they] bear a much larger share
of the responsibility for historical and current greenhouse emissions, and have greater financial and technical resources.”48
The Kyoto Protocol also allocates one vote to each Party49
and requires “new and additional financial resources to meet the
agreed costs incurred by developing country Parties.”50 However, Kyoto goes significantly beyond the UNFCCC by creating quantified emissions reductions. It creates mechanisms to
achieve these goals, particularly the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), which is informative in this discussion since it
represents a significant facet of the existing UNFCCC structure
for expansion of clean technologies in developing countries.51
The CDM allows projects in developing countries to earn
emission reductions credits that can then be traded in a carbon
market.52 It also creates an alternative mechanism for developed
countries to meet their obligations without directly reducing their
54

own emissions, which is arguably more economically efficient.
Theoretically, this dual goal helps developed countries meet their
GHG emission reduction targets while stimulating sustainable
development and emission reductions in developing countries.53
However, the relationship between CDM projects and sustainable
development is frequently the subject of debate:54 does the CDM
help developing countries achieve sustainable development or
does it help developed countries
create low-cost emission reduction credits?55 Criticisms have
ranged from the actual impact of
offsets to the cost of reductions,
and from local environmental
integrity and community involvement to the CDM’s long term
viability as a mechanism to promote sustainable development.56
As the prelude to Copenhagen
continues, developing countries
are calling for more effective
technology transfer than the
CDM has yet achieved.57

new funding today, it may be difficult differentiate it from existing overseas development aid, which is ineligible to fulfill the
UNFCCC’s “new and additional” requirement.66
The ICTF could also create potential conflicts in terms of nonfinancial requirements and governance mechanisms. For example,
regardless of how or where monies are distributed, all projects
must conform to the Fund’s extensive selection criteria and reporting requirements.67 Thus, if funds
are to be distributed through an
agreement to be negotiated under
the UNFCCC there would be two
options for compliance. First, the
agreement would have to incorporate the explicit requirements
included in the U.S. legislation.
Or second, the agreement would
have to incorporate a mechanism
by which Parties could specifically approve and enforce unique,
individual requirements. On top
of the obligation to comply with
U.S. requirements, the discussion
draft incorporates a component
which may preclude any ICTF-funded project from incorporation
into an international fund: it appears to give the U.S. Secretary of
State the authority to unilaterally suspend or terminate assistance if
a facet of a project does not operate in compliance with its original approval.68 Not only does this appear to be an impracticable
demand to incorporate, but it also conflicts with the UNFCCC’s
themes of equity and the concepts of fostering sustainable development as defined by the host-country and encouraging local control
of internationally financed projects.
Finally, the ICTF’s requirements for identifying eligible countries could decrease the feasibility of distributing funds through an
international mechanism. It defines eligible country as a developing country that has already taken measures towards considerable
overall improvements and mitigation activities “that will achieve
substantial reductions [in GHG emissions]. . . relative to businessas-usual levels.”69 While this may make environmental sense, it
does not reflect the standards under which the UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol, or CDM programs should operate.70 The Convention
does not explicitly include guidance regarding the contributions
of developing countries to technology development,71 but the
recent Bali Action Plan recognizes the importance of developed
countries’ role in assisting developing countries with technology
finance and “taking into account social and economic conditions
[of a developing country] and other relevant factors.”72 Inflexibly
requiring a developing country to “prove itself” before becoming eligible for funding does not reflect a program created on the
“basis of equity and in accordance with . . . common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”73

Clean technology transfer
and climate adaptation are
among the most important
topics to be discussed
in upcoming UNFCCC
negotiations.

The Proposed U.S. Clean Technology Fund
& International Climate Change Adaptation
Plan: International Legal Implications
Clearly, the ICTF language was crafted considering the
expiration of Kyoto. “Not later than January 1, 2012, and annually thereafter, the President shall determine and publish a list of
countries eligible for assistance.”58 It goes on to require that an
eligible country must have “signed and ratified an international
treaty or agreement”59 and explicitly authorizes distribution of
assistance through a fund created pursuant to the UNFCCC or
agreement negotiated under the Convention.60 The Adaptation
Fund was also drafted with the existing international climate
structure in mind. It requires that 40–60% of its funding be distributed through an international fund created under the UNFCCC
or agreement pursuant to the Convention.61 Furthermore, it notes
that under the United States’ UNFCCC obligations, funding for
adaptation programs must be predictable, sustainable, and additional to existing overseas development aid.62

The International Clean Technology Fund
The ICTF presents several issues when considering how it
might fit into a UNFCCC framework. First and foremost, since
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and CDM all have additionality requirements,63 which is an extremely important point for
developing country Parties, it is safe to assume that a similar
requirement will be included in any future agreement.64 However, the ICTF includes no financial additionality language. This
is particularly significant since the ICCAP includes explicit reference to the UNFCCC additionality requirement.65 The difference may imply that it was intentionally excluded from the ICTF
subtitle. Further, the absence of additionality language leaves
some ambiguity as to whether or how it could fulfill any additionality requirements in a future protocol. Although it is clearly
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The International Climate Change Adaptation Plan
The ICCAP is more explicitly written to reflect current UNFCCC
and future protocol obligations. It includes specific reference to
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UNFCCC additionality requirements and requires a percentage of
assistance to go through a hypothetical UNFCCC or future protocol
fund. It does not include, however, specific language explaining how
or when its funding should be considered new and additional. The
inclusion of language in domestic legislation specifying an intention
that overseas development funding is new and additional pursuant to
the UNFCCC requirements is by no means required. But given the
longstanding confusion regarding how to determine exactly what is
new and additional and the requirement that donor countries “clarify
how they have determined that [resources are] . . . new and additional,”74 it would be good practice for a donor country to be explicit
about its intention upon creation of new funding.
The Plan’s requirements also invoke language of sustainable
development and community engagement.75 Although the goals
of adaptation programs and the CDM are certainly not analogous,
the language here appears to be aimed at addressing some of the
contentious issues identified in CDM implementation—issues
that inherently arise when developed countries fulfill international
obligations within the boundaries of developing countries. For
example, it requires quantifiable performance goals, the creation
of specific performance indicators, extensive, country-specific
community engagement, and alignment with each country’s
development goals.76 While these are laudable inclusions, there
currently are not mechanisms identified to further develop, define,
and implement these goals at an international level.
Much like the ICTF, the ICCAP subtitle would impose its
own to be established requirements, enforcement, and reporting
mechanisms equally on any project funded through an international fund. The ICCAP even goes a step further by outlining specific requirements for an eligible fund which include reporting,
governing body meeting, and eligibility standards. This is a bold
prerequisite for a hypothetical funding mechanism and has the
potential to create substantial ambiguities and enforcement challenges, as well as conflicts between negotiators, funding partners,
and the developing countries where the projects ultimately occur.
Finally, creating a haze over all of its requirements, the ICCAP
would have two overarching purposes. In addition to aiding the most
vulnerable developing countries in adapting to climate impacts, its
second stated purpose is protecting U.S. security interests.77 This
significantly changes the UNFCCC climate discourse and emphasizes the U.S.-centric focus of the entire legislation.78 While national
security may have become part of the global climate discourse, it
certainly not part of the existing legal framework. Focusing on U.S.
security interests will help a bill pass in the U.S. House of Representatives, but focusing on global political stability and its contribution to peace will be more significant at the international level, and
these things, arguably, are not too different.

The Proposed U.S. Clean Technology
Fund & Climate Change Adaptation Plan:
International Policy Implications
Despite the potential conflicts between the U.S. climate bill
and the existing international legal infrastructure and discourse,
it is important to acknowledge that the proposed legislation is
simply a discussion draft. As the United States re-engages in
the international climate debate,79 the discussion draft’s value
may be its insight into how and why these provisions strengthen
and clarify the U.S. position. In order for the 2009 Copenhagen
negotiations to be successful in creating a post-2012 agreement
many experts agree that “the United States must lead at home.”80
To achieve this, comprehensive domestic legislation to reduce
emissions is essential, particularly legislation that includes support for developing countries.81 By discussing this bill in the
U.S. Congress, the United States is beginning to indicate the
level of support it may be prepared to give developing countries
in the global fight against climate change. This bill could be read
as a first step towards to putting “a concrete and comprehensive
offer on the table.”82
In preparation for international negotiations, any domestic legislation must include international technology diffusion
and development which are increasingly considered essential
to combating climate change.83 This is particularly true where
international policy structures do not have full international participation.84 Including international technology provisions in
domestic legislation may be a signal that the United States is
prepared to go forward with negotiations even without full or
substantially equal international participation, a longtime roadblock to U.S. involvement.

Conclusion
Experts continue to identify countless “essential” points
to a successful Copenhagen outcome.85 Two recurring themes
are “actions by developing countries [and] finance for mitigation and adaptation.”86 The international technology provisions
of the discussion draft address those two concerns directly and
signal a potential shift in the U.S. policy outlook. While domestic legislation outlining technology and adaptation priorities is
important, it is equally important not to unilaterally impose U.S.
will upon the world. How the proposed provisions will function domestically must be more thoroughly developed. Perhaps
more importantly, how these policies will be incorporated into a
post-Kyoto agreement must continue to be a vital part of the discourse, since clean technology transfer and climate adaptation
are among the most important topics to be discussed in upcoming UNFCCC negotiations.

Endnotes: A Stop on the Road to Copenhagen
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2 Cheryl Hogue, A Climate of Change, Chem. & Eng’g News, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/87/8714gov2.html.
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Posting of Michael Wriglesworth to UN Climate Change Conference Blog,
http://en.cop15.dk/blogs/view+blog?blogid=1017 (Apr. 10, 2009, 14:20).
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Book Review
The Role of the Environment in Poverty
Alleviation
Edited by Paolo Galizzi
Reviewed by Melissa Blue Sky & Megan Chapman*

T

he nexus between poverty and environmental degradation—or framed more positively, between poverty
alleviation and environmental protection—is too often
ignored. For some, the two are seen as mutually exclusive and
contradictory goals. For others, they are so closely tied as to
be taken for granted. The Role of the Environment in Poverty
Alleviation speaks to both audiences through illustrations of the
myriad ways in which environment and development are linked.1
Tackling such a broad area, the book’s editor Paolo Galizzi does
an admirable job of organizing the collection of essays thematically and alternating among a variety of viewpoints, from theoretical debates to case studies of natural disasters and cutting
edge projects in social entrepreneurship.
This book is the result of a partnership between Fordham
University, The Nature Conservancy, and the United Nations
Development Programme (“UNDP”), which began a lecture
series on People and the Environment in 2005. The collection of
essays comes from the first in the lecture series, and draws from
a multitude of fields: international environmental law and development policy, natural disaster relief and planning, microfinance
and housing strategies, and legal empowerment of the poor. The
project—both the lecture and book series—fits the times, as both
poverty alleviation and the environment are explicitly listed in
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”),
which the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”)
and the UNDP have been working together to implement.
Although some of the essays are limited in scope to efforts by
particular organizations or projects, they provide interesting case
studies of successful linking of environment and development.
Fittingly, the first section of the book, entitled Poverty
Reduction and the Environment are not Opposing Goals, contains a sound critique of one prevailing view that incorporating
environmental protection into development will slow growth
and perpetuate poverty in developing countries. The late environmental economist, David Pearce, looks at the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (“EKC”) hypothesis, which asserts that countries
cannot protect their environment without sacrificing economic
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growth. Pearce contends that in concluding environmental
protection is a “luxury good,” EKC ignores negative impacts
on human health caused by environmental degradation, which
in turn decrease long-range growth. Moreover, EKC does not
acknowledge that some damage to the environment may be
irreparable or that alternative models incorporating environmental objectives into plans for development exist.
For Pearce, wealth includes human, social, and environmental capital, and using this measure, he suggests that while
per capita incomes are increasing in some developing countries,
per capita wealth in these countries is decreasing. This growth in
income paired with loss of wealth may be an indicator of unsustainable development, due in part to resource exploitation and
environmental contamination. Because the rural poor are disproportionately dependent on the ecosystem for their livelihoods,
they are likely to be driven into even deeper poverty as a result
of environmental degradation. To link environmental management with development gains, Pearce argues, environmental
policy and investment in environmental assets such as water and
sanitation, wetlands, and fisheries must incorporate the goals of
long-term local management of the natural environment.
While the first section broadly addresses why poverty reduction and the environment are not opposing goals, the subsequent
essays are organized around somewhat narrower themes: natural
disasters, information and education, and legal empowerment.
Of these, the first ties most closely to the book’s overall thesis: that poverty alleviation and environmental goals are interrelated and must be tackled together. Most interesting is the brief
study of the impact of the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast
Asia. After illustrating how the tsunami’s effect was felt disproportionately by the poorest populations, author Annie Maxwell
identifies the disaster’s environmental causes and consequences.
Where coral reefs, natural dunes, and mangroves were intact,
they served as natural buffers and communities suffered less.

*Melissa Blue Sky and Megan Chapman are J.D. candidates, May 2011, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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For example, in Sri Lanka, an intact coral reef made the difference between the tsunami coming inland 1.5 kilometers versus fifty meters, and killing 1,700 people versus no one. On the
other end of the spectrum, Maxwell argues, the recognition that
environmental impact should be part of disaster relief planning
came too late. For example, in the Aceh region of Indonesia,
over 120,000 homes were destroyed and needed to be rebuilt.
This tremendous demand for an immediate supply of lumber led
to illegal logging of one of the area’s few remaining rain forests. Similarly, poor coordination between relief groups led to a
huge surplus of small fishing boats to replace those destroyed in
Sri Lanka—without enough larger multi-daytrip fishing boats—
leading rapidly to overfishing of shallow waters.
As with many interdisciplinary topics, the breadth of the
issues and the overlapping cycles of cause and effect could overwhelm the reader if not for a few refreshingly pragmatic essays
and inspiring case studies. One that stands out is an essay by
three professionals involved in the World Conservation Union on
knowledge necessary to meet poverty alleviation. It focuses on

the process of “knowledge to action,” or methods that can help
to translate knowledge generated by academics and researchers into useful information for those who can put it into action
in developing countries, and promote information exchange
between practitioners.
Another essay offers a much-needed glimmer of hope: a
case study of social entrepreneurship by International Development Enterprises India (“IDEI”). IDEI adapted the drip irrigation system used on large commercial farms to be suitable to the
small farms common among subsistence farmers in India. The
modified product prioritizes affordability such that a poor, riskaverse farmer may see net benefits of his investment within one
growing season, and serves both poverty alleviation—increasing
crop yields and thus profits—and environmental benefits—by
reducing water consumption. While poverty and environmental degradation are often two components in a vicious cycle, the
IDEI case study and others offered in this book remind us that
creative approaches to development and environmental protection can and should yield positive outcomes on both fronts.
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Endnotes: Aquaponics & Landfill Methane Use continued from page 11
1

See generally Aquaponics.com, Information—Aquaponics Overview, http://
www.aquaponics.com/InfoAquaponics.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Overview] (noting that aquaponics is in its commercial infancy despite the
existence of fish farming and soilless plant culture in combination for thousands
of years).
2 See PracticalEnvironmentalist.com, What the Heck is Aquaponics?, http://
www.practicalenvironmentalist.com/gardening/what-the-heck-is-aquaponics.
htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
3 See Department of Energy, Landfill Gas to Energy for Federal Facilities: Fact Sheet, available at http://www.epa.gov/lmop/res/pdf/bio-alt.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009) (placing the birth of landfill gas capture for energy use in
the late 1970s).
4 See generally Overview, supra note 1 (describing how the problem of
removing nutrient rich water from an aquaculture system satisfies the need
for nutrient rich water in a hydroponic system); Energy Information Administration, Landfill Gas, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/
landfillgas/landfillgas.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (providing official energy
statistics compiled by the U.S. Government and stating that the landfill methane
that is captured and burned for fuel is prevented from leaching into the
atmosphere).
5 E.g., Eco-sphere.com, The Inside Story, http://www.eco-sphere.com/
aboutecosphere.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (advertising a closed,
interdependent ecological system as an educational tool for young people;
the system was first developed by NASA scientists as they attempted to create
self-contained communities for astronauts).
6 Steve Diver, National Sustainable Agriculture Information Service,
Aquaponics: Integration of Hydroponics with Aquaculture 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.attra.org/attra-pub/PDF/aquaponic.pdf (enumerating the
benefits of aquaculture’s use of wastes to fertilize plants situated above fish
tanks).
7 See id. at 1 (pointing out that “[g]reenhouse growers view aquaponics as a
way to introduce organic hydroponic produce into the marketplace, since the
only fertility input is fish feed and all of the nutrients pass through a biological
process”).
8 See What the Heck is Aquaponics?, supra note 2 (distinguishing deep water
aquaponics from reciprocating aquaponics by describing the differing plant
placement and comparing aquaponics to conventional agriculture and concluding that “. . . aquaponics is a huge water saver.”).

9

E.g., Overview, supra note 1 (proffering that a miniature ecosystem is created that benefits both the fish and the plants).
10 Center for Innovative Food Technology, Alternative AG Ventures –
Aquaponics 1, available at http://www.eisc.org/attach/aquaponics.pdf (articulating that farmers can profit from their hydroponic vegetables grown on less
than one acre of land).
11 See Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effect of Aquaculture on World Fish Supplies, 405 Nature 1017, 1018 (2000) [hereinafter Effect of Aquaculture] (presenting the pros and cons of fish farming and noting that tilapia can displace the
catches of some wild species such as cod, hake, haddock, and pollock).
12 Overview, supra note 1.
13 See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, GHG Data from
UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
14 Environmental Protection Agency, Landfill Methane Outreach Program,
http://www.epa.gov/lmop/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) [hereinafter
LMOP] (asserting that there are over 500 landfills that are good candidates for
methane capture and energy use).
15 See ScienceDaily.com, Greenhouse Gases, Carbon Dioxide and Methane,
Rise Sharply In 2007 (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.sciencedaily.
com/releases/2008/04/080423181652.htm.
16 See, e.g., GHGonline.org, Sources of Methane – Landfill, http://www.
ghgonline.org/methanelandfill.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (observing that up
to fifty percent of landfill methane emissions can be reduced through methane
recovery systems, including methane capture for energy production).
17 See LMOP, supra note 14 (clarifying that a small amount of non-methane
organic compounds are released in the decomposition process).
18 Id.
19 E.g., Chicago Climate Exchange, Landfill Methane Emissions Offsets,
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=222 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009)
(recognizing the offset potential of “[m]ethane collection projects that include
electricity generation,” which may qualify “based on displaced emissions”).
20 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 6, at 1 (lauding the benefits of aquaculture in
large part because of the symbiotic use of fish effluent and the bio-filtration that
the plant roots perform).
21 See Effect of Aquaculture, supra note 11, at 1019 (warning that tilapia fish
feeds often exceed the percentage requirement for the level of fish meal used
and that fish meal is produced from wild caught fish).
22 See LMOP, supra note 14.

Endnotes: Border Adjustment Measures in Proposed U.S. Climate Change Legislation continued from page 19
10

The Boxer Amendment died in a 48-36 vote against cloture on June 2,
2008. No further action has been reported on the Boxer Amendment to date.
An article published one day before the cloture vote on the Boxer Amendment
stated that “several senators are questioning why they are being asked to vote
on a lengthy substitute version of the bill that Boxer and her allies just introduced a week and a half ago.” Juliet Eilperin and Steven Mufson, Climate Bill
Underlines Obstacles to Capping Greenhouse Gases, Washington Post, June
1, 2008, at A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/05/31/AR2008053102471.html.
11 See Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. Title XIII, Subtitle A and
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th
Cong. Title IV, Subtitle A, Part 2. It should be noted that the Waxman-Markey
bill utilizes the border adjustment measure as a “backstop” to a more comprehensive free allowance mechanism for trade-sensitive, energy-intensive industries. In other words, under this bill, free allowances would first be provided to
such industries to ensure their global competitiveness. Should these allowances
not meet this stated goal, border adjustment measures would then be used.
12 See, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Response of the Pew Center
on Global Climate Change to the Committee on Energy and Commerce and
its Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, U.S. House of Representatives,
on the Climate Change Legislation Design White Paper: Competitiveness
Concerns/Engaging Developing Countries 2 (2008), available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docUploads/Pew%20Center%20on%20CompetitivenessDeveloping%20Countries-FINAL.pdf.
13 Nigel Purvis, Res. for the Future, Mind the Gap: The Case for Climate

59

Competitiveness Protection Authority 2 (2008), available at http://www.
rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-08-03.pdf.
14 See Elliot Diringer, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, The U.S.
Election and Prospects for a New Climate Agreement 4 (2008), available at
http://www.boell.de/climate-transatlantic/index-117.html. (“There is now an
emerging consensus in Washington that the United States should proceed with
mandatory action at home, with or without developing country commitments,
provided the legislation includes trade provisions to protect U.S. industry from
competitive harm by imposing like costs on energy-intensive imports from
countries like China.”).
15 Staff of H.R. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong., Climate
Change Legislation Design White Paper: Competitiveness Concerns/Engaging Developing Countries 1 (Comm. Print 2008) (“If the U.S. were to cap its
own GHG emissions without corresponding action by developing nations that
compete in global trade markets, the cost of producing some American products
would increase relative to those manufactured in countries without emissions
limits. As a result, U.S. industry might relocate to (or expand operations in)
countries that do not limit the emissions of their industries, causing both the
environment and the U.S. economy to suffer.”).
16 Id. at 2, 8.
17 Id. at 12.
18 Issues in Designing a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 16 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orzag, Director, Congressional Budget Office), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/orszag.pdf.
and
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Id.
See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 4 (Nicholas Inst.,
Working Paper no. 07-02, 2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf.
21 A “covered good” is defined as:
[A] good that (as identified by the EPA Administrator by rule
(A) is a primary product or manufactured item for consumption;
(B) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the good, a substantial quantity of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect
greenhouse gas emissions; and (C) is closely related to a good the
cost of production of which in the United States is affected by a
requirement of [the Boxer Amendment].
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1311(7). In § 1311(16), “primary
product” is defined as:
(A) iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass,
and fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, or industrial ceramics; or
(B) any other manufactured product that—(i) is sold in bulk for purposes of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions
generated in the manufacture of products by covered entities in the
industrial sector.
Id. § 1311(16).
22 “Comparable action” is defined in the Boxer Amendment as “greenhouse
gas regulatory programs, requirements and other measures adopted by a foreign
country that, in combination, are comparable in effect to actions carried out
by the United States through federal, state and local measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Commission.” The determination of
whether a country has taken comparable action will be based on the following
requirements, in compliance with applicable international agreements:
(i) A foreign country is deemed to have taken comparable action
if the Commission determines that (I) the percentage change in
greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the relevant
period is equal to, or better than, (II) the percentage change in greenhouse gas emissions in the United States during the same period.
The Commission will develop rules for taking into account net
transfers to and from the United States and other foreign countries
of greenhouse‐gas allowances and other emission credits.
(ii) If a foreign country it not deemed to have taken comparable
action under clause (i), the Commission will take into consideration,
the extent to which all of the following actions that have the effect
of limiting greenhouse‐gas emissions in the foreign country have
been taken during the relevant period, and that these actions have
been fully implemented, verified and enforced: (I) the deployment
and use of state‐of‐the‐art technologies in industrial processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and other energy
facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and appliances) and
implementation of other techniques or actions that have the effect of
limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the
relevant period; and (II) any regulatory programs, requirements, and
other measures that the foreign country has implemented to limit
greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Id. § 1311(4).
23 Id. § 1314.
24 Exemptions include foreign countries (i) that have been classified as a
least-developed developing country by the United Nations, or (ii) whose share
of total global greenhouse gas emissions is below the de minimis percentage
defined in the Boxer Amendment as “0.5% of total global greenhouse gas emissions for the most recent calendar year for which relevant data is available,
taking into consideration the annual average deforestation rate during a representative period for a developing foreign country.” Id. § 1316(b)(2).
25 Id. § 1316(b)(2).
26 Id. § 1316(b)(3).
27 Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1314.
28 Id. §§ 1314(d)(1)-(2).
29 Id. § 1316(a)(3).
30 The “general formula” is defined as:
[T]he international reserve allowance requirement, as described in
paragraph (1), for a compliance year is equal to the product obtained
20
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by multiplying (A) the national greenhouse gas intensity rate for
each category of covered goods of each covered foreign country for
the compliance year, as determined by the Administrator under paragraph (3); by (B) the allowance adjustment factor for the industry
sector in the foreign country that manufactured the covered goods
entered into the United States, as determined by the Administrator
under paragraph (4); by (C) the economic adjustment ratio for the
foreign country, as determined by the Commission under paragraph (5).
Id. § 1316(d)(2).
The “national greenhouse gas intensity rate” is calculated by the Administrator:
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(A), on a
per unit basis, in an amount equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (A) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and
indirect greenhouse‐gas emissions that are attributable to a category
of covered goods of a covered foreign country during the most calendar year (as adjusted to exclude those emissions that would not be
subject to the allowance submission requirements of section 202 for
the category of covered goods if manufactured in the United States);
by (B) total number of units of the particular covered good that are
produced in the covered foreign country during the same calendar
year.
Id.
The “allowance adjustment factor” is calculated by the Administrator:
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(B) in
an amount that is equal to 1 minus the ratio that (i) the number of
allowances, as determined by the Administrator under subparagraph
(4)(B), that an entire industry sector in the foreign country would
have received at no cost if such allowances were allocated in the
same manner that allowances are allocated at no cost under Titles V
through XI to the same industry sector in the United States; bears to
(ii) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect
greenhouse‐gas emissions that are attributable to a category of covered goods of a covered foreign country during a particular compliance year.
Id.
“Allowances allocated at no cost” are calculated by the Administrator:
[I]n an amount equal to the product obtained by multiplying—(i) the
baseline emissions level that the Commission has attributed to a category of covered goods of a foreign country; by (ii) the ratio that—
(I) the quantity of allowances that are allocated at no cost under
Titles V through XI to entities within the industry sector that manufactures the covered goods for the compliance year during which the
covered goods were entered into the United States; bears to (II) the
total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect greenhouse gas emissions of that sector during the same compliance year.
Finally:
[T]he Administrator shall apply an economic adjustment ratio of 1
for a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(C) unless
the Commission makes an affirmative decision to lower the ratio
in order to take into account all of the following actions that the
foreign country has taken during the relevant period, and that these
actions have been fully implemented, verified, and enforced—(A)
the deployment and use of state of the art technologies in industrial
processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and
other energy facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and
appliances) and implementation of other techniques or actions that
have the effect of limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign
country during the relevant period; and (B) any regulatory programs,
requirements, and other measures that the foreign country has implemented to limit greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1316(d)(2).
31 Id. § 1316(d)(1)(B).
32 Under this methodology, each importer would (i) determine for each covered foreign country the number of allowances that apply to the category of
covered goods manufactured and processed entirely in that covered foreign
country for that compliance year; and (ii) of the allowance requirements identified for particular covered foreign countries, apply the requirement that imposes
the highest number of allowances for the category of covered goods. The
Administrator may allow importers to apply an alternate method for establishing this requirement, but only if the importer demonstrates in an administrative
hearing by a preponderance of evidence that the alternate method will establish
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an international reserve allowance requirement that is more representative than
the applicable requirement. Id. § 1316(d)(8).
33 Such programs represent a “comparable action” if the Administrator certifies that the program (i) places a quantitative limitation on the total quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions of the covered foreign country in terms of tons emitted per year and achieves that limitation through an allowance trading system;
(ii) satisfies criteria established by the Administrator for requirements relating
to the enforceability of the cap and trade program, including requirements for
monitoring, reporting, verification procedures, and allowance tracking; and (iii)
is a comparable action. Id. § 1316(e)(1).
34 Id. § 1316(e)(2).
35 Id. § 1316(e)(2)(A).
36 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th
Cong. § 414(b) [hereinafter American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009].
Furthermore, a country will be determined to have:
[C]ommensurate greenhouse gas regulation if (1) the country’s
annual greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity (as described
in section 403(b)) for a sector or sub-sector is equal to or less than
the greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity for such sector or
sub-sector in the United States in the most recent calendar year for
which reliable data are available; or (2) the country has implemented
policies, including sectoral caps, export tariffs, or production fees,
that individually or collectively place a price on greenhouse gas
emissions from a sector or sub-sector that is at least 60 percent of
the cost of complying with title VII of the Clean Air Act in the
United States for such sector or sub-sector, averaged over a two-year
period.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 405(b)(2).
37 Id. § 414(a).
38 Id. § 416(a).
39 Id. § 415.
40 Id. § 416(a)(1)(C).
41 Id. § 416(a)(2).
42 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 411(1).
This section specifies “iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube),
aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass and
fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, and industrial ceramics” as “primary products.” It also provides a “catch-all” sub-provision covering
[A]ny other manufactured product that (i) is sold in bulk for purposes of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions generated in the manufacture of products [that were specifically listed
earlier].
Id.
43 Id. § 402(b)(1). Carbon leakage is defined as “any substantial increase (as
determined by the Administrator) in [GHG] emissions by manufacturing entities located in countries without commensurate [GHG] regulation, provided
that such increase is caused by an incremental cost of production increase in the
United States resulting from the implementation of title VII of the Clean Air
Act.”
44 Id. § 403(a).
45 Id. § 403(b).
46 Id. § 403(c). The direct compliance factor is equal to the “product of (i) the
output of the covered entity; and (ii) 85 percent of the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) per unit of output for all
covered entities in the sector or sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator
based on reports provided under subparagraph (C).” The “indirect carbon factor for an entity for a calendar year is the product obtained by multiplying the
output of the covered entity by both the emissions intensity factor determined
pursuant to clause (i) and the electricity efficiency factor determined pursuant to
clause (ii) for the year concerned.” The “emissions intensity factor” in a regulated electricity market is “the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the electricity purchased by the
covered entity, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided
under subparagraph (D).” “In a wholesale competitive electricity market, the
emissions intensity factor is the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the marginal source of supply
of electricity purchased by the covered entity, as determined by the Administrator `based on reports provided under subparagraph (D).” “The electricity
efficiency factor is 85 percent of the average amount of electricity (in kilowatt
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hours) used per unit of output for all covered entities in the relevant sector or
sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided under
subparagraph (C).”
47 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 405(b).
48 See id. Titles I and IV.
49 Also known as H.R. 1862, the bill was introduced on April 1, 2009 and was
referred to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1862, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
50 Id. § 2.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 S.3036, 110th Cong. § 6006 (2008). An important difference between the
Boxer Amendment and S.3036 is that the requirement for U.S. importers to
submit emissions allowances for the covered goods imported would have gone
into effect from January 1, 2020 under S.3036, meaning that there would have
been an eight-year delay between requiring emissions allowances from domestic manufacturers (which would commence in 2012) and from importers. In
contrast, the Boxer Amendment incorporates only a two-year delay between
domestic and international requirements, requiring importers to purchase and
produce emissions allowances beginning from January 1, 2014. A further
difference concerns how key terms in the border adjustment measures are
defined, thus having an impact on how these measures will be implemented
and enforced. Baseline emissions level used to calculate emissions attributable
to covered goods, and to determine whether comparable actions have been
taken, would be calculated as of 2005 levels in the Boxer Amendment, but as
of the period from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014 under S.3036. While
the Boxer Amendment specifically addresses the calculation of allowances for
goods from multiple covered countries, S.3036 does not. Further, under the
Boxer Amendment, the definitions of comparable action and the formulas to
be used by the EPA are far more developed and fully conceptualized than in
S.3036. For example, in contrast to the methodology described above in the
section on the Boxer Amendment, the methodology for calculating the international allowance requirements under S.3036 only covers the initial compliance
year, and is defined as “for each category of covered goods of each covered
foreign country” it is “equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (i) the excess,
if any, of the total emissions from the covered foreign country that are attributable to the category of covered goods produced during the most recent year for
which data are available, over the baseline emission level of the covered foreign
country for that category; and (ii) the total quantity of the covered good produced in the covered foreign country during the most recent calendar year.” Id.
§ 6006(d)(2)(A). The legislation is designed so that the allowance requirements
would be adjusted later:
(i) in accordance with the ratio that (I) the quantity of allowances
that were allocated at no cost to entities within the industry sector
manufacturing the covered goods fro the compliance year during
which the covered goods were imported into the United States, bears
to (II) the greenhouse gas emissions of that industry sectors; and
(ii) to take into account the level of economic development of the
covered foreign country in which the covered goods were produced.
Id. § 6006(d)(2)(B). While the Boxer Amendment’s methodology is more
detailed and complex, its basic principles are roughly the same as in S.3036.
55 H.R.6186 was introduced in the House of Representatives on June 4, 2008,
and referred to the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on
June 12, 2008. No further action has been taken on this bill. H.R. 6186, 110th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
56 H.R.6316 was introduced into the House of Representatives on June 19,
2008 and referred to the House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, Energy
and Research on November 19, 2008. No further action has been taken on this
bill. H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
57 However, there are some significant differences between the Boxer Amendment and H.R.6316 that are worth noting. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two is that, unlike the Boxer Amendment, which requires
imports from any foreign country not on the exempted list to submit emissions
allowances, H.R.6316 applies only to countries that are members, or observant
governments of, the WTO, defined in the bill as “WTO participants.” Imports
from countries that are not WTO participants are not regulated under this
legislation, and therefore efforts to limit GHG emissions and spread the cost
of regulation among nations do not extend to countries outside of the WTO.
Another significant difference is H.R.6316’s inclusion of provisions for negotiating agreements with WTO participants who are developing countries to
secure comparable action on GHG emissions, including offering countries will-
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ing to negotiate such agreements preferential access to the domestic U.S. carbon market. H.R.6316 § 115(b)(1). The preferential agreements could include
incentives such as the ability of the WTO participant to choose its base year or
its maximum GHG emissions limits for its system, rather than requiring it to
match the U.S. limitations in order to access the U.S. carbon market. Id. The
negotiated agreements would only be available on a “first-come, first-served”
basis, and would not be negotiated in a way that would breech this emissions
budget. Id. Finally, the requirement for importers to provide emissions allowances on imports from covered countries would begin from January 1, 2015
under H.R.6316, rather than on January 1, 2014 under the Boxer Amendment.
Therefore, H.R.6316 allows for a three-year implementation gap before implementing the border adjustment measure, rather than a two-year gap indicated
under the Boxer Amendment. H.R.6316. § 111(d)(1).
58 The GATT is incorporated into the set of agreements known collectively as
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which
entered into effect on January 1, 2005.
59 For instance, one line of cases suggests that the definition of “like” is
broader under Article III.4 than it is under Article III.2. See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – Asbestos”), ¶¶ 87-154,
WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001).
60 The Mercado Común del Sur (“MERCUSOR”), is a regional trade agreement in South America.
61 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (“Brazil – Tyres”), ¶ 232, WT/DS332/
AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
62 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“U.S. – Shrimp”), ¶¶
122-24, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 22, 2001).
63 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
64 See e.g., Statement of Joost Pauwelyn, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means,” March 24, 2009.
On page 13 of his written statement, Professor Pauwelyn refers to “a carbon
assessment on a product-specific basis by, for example, allowing an importer
to demonstrate the actual carbon-footprint of a specific batch of imports.”
(Emphasis in the original.)
65 TBT Agreement, supra note 63, art. 2.1.
66 Id. art. 2.2.
67 Id. art. 2.4.
68 Id. art. 12.
69 The Emission Migration Prevention with Long-term Output Yields Act
(“H.R. 1759”), introduced by Representatives Jay Inslee and Mike Doyle on
March 26, 2009, provides an example of the adoption of technical standards
in legislation designed to address GHG emissions. H.R. 1759, 111th Cong.
(2009). Although this legislation does not apply to imported goods, it does
apply to domestic industries in a way intended to defend against carbon leakage. Under the proposal, emission allowances would be distributed to industries
vulnerable to external competition as a result of the imposition of a cap-andtrade program. The allowances would be subject to a declining cap, which

would force industries either to adopt clean technologies and become more efficient, or, alternatively, to move operations offshore to avoid U.S. restrictions.
Given that the adoption of such technical standards to determine distribution of
emissions allowances could force less efficient manufacturers to relocate operations offshore, rather than adopt expensive, cleaner technologies, it is possible
that eventually, only the most efficient operators would remain in the United
States. The most efficient operators then would have to both increase expenses
to maintain efficiency and defend against competition from manufacturers who
have moved offshore and are able to produce at lower cost. In short, technical
standards, when not carefully applied, can have unintended consequences, and
when applied to imported goods they can trigger a TBT Agreement challenge.
70 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
71 The SCM Agreement permits WTO Members to take action against foreign
governments’ subsidies in two distinct ways. The first method is through direct
challenges that WTO Members may pursue before WTO dispute settlement
panels pursuant to Part III of the SCM Agreement, which may, if successful,
result in a WTO ruling requiring that the subsidizing WTO Member terminate
the subsidy program. Id. pt. III. The second method, authorized in Part V of the
SCM Agreement, is through the imposition of countervailing duties (“CVDs”)
on imported products benefiting from alleged subsidies. Id. pt. V.
72 Such a theory of subsidization would posit that the system norm is the government sale of emissions allowances to manufacturing industries. Thus, the
provision of allowances to some industries or entities would arguably constitute
a government decision to forego government revenue otherwise due. Id. art.
1.1(a)(ii).
73 This observation applies to challenges brought pursuant to Part III of the
SCM Agreement, for non-export contingent, actionable subsidies. Id. art. 5.
74 The Article 8.2(c) exception covered “assistance to promote adaptation of
existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or
regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms,”
subject to certain specified limitations. Id. art. 8.2(c). It seems this exception
might have covered a range of emerging clean energy technologies useful in
mitigating climate change.
75 See id. at Art. 31, concerning period of applicability of SCM Agreement
Article 8.
76 Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, Speech before a European Parliament
panel (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl91_e.htm.
77 While the levy of an internal consumption tax is also a possibility, it is likely
that a requirement to submit allowances would optically appear more permissible under the WTO.
78 So, for example, all suppliers of corrosion-resistant or stainless steel sheet
to a U.S. manufacturer of kitchen appliances would be required to submit emissions allowances for the steel products supplied to the manufacturer. However,
the suppliers would be able to obtain allowance refunds if they can certify that
the same amount of allowances were submitted at the point of production.
Alternatively, a prospective system utilizing a certification process may also be
considered.

Endnotes: Avoiding Derailment of Wind Power Development continued from page 20
1

John A. McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and Other Laws: the Wind Industry Collides With One of Its Own,
the Environmental Protection Movement, 28 Energy L. J. 71, 71 (2007).
2 See Press Release, BirdLife International, Position Statement on Wind
Farms and Birds (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.ornithologiki.gr/gr/
politiki/wind_birdlife.php.
3 See Gone With the Wind: Impacts of Wind Turbines on Birds and Bats:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, 110th
Cong. (May 1, 2007) (testimony of Mike Daulton, National Audubon Society
Director of Conservation Policy) [hereinafter Daulton], available at http://
resourcescommittee.house.gov/images/Documents/20070501b/testimony_
daulton.pdf (noting concern about the potential cumulative effects of poorly
sited wind farms on bird populations).
4 See American Bird Conservancy, American Bird Conservancy’s Wind
Energy Policy, http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/wind/wind_policy.
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html (last visited April 5, 2009) (describing avian mortality caused by collision
with the wind turbine structure or electrocution on power lines).
5 Daulton, supra note 3.
6 See Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Seeks Redress
for Massive Illegal Bird Kills as Altamont Pass, CA, Wind Farms (Jan. 12,
2004) available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/birdkills1-12-04.htm.
7 See Daulton, supra note 3 (asserting that the FWS “has not prosecuted a
single case citing a violation of wildlife laws against a developer”).
8 See McKinsey, supra note 1, at 75-79.
9 See id. at 88-89.
10 Id. at 77.
11 Cf. American Bird Conservancy, supra note 4 (detailing how global warming will cause “changes in the ranges of birds, disruption of migration timing
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and synchrony with food resources”); Daulton, supra note 3 (calling global
warming a “severe threat” to birds).
12 Joris Everaert & Eckhart Kuijken, Industrial Wind Action Group, Wind Turbines and Birds in Flanders: Preliminary Summary of the Mortality Research
Results (June 19, 2007), http://www.windaction.org/documents/11725.
13 Center for Biological Diversity, supra note 6.
14 Jennifer Bogo, How the Deadliest Wind Farm Can Save the Birds: Green
Machines, Popular Mechanics (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://www.
popularmechanics.com/science/earth/4222351.html.
15 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and
Natural Habitats, 1992 Europ. T.S. No. 104, Recommendation No. 109 (2004),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/conventions/bern/
Recommendations/Rec109_2004_en.pdf.
16 Press Release, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Save the Lewis
Peatlands (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www.rspb.org.uk/supporting/

campaigns/lewis/index.asp; see also, e.g., Michael McCarthy, Biggest Onshore
Wind Farm Plan Rejected, The Independent, Apr. 22, 2008, available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/biggest-onshore-windfarm-plan-rejected-813320.html.
17 Press Release, BirdLife International, Wind Farm “Whether Map” (Feb.
20, 2008) available at http://www.birdlife.org/news/news/2008/02/rspb_windfarms.html.
18 U.S. Dep’t of Int., Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Comm. Charter
(2007) available at http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/
Commitee_Charter.pdf.
19 U.S. FWS, Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Comm., Pre-Decisional
Second Release Draft of the “One-Text” from the Wind Turbine Comm.’s
Synthesis Workgroup, 13-14 (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/
habitatconservation/windpower/Second_Release_Draft_One_Text_FAC_
Briefing_3_13_09.pdf.
20 Id. at 3.

Endnotes: The Clean Technology Fund and Coal continued from page 24
17

World Bank, Clean Technology Fund: Investment Criteria for Public
Sector Operations 6 (2009) [hereinafter Public Sector Criteria], available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/CTFInvestmentCriteriarevisedcleanJan16.pdf (requiring proposals for investments to include an analysis of “the expected reduction in the cost of the technology due to technological
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Endnotes: Intellectual Property Rights to Enhance International Clean Tech Transfers continued from page 51
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See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Climate Change and
Human Rights: A Rough Guide 86 (2008), available at http://www.ichrp.org/
files/reports/36/136_report.pdf.
2 Financial Express, U.S. Says Lax China IPR Hampers Clean Tech Trade,
Jan. 9, 2008, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/us-says-laxchina-ipr-hampers-clean-tech-trade/259691/.
3 Gerard Wynn, Copyright Fear Hampers West’s Climate Work in China,
Reuters, May 16, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/funds
FundsNews/idUSL1655432720070516.
4 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (laying out Congress’s power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, § 1,
art. 45, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
6 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
7 E.g., id. art. 25(1), 27(1).
8 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Intellectual Property rights and Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution
2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocument [hereinafter
Human Rights Resolution 2000/7] (declaring that “there are apparent conflicts
between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other”).
9 Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 47, 55 (2003).

10

Human Rights Resolution 2000/7, supra note 8.
Douglas Clement, Creation Myths: Does Innovation Require Intellectual
Property Rights?, Reason, March 2003, available at http://www.reason.com/
news/show/28703.html.
12 See Patrick Avato & Jonathon Coony, Accelerating Clean Technology
Research, Development, and Deployment, 18 (World Bank Working Paper No.
138, 2008), available at http://www.esmap.org/filez/pubs/78200895253_
accelerating_clean_energy.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (noting that energy
research and development requires significant initial capital investment).
13 Jeffrey Sachs, Keys to Climate Protection, Scientific American (Apr. 2008),
available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=technological-keys-toclimate-protection-extended (acknowledging that patent protection may be a
double-edged sword).
14 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy 125 (2002), available at http://www.
iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf (noting that some
hope to one day have an international patent system with a single application
process).
15 World Intellectual Property Organization, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: An Overview, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2009).
16 See, e.g., T.K. Jayaraman & Baljeet Singh, Foreign Direct Investment and
EmploymentCreation in Pacific Countries: An Empirical Study of Fiji, 5 (May
2007), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp3507.pdf.
17 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 1, at 76.
11
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31, 2009), http://energycommerce.house.gov/ (select Newsroom hyperlink,
select New Clean Energy Legislation); see also Darren Samuelsohn & Ben
Gelman, House Democrats release draft energy, climate bill, N.Y. Times, Mar.
31, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/03/31/31greenwire-housedemocrats-release-draft-energy-emissions-10364.html.
5 See Press Release, Energy and Commerce, supra note 4.
6 See Posting of Jesse Jenkins to Breakthrough Blog, http://thebreakthrough.
org/blog/2009/04/new_climate_bill_proof_of_misp.shtml (Apr. 1, 2009,
9:55 PM) (“The draft Markey-Waxman climate bill is proof that the green
groups leading the climate charge won’t fight for investments in clean energy
technologies and a new energy economy. Instead, they’ll throw these critical
investments overboard to preserve precious regulations and an increasingly
compromised “cap” on carbon.”).
7 See Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Waxman-Markey Draft
Sets Stage for Climate Legislation (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.ucsusa.org/
news/press_release/waxman-markey-draft-sets-pace-0214.html.
8 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, discussion draft,
111th Cong., §§ 451-56, 491-96 [hereinafter Climate Bill], available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090331/acesa_discussiondraft.pdf
(establishing an International Clean Technology Fund and International Climate
Change Adaptation Program); see also Posting of Melanie Nakagawa to NRDC
Switchboard, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/mnakagawa/waxman_markey_
bill_shows_stron.html (Apr. 3, 2009).
9 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 451.
10 Id. at § 455.
11 Id. at § 455. See also Nakagawa, supra note 8 (outlining the some of the
benefits of the exporting clean technology provisions as providing “assistance
to encourage widespread deployment of clean technologies to developing
countries . . . specif[ying] that only developing countries that have ratified an
international treaty and undertaken . . . mitigation activities . . . are eligible
. . . establish[ing] an International Clean Technology Fund . . . [and identifying] criteria for project selection.”)
12 Climate Bill, supra note 8, §§ 451-60.
13 Id. at § 453.
14 See discussion infra, n.24, n.70 and accompanying text.
15 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 451.
16 Id. at § 455.
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Id. at § 455.
Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 455; see also Figure 1.
19 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 454.
20 Id.
21 Id. at § 455.
22 Id.
23 Id. at § 454.
24 Id. at § 456.
25 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 455.
26 Id. at § 491 (“[G]lobal climate change is a potentially significant threat multiplier for instability around the world . . . increasing hunger and poverty and
causing increased pressure on developing countries.”).
27 Id.
28 Id. (“[T]he consequences of global climate change . . . are likely to pose a
long-term threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economic interests
of the United States.”).
29 Id.
30 Id. (“[U]nder the [UNFCCC] and under the Bali Action Plan, developed
country parties, include in the United States, committed to provide ‘new and
additional financial resources’ to assist developing counties in meeting the costs
of adaptation.”).
31 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 492.
32 Id. at § 494.
33 Id.
34 Id. (establishing reporting requirements that begin no later than 180 days
after enactment).
35 Id. at § 495.
36 Id.
37 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 495.
38 Throughout the Fund and Adaptation Program text of the bill, there is
frequent reference to the World Bank and to existing or hypothetical future
international funds. For example, developing country is defined as “a country
eligible to receive financial assistance from the” World Bank. Climate Bill,
supra note 8, § 452. Distribution of assistance is authorized through agreements
with the World Bank, “other multilateral development banks, or international
development institutions.” Id. at § 455. Furthermore, the criteria for Fund
project selection require that any approved project be “co-financed by the host
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country government, private sector institutions, or a multinational development
bank.” Id. And explicitly, the Adaption Program language references the financial additionality requirement under the UNFCCC which has been controversial
in its enforceability particularly in light of recent developments with emerging
international funding mechanisms such as the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds. See generally, Addie Haughey, The World Bank Clean Technology
Fund: Friend or FOE to the UNFCCC?, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter
2009, at 57.
39 David Hunter et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 670
(2007).
40 See Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Hot Markets: The Future of the
American Legal Practice in the Regulation and Business of Greenhouse Gases,
16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 44, 45 (2008).
41 See id.; see also David Hunter et al., supra note 39, at 691 (explaining the
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that there has been considerable “debate over the technical rules to ensure the
flexibility mechanism are in fact leading to additional reductions”); and Commentary, Kyoto out of kilter, Christian Sci. Monitor, at 8, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1206/p08s02-comv.html?s=widep.
42 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] Website,
Essential Background, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/
items/2627.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
43 UNFCCC, art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
44 Id. art. 3.
45 See id. art. 18; see also Haughey, supra note 38, at n.57, n.58 and accompanying discussion.
46 See UNFCCC, supra note 43, art. 4, para. 3.
47 Taryn Fransen et al., World Resources Institute, Measuring the Way
to a New Global Climate Agreement 5 (2008), available at http://pdf.wri.org/
measuring_the_way_to_a_new_global_climate_agreement.pdf.
48 See Manish Bapna & Heather McGray, Financing Adaptation: Opportunities
for Innovation and Experimentation (forthcoming in 2009 in Brookings Institution, Climate Change and Global Poverty: A Billion Lives in the Balance?),
available at http://pdf.wri.org/financing_adaptation.pdf; see also UNFCCC,
supra note 43, art. 4 (requiring all Parties to develop, update, and publish
national inventories of anthropogenic emissions of GHG, cooperate in preparing for adaptation, promote scientific and technological research, promote
exchange of said scientific and technological research, among numerous other
commitments).
49 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, art. 11 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
50 Id.
51 See Morton Anderson, Saving up for the “Copenhagen Protocol,” COP15
United Nations Climate Change Conference Copenhagen (Apr. 9, 2009), http://
en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=1065.
52 See UN Env’t Program, Legal Issues Guidebook to the Clean Development Mechanism 6 (2004); see also UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties,
Report of the Conferences of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Decision 17/
CP.7, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Seventh
Session Report] (establishing that public funding for CDM projects must also
be additional and should not result in the diversion of overseas development
aid).
53 UNFCCC Website, About CDM, http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
54 See generally Karen Holm Olsen, The clean development mechanism’s
contribution to sustainable development: a review of the literature, Climatic
Change, Sept. 2007, at 59; see also Hunter et al., supra note 39, at 694.
55 See generally Joyceline A. Goco, Head IACC Secretariat, Presentation at
the First National Workshop on Capacity Development for the Clean Development Mechanism in the Philippines, The UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and an
Introduction to CDM, available at http://www.cd4cdm.org/Asia/Philippines/
First%20National%20Workshop/unfccckpintrotocdm.ppt; and U.S. Gov.
Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters No. GAO
09-151, International Climate Change Programs: Lessons Learned from
the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09151.pdf.
56 See Karen Holm Olsen, The Clean Development Mechanism’s Contribution to Sustainable Development http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/
CDM&SustainDevelop_literature.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009); Int’l Rivers,
Bad Day in Congress for the CDM (Mar. 6, 2009), http://internationalrivers.

71

org/en/blog/patrick-mccully/bad-day-congress-cdm; and Int’l Rivers & CDM
Watch, The Good, the Bad, and the Dammed Ugly (2003), available at http://
internationalrivers.org/files/gbduirncdmwatch.pdf.
57 See Fransen et al., supra note 47, at 5-6 (noting that one aspect of that call
includes redeveloping a governance structure that mandates that “any funding
not under the authority and guidance of the UNFCCC shall not be regarded as
the fulfillment of [financial] commitments by developed countries”); and Proposal by the G77 & China
For A Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/technology_proposal_
g77_8.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
58 Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 454.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at § 495.
62 Id.
63 See Seventh Session Report, supra note 52; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 49
and UNFCCC, supra note 43, art. 3.
64 In fact, after the CDM was created, it began requiring that public CDM
funding should not result in a diversion of ODA. See Seventh Session Report,
supra note 52.
65 See Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 491.
66 See UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conferences of the
Parties on its Fifth Session, Review of the Implementation of Commitments and
of Other Provisions of the Convention, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/7 (Feb. 16,
2000), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop5/07.pdf (establishing
that public funding for CDM projects must also be additional and should not
result in the diversion of overseas development aid).
67 See Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 495.
68 Id. at § 455.
69 Id. at § 454.
70 Live from the Wall Street Green Trading Summit, Red, Green, and Blue
(Apr.1, 2009), http://redgreenandblue.org/2009/04/01/live-from-the-wallstreet-green-trading-summit/ [hereinafter Life from Wall Street]. This is particularly troubling in the sense of offsets. Heather McGray et al., The World
Resources Institute, Weathering the Storm: Options for Framing and Adapting Development 27 (2007) [hereinafter Weathering the Storm], available at
http://pdf.wri.org/weathering_the_storm.pdf.
71 See Weathering the Storm, supra note 70, at 33.
72 UNFCCC, Provisional Agenda of the Ad Hoc Working Group on LongTerm Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Fulfillment of the Bali
Action Plan and components of the agreed outcome, Fifth Session, Note by
the Chair, Part II, Bonn, F.R.G.., Mar. 29-Apr. 8, 2009, UN Doc. FCCC/
AWGLCA/2009/4 (Mar. 18, 2009) 3, 17-22, available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2009/awglca5/eng/04p02.pdf.
73 UNFCCC, supra note 43, art. 3.
74 See Haughey, supra note 38, at n.49.
75 See Climate Bill, supra note 8, § 494.
76 Id. at § 496.
77 See discussion supra, n.27, n.28 and accompanying text.
78 See Live from Wall Street, supra note 70.
79 See Eilperin, supra note 1.
80 Roadmap from Poznan to Copenhagen – Preconditions for Success: Hearing before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming,
111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Elliot Diringer, Vice President, International Strategies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change) available at http://
globalwarming.house.gov/tools/3q08materials/files/0099.pdf.
81 Id. at 5.
82 Id. at 7.
83 Leon Clarke et al., Technology and International Climate Policy 1 (The
Harvard Project on Int’l Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-21, 2008) available
at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ClarkeWeb2.pdf (last visited Apr.
10, 2009).
84 Id. at 1-2.
85 See, e.g., James Russell & Janet Sawin, Help Wanted: International Climate Change Mitigation Seeks Leader, e2 – Eye to Earth, Sept. 25, 2007,
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5369 (indicating that China’s participation
is essential); Videotape Transcript: UNFCCC chief de Boer discusses U.S.
role in Copenhagen talks (OnPoint, Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/
tv/transcript/958 (identifying four political essentials for moving forward at
Copenhagen: clarity on how much industrialized countries willing to reduce
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their emissions, clarity on how much major developing countries like China and
India are willing to limit their emissions growth of their emissions; clarity on
finance will be essential to help engage developing countries in reducing emissions and adapting to impacts of climate change; and decisions on how money
will be managed).
86 See Roadmap from Poznan to Copenhagen – Preconditions for Success:
Hearing before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global
Warming, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written statement of Ambassador John Bruton, Ambassador to the Delegation of the European Commission to the USA)

available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/3q08materials/files/0100.
pdf; see also Conference of European Churches, CSC Briefing on the Commission Proposal for Post-Kyoto Negotiations (2009), http://www.cec-kek.org/
pdf/EuropeUpdate23PostKyoto.pdf; Andrew Keeler & Alexander Thompson, Industrialized Country Mitigation Policy and Resource Transfers to
Developing Countries: Improving and Expanding Greenhouse Gas Offsets 11,
16 (The Harvard Project on Int’l Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-05, 2008),
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/KeelerWeb4.pdf.

UPDATE
The following language should be added to the article
by Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden in SDLP’s 2009 Climate Law Reporter. This is an update to the Walker case
which was discussed in detail in that article. See Jacqueline
Peel & Lee Godden, Planning for Adaptation to Climate
Change: Landmark Cases from Australia, Sustainable
Dev. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2009, at 37, 39.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal,1 later overturned the decision of Justice Biscoe on a technicality,
finding that whilst the ‘public interest’ was an implied
mandatory consideration, the ESD principles were not.
The Court held that, although the Minister did not consider
ESD principles, that oversight only had relevance for the
inadequacy of a ‘public interest’ consideration, which was
a merits-based matter. The merits approach was to be contrasted to an overarching failure to consider the public interest at all, which would be susceptible to judicial review.2

Nonetheless, the majority of the Court stressed, ‘the principles of ESD are likely to come to be seen as so plainly an
element of the public interest, in relation to most if not all
decisions, that failure to consider them will become strong
evidence of failure to consider the public interest and/or to
act bona fide in the exercise of powers granted to the Minister, and thus become capable of avoiding decisions.’3 Thus
while the majority judgment set a steep threshold test for
declaring decision-making invalid, it does not preclude
ESD principles as a relevant consideration in determining
the public interest in climate change contexts.
Endnotes:
1

Minister for Planning v. Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423; [2008]
NSWCA 224.
2 Id. at 40, 41, 44.
3 Id. at 56.
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